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Abstract 
This dissertation examines how various debates within English Christianity shaped the feminist 
arguments of women writers of the long eighteenth century and the impact these women writers 
had on the mid-century sentimental novel. By analyzing the complex relationships between 
religion and feminism, this dissertation traces a tradition of female-authored theological 
discourse and argues that the most powerful feminist arguments of the period arose within 
specific theological contexts. My introduction considers the role religion played in shaping 
women’s writing of the long eighteenth century and connects the theological writing of the 
women analyzed in this study to mid-century discourses of sensibility. I examine the work of 
Damaris Masham and Mary Collyer, two writers who frame the central issues of this study. In 
Chapter One I explore the anti-clerical writings of seventeenth-century Quaker Margaret Fell, 
whose arguments for women’s spiritual equality arise out of her attacks on the oppressive 
Restoration Anglican establishment. In the latter half of the chapter, I examine the heated 
responses to radical Quaker women in the early eighteenth century to demonstrate how 
arguments about the role of women in Christianity proved crucial both to the philosophy of John 
Locke and to attempts to downplay the more radical aspects of Quaker doctrine. Chapter Two 
analyzes Mary Astell’s hostile responses to various strains of deism, especially her response to 
the third Earl of Shaftesbury, and argues that her High Church Anglican attacks on the often 
misogynist and socially exclusionary rhetoric of deist writers constitute a crucial aspect of her 
feminism. Chapter Three examines two distinct periods in the career of Catharine Trotter. The 
first section argues that Trotter’s witty appropriation of seventeenth-century Anglican anti-
Catholic polemic allows her to argue for her own religious and intellectual independence, and the 
second section demonstrates the importance of her synthesis of competing strands of British 
 ii
moral philosophy to mid-century sensibility. Chapter Four argues that the good-natured Christian 
benevolence of the protagonist of Sarah Fielding’s David Simple both critiques various 
irreligious philosophical systems Fielding viewed as harmful to women and supports an un-
gendered and non-doctrinal Christianity amenable to her feminism. The latter section of the 
chapter demonstrates how Fielding’s co-authored experimental novel The Cry enacts the 
anxieties earlier women writers like Astell express about emerging secularization. This study 
demonstrates the vital significance of religious debate to the feminist positions of women writers 
of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. It also illustrates how central these women 
were to the literature of sensibility of the mid eighteenth century. 
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Introduction 
This dissertation analyzes the feminist dimensions of women’s religious writing between 
the Restoration and the mid eighteenth century. Arguing for the significance of women’s 
religious texts in the discourses of eighteenth-century sensibility, this project examines Margaret 
Fell, Aphra Behn, Damaris Masham, Mary Astell, Catharine Trotter, Mary Collyer, and Sarah 
Fielding, writers who legitimized different modes of resistance to political and religious 
authority. In appropriating traditional religious rhetoric for their own ends, these writers 
challenged the masculinist presuppositions of Christian theology and English society during the 
period. They did so not simply to advance feminist arguments, but because, in their eyes, 
Christianity offered the only foundational support for women against an often predatory culture. 
In this respect, their religious writings complicate narratives that tend to equate women’s self-
consciousness with an anti-religious ‘Radical Enlightenment’ or with other accounts of 
secularization.  
This project examines a wide range of texts produced by women writers of the period, 
and the latter chapters link women’s religious and philosophical works to the emergence of the 
sentimental novel, especially through the work of Sarah Fielding. Fielding and Mary Collyer are 
important pioneers of sentimental fiction, and often their work is more concerned with 
philosophical speculation than narrative action. This dissertation situates both writers within the 
narrative of Christian feminism that preoccupied women writers during the period and that cuts 
across political and epistemological lines. This introduction, along with critically and historically 
situating the project’s argument, also ends by briefly analyzing two of these women writers, 
Damaris Masham and Collyer. The work of Masham in the late seventeenth century and the 
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work of Collyer in the mid eighteenth century frame the central issues of this study, including the 
importance of theological debate to both the feminism of these writers and the rise of sensibility. 
In an essay on Masham, Jacqueline Broad highlights the various pitfalls that affect 
scholars who study early modern women philosophers. As she notes, although it is crucial to 
incorporate these women writers into the canon by demonstrating “that they participated in the 
great intellectual debates of their time, and that they were perceptive critics of their famous male 
contemporaries,” this approach – which she memorably labels as the “add women and stir 
method” – is often “somewhat limited” because it can ignore historical contexts and less famous 
writers and thinkers.1 Moreover, according to Broad, “if we interpret women’s writings as that of 
‘surrogate men’ … then we may lose sight of the subtle divergences in women’s thought” even 
though “some of the most original and modern contributions from early modern writers … are 
their derivations of feminist ideas from the philosophies of their male contemporaries.”2 Broad is 
certainly accurate that some scholarship is too eager to subordinate women writers to their more 
famous male contemporaries. Many of the ideas that modern scholars would label as feminist 
from writers like Astell, Trotter, and Fielding arose from their discursive interactions with male 
philosophers and writers, although her labeling of these ideas as “derivations” is perhaps too 
strong. This dissertation, an analysis of the ways in which women writers articulated feminist 
arguments using the material of early modern English Christian theology, builds on Broad’s 
observation. Beginning with the work of Fell in the 1660s and concluding with the philosophical 
fiction of Fielding in the 1740s and 1750s, this study examines how early modern women writers 
took advantage of theological debate to argue for a variety of increased roles for women in both 
                                                 
1 Jacqueline Broad, “Adversaries or Allies? Occasional Thoughts on the Masham-Astell 
Exchange,” Eighteenth-Century Thought 1 (2003): 127. See also Broad, Women Philosophers of 
the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
2 Broad, “Adversaries,” 127. 
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the church and English society, and how their writings contributed to the sentimental novel in the 
mid eighteenth century. It does so through a close investigation of these writers’ philosophical 
and religious texts, many of which have been undeservedly neglected in favor of drama, poetry 
and fiction. 
Enlightenment Trajectories 
Although latitudinarian women writers like Masham and Trotter published complex 
theological works that synthesized and modified the philosophies of Locke, Samuel Clarke and 
others, they have been relatively ignored in scholarly discussions of the period. Several recent 
works, however, have begun to trace a genealogy of women, religion, and feminism of the 
Enlightenment. Karen O’Brien’s Women and Enlightenment in Eighteenth-Century Britain 
provides a welcome corrective to earlier studies of feminism that overemphasized Tory 
opponents of Whiggish notions of civil government like Astell and Behn. As O’Brien suggests, 
much of this overemphasis derives from Carole Pateman’s influential account in her 1988 The 
Sexual Contract: Aspects of Patriarchal Liberalism of the ways that liberal ideas of government, 
derived from Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, prohibit women from the political sphere.3 
In contrast, O’Brien offers a much more nuanced study of the continuities and disagreements 
between women writing from “different Christian epistemologies.”4 She focuses on the ways 
women writers crafted feminist arguments from within a Whiggish Anglican tradition, arguing 
“that Whiggism, in its political and established religious forms, was not … inherently 
antipathetic to arguments promoting the status and rights of women, and that it was in fact, in the 
                                                 
3 See Karen O’Brien, Women and Enlightenment in Eighteenth-Century Britain (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2009), 8-9. 
4 O’Brien, Women, 44. 
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longer run, the medium in which such arguments most flourished.”5 Although she largely 
examines what she terms “Anglican Whig feminism,” she is cognizant of avoiding “framing a 
Whiggish narrative,” and demonstrates, like Broad and other scholars such as Rachel Weil, the 
similarities between competing religious and political traditions.6 Focusing on Masham and 
Trotter in the early eighteenth century, O’Brien shapes a persuasive narrative that places Trotter 
between Masham and the mid-century Bluestockings, Catharine Talbot, Elizabeth Carter, and 
Elizabeth Montagu. As useful as O’Brien’s study is, she has little to say about the contributions 
of seventeenth-century dissenting women, and she does not mention Quakers. Moreover, her 
large-scale examination obscures some of the important shifts in the thought of writers like 
Trotter; she has little discussion of Trotter’s Catholicism before 1707, for example, which I 
discuss in Chapter Three.  
In contrast to O’Brien’s wide-ranging study of women and the Enlightenment, Sarah 
Apetrei’s recent Women, Feminism and Religion in Early Enlightenment England offers a 
focused and penetrating account of the seventeenth and early-eighteenth-century origins of 
feminism. Apetrei examines the period from 1680 to 1710, and especially the explosion of 
feminist texts published in the 1690s. She argues “that the impulse for moral reform and the 
apocalyptic fervour which surrounded the Williamite Revolution acted as a catalyst [for the 
emergence of feminism in England], stimulating unprecedented numbers of women to intervene 
in debates about religion, marriage and education.”7 Unlike O’Brien, Apetrei devotes equal time 
to Anglican writers like Astell and sectarians like Jane Lead. Indeed, Apetrei argues that much 
                                                 
5 O’Brien, Women, 36. 
6 O’Brien, Women, 35, 9. See Rachel Weil, Political Passions: Gender, the Family and Political 
Argument in England, 1680-1714 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000). 
7 Sarah Apetrei, Women, Feminism and Religion in Early Enlightenment England (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010), 9. 
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modern scholarship “reinforces … an artificial dichotomy between humanist traditions and the 
literature of radical spiritualism.”8 Consequently, she argues, scholars “have tended to accept the 
intellectual segregation imposed by seventeenth-century commentators on enthusiasm and 
rationalism, and favoured the conclusion that the two feminist types grew out of totally different 
soil.”9 Apetrei traces the many continuities in thought between these two “feminist types,” 
focusing the first half of her study almost exclusively on Astell and the latter half on Quaker, 
Philadelphian, and other visionary women. Her examination of feminist religious writing from 
such a diverse group of women writers demonstrates their enormous contribution to both 
feminism and Enlightenment thought. Because the period she studies is so narrow, Apetrei is 
able to tease out the complex theological influences and contributions of the writers she 
examines; however, because of her narrow focus and the attention she devotes to Astell, there is 
little discussion of latitudinarian women writers like Masham and Trotter in her study. 
Efforts to trace the aspects of the Enlightenment that inaugurated feminist thought lead 
inevitably to debates about the impact of Cartesianism – as well as the role of the so-called 
‘Radical Enlightenment’ – on emerging feminism. Citing François Poulain de la Barre’s 
remarkable Cartesian feminist texts of the 1670s, Jonathan Israel maintains that “Cartesianism … 
produced the first systematic theory arguing for the equality of women.”10 Israel, however, also 
demonstrates how Cartesianism could be used to argue against ideas of female equality, and 
posits that “only monist systems could supply criteria capable of consistently underpinning a 
                                                 
8 Apetrei, Women, 20. 
9 Apetrei, Women, 34. 
10 Jonathan Israel, Enlightenment Contested: Philosophy, Modernity, and the Emancipation of 
Man 1670-1752 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 572. See also Jonathan Israel, Radical 
Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2002). 
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comprehensive doctrine of female equality.”11 As he does with the majority of his arguments for 
the role of a ‘Radical Enlightenment,’ Israel looks to the influence of Spinoza: “Spinozism in 
particular could combine criticism of tradition, conventional morality and existing structures of 
authority with the independent critical thinking urged by Cartesianism, in such a manner as to 
ground a more balanced female equality.”12 While rightly pointing out the limits of Cartesian 
influences on emergent feminism, Israel’s broad category of “female equality” is somewhat 
problematic. Women writers of the period argued for a wide range of political and religious 
positions, not all of which fit easily under an expansive “equality,” and because Israel focuses 
almost exclusively on male writers, he does not consider the impact of Cartesianism on English 
women writers of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. These women, while 
amenable to Cartesian ideas of reason divorced from gendered assumptions of feminine 
weakness, were skeptical of the emancipatory power of his dualism and any ideas tainted by 
Spinoza and other radical writers. Jacqueline Broad analyzes the influence of Cartesian 
philosophy on Astell, Masham, Trotter and others, and argues against earlier “interpretive 
literature on early modern women [that] credits Cartesianism with providing both the inspiration 
and the subject matter for their intellectual writings.”13 Instead, she argues that these women 
“find inspiration in the new Cartesian conception of reason, but they are also critical of other 
aspects of Cartesian philosophy – particularly its metaphysical doctrines.”14 Indeed, what this 
dissertation demonstrates is that what an emphasis on the role played by Descartes and his more 
radical followers on nascent feminism obscures is the central place of Christianity. As Apetrei 
observes, “Descartes remains … the main backdrop to intellectual feminism in the late 
                                                 
11 Israel, Enlightenment, 576. 
12 Israel, Enlightenment, 576. 
13 Broad, Women Philosophers, 5. 
14 Broad, Women Philosophers, 12. 
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seventeenth-century,” and as a result, “religious arguments which many women used in their 
defences are sometimes presented as digressions, as apologetic commodities which were 
necessary but essentially marginal.”15 Apetrei is correct that religious arguments, far from being 
“marginal,” were instead the most essential component of the feminism of the late seventeenth 
and early eighteenth century. Moreover, it was their participation in intricate and complex 
theological debates that motivated these women writers to articulate feminist positions, and these 
religious arguments provided the foundation for their feminism. 
Latitudinarian Feminism and Literature of Sensibility 
In her analysis, O’Brien emphasizes how important ideas of Christian benevolence were 
to women writers of the early Enlightenment. Rejecting Calvinist ideas of fundamental human 
depravity, Trotter, for example, believed that men and women were instinctually benevolent, and 
that this benevolence motivated humans toward affective social bonds and against atomistic 
notions of selfish individualism.16 O’Brien argues that most of the women she locates in her 
narrative of an Anglican Whig Feminism “came to understand benevolence neither as a delusion 
of egotism nor as a potential distraction from the duty to love God, but as the main business of a 
virtuous, socially purposeful life,” and that “the word benevolence … came to endow the moral 
agency of women with public significance.”17 Natural benevolence also became the lynchpin of 
literature of sensibility, especially as it arose in the 1740s from two female pioneers, Mary 
Collyer and Sarah Fielding. Theological debate, especially about the proper role of benevolence 
in Christianity, was the most significant motivating factor for the literature of sensibility as it was 
inaugurated by Fielding and Collyer. In her study of sensibility, Janet Todd regards benevolence 
                                                 
15 Apetrei, Women, 36. 
16 O’Brien, Women, 38. 
17 O’Brien, Women, 39. 
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as a critical term of “sentimental doctrine,” as does R.F. Brissenden.18 The motivating idea, then, 
for arguably both the most important strain of feminism and one of the central literary 
phenomenons of the eighteenth century was the same: an active social benevolence, partly drawn 
from latitudinarian Anglicanism and British moral philosophy. 
Although it affected many areas of British culture in the mid to late eighteenth century, 
sensibility was chiefly shaped by literary works.19 There is some degree of scholarly 
disagreement about the use and interchangeability of the terms ‘sensibility’ and ‘sentiment’ or 
‘sentimental literature.’ Todd notes that in literary criticism the two terms often seem to be 
synonymous, but she makes a slight distinction between them, noting that a “’sentiment’ is a 
moral reflection, a rational opinion usually about the rights and wrongs of human conduct; the 
early eighteenth-century novel of sentiment is characterized by such generalized reflections.”20 
As a consequence, Todd argues that the “novel of sentiment of the 1740s and 1750s praises a 
generous heart and often delays the narrative to philosophize about benevolence; the novel of 
sensibility, increasingly written from the 1760s onwards, differs slightly in emphasis since it 
                                                 
18 Janet Todd, Sensibility: An Introduction (London: Methuen, 1986), 5; R.F. Brissenden, Virtue 
in Distress: Studies in the Novel of Sentiment from Richardson to Sade (London: Macmillan, 
1974). On the other hand, citing Hume’s “uneven use of ‘benevolence,’” John Mullan disagrees 
with the emphasis placed on “ideologies of benevolence” by “those who have sought to connect 
the discourses of moral philosophy with those of narrative fiction in this period,” and instead 
argues that “much of what is called ‘sentimental’ fiction actually depicts benevolence as a 
limited and exceptional propensity.” Sentiment and Sociability: The Language of Feeling in the 
Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 39-40. As he acknowledges, however, 
there is an important distinction between Hume’s more secular understanding of benevolence 
and those who relied on Christianity to naturalize benevolence: “The absence of religious 
reference from Hume’s accounts of fellow-feeling precludes the kind of naturalization of 
benevolence to be found in the work of some of his contemporaries” (40). Moreover, Mullan’s 
account of benevolence in fiction is limited to only a few canonical works (144-6). 
19 Todd, Sensibility, 4. 
20 Todd, Sensibility, 7. 
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honours above all the capacity for refined feeling.”21 As useful as Todd’s distinction is, in 
practice it is hard to place. Sensibility was a diffuse cultural phenomenon, and, as Todd writes, 
the “sentimental text is necessarily fragmented.”22 The result of this fragmentation is that 
locating meaningful differences between sentiment and sensibility based on appeals to rational 
reflection on the one hand and instinctual affective response on the other are problematic. More 
recent studies of the eighteenth-century novel continue to use the terms more or less 
synonymously. In her recent study of eighteenth-century fiction, Patricia Meyer Spacks uses both 
synonymously, writing, “[f]or several decades, the sentimental novel, or novel of sensibility, 
flourished in England (as well as on the Continent).”23
In his classic study of sensibility, G.J. Barker-Benfield interrogates the idea of a “Cult of 
Sensbility,” and argues that “[i]f sensibility was a form of religion, the evidence suggests it was 
overwhelmingly a religion of women.”24 Barker-Benfield is of course using the term ‘religion’ 
loosely, but, as his study demonstrates, sensibility was largely concerned with reconsidering the 
role of women in English society with the larger goal of reforming male behavior: “Women’s 
minds, bodies, and domestic spaces were [sensibility’s] sanctums ... where it could be 
consolidated and developed into self-consciousness and authoritative convention, before issuing 
outward in demands for heterosocial politeness and, eventually, reform.”25 Sensibility thus 
partook of the same reforming energies that Apetrei demonstrates stimulated women’s 
religiously motivated feminist interventions in the late seventeenth century. Barker-Benfield 
                                                 
21 Todd, Sensibility, 8. 
22 Todd, Sensibility, 104. 
23 Patricia Meyer Spacks, Novel Beginnings: Experiments in Eighteenth-Century English Fiction 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 127. 
24 G.J. Barker-Benfield, The Culture of Sensibility: Sex and Society in Eighteenth-Century 
Britain (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 262. 
25 Barker-Benfield, Culture, 262-3. 
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briefly discusses Astell, but does not mention the philosophical writing of Trotter or Masham, 
nor does he discuss Sarah Fielding, who shaped the form of sentimental literature. Although he 
notes that Astell “attacked Shaftesbury,” while talking about the relationship of her rejection of 
Lockean epistemology and embrace of Platonism to her feminism, he argues that the “linking of 
sensationalism to male appetite is one clue in understanding the appeal of Cambridge Platonism 
and its derivatives in the ensuing sentimental culture of women, including its embrace of 
Shaftesbury and romanticism.”26 While he is correct about Astell’s emphasis on Platonism, it is 
not at all clear that women associated with sensibility embraced Shaftesbury; indeed, Astell’s last 
work was a fervent attack on Shaftesbury, and Trotter and Fielding both rejected Shaftesburian 
philosophy because of its irreligious associations. Likewise, several of the Bluestockings were 
very ambivalent about Shaftesbury.27 Although Shaftesbury’s Characteristicks is recognized as 
one of the crucial texts undergirding sensibility, particularly as an influence on Francis 
Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam Smith, it was rarely uncritically accepted by women writers 
because of its supposed anti-Christian character. 
Both Fielding and Collyer pioneered the sentimental novel by establishing perhaps its 
most important characteristic, the so-called ‘Man of Feeling.’ As he is manifested in fiction from 
the 1740s to the 1770s, the man of feeling practiced many of the ideals important to ideologies of 
sensibility. In his study of the ‘Good-Natured Man’ in literature of the long eighteenth century, 
                                                 
26 Barker-Benfield, Culture, 194, 195. 
27 In a letter to Catherine Talbot in 1744, Elizabeth Carter writes of Shaftesbury that he “surely 
… had some as wrong and dangerous [principles] as ever mingled their ill influence with a fine 
genius.” Carter responds in the following letter, that she “perfectly forgive[s] … any censure on 
my Lord Shaftesbury, for one half of his works I never read, and the other half I have forgot.” 
See A Series of Letters Between Mrs. Elizabeth Carter and Miss Catharine Talbot, From the 
Year 1741 to 1770, ed. Montagu Pennington, 4 vols. (London: 1809), 1:79 and 1:82. For a 
consideration of Shaftesbury’s influence on the mid-century Bluestockings, see O’Brien, 
Women, 56-67.  
 10
John K. Sheriff incorporates the Man of Feeling into his larger category of the Good-Natured 
Man. Arguing for a direct influence among theology, philosophy, and literature, Sheriff writes: 
The Good-Natured Man character type is both the product and the device of those 
ministers, philosophers, and artists who reevaluated human nature and tried to restore or 
preserve belief in the value of moral goodness by giving it a basis in nature. The 
characteristics and qualities of the Good-Natured Man were first defined by the 
Latitudinarian divines. Then Shaftesbury demonstrated that, theoretically, if all these 
characteristics were embodied in one person, that person would live happily and 
harmoniously with his own physical, psychological, and spiritual nature, with his society, 
and with the natural universe. The writers of belles lettres brought the Good-Natured Man 
to life as a character, placed him in society, and recorded his joy, conflicts, successes, and 
failures.28
Sheriff traces The Good-Natured Man to its origins in both latitudinarian Anglicanism and moral 
philosophy derived in large part from Shaftesbury.29 His background discussion, however, has 
no mention of women philosophers or theologians, and he spends almost no time analyzing the 
fiction of Fielding and Collyer (Collyer does not even appear in the index). Sheriff’s omissions 
are problematic, because, as Gerard A. Barker argues, “[i]n [Sarah Fielding’s] David Simple and 
its sequel, Volume the Last (1753), we can, in fact, see the beginning of the complex impact 
benevolence and sensibility, ideals embodied in the Man of Feeling, were destined to have on the 
novel,” and that “[t]ogether with Lucius Manley, the hero of Mary Collyer’s Felicia to Charlotte 
(1744), David Simple shares the distinction of being one of the two earliest examples of the Man 
                                                 
28 John K. Sheriff, The Good-Natured Man: The Evolution of a Moral Ideal, 1660-1800 
(University, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1982), x-xi. 
29 Sheriff, Good-Natured, 1-18. 
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of Feeling in English fiction.”30 Moreover, as this dissertation demonstrates, both Fielding and 
Collyer were influenced by latitudinarian thought, and well versed in Locke and Shaftesbury. 
Later studies of religion and eighteenth-century literature perpetuate Sheriff’s exclusions. Patrick 
Müller’s more recent study of latitudinarianism and eighteenth-century literature, for example, 
likewise has no consideration of either women philosophers or novelists.31
Chapter Summaries 
This dissertation begins by analyzing women and the Religious Society of Friends in 
Chapter One. I first consider Margaret Fell, the so called “Mother of Quakerism,” and argue that 
her sectarian anti-clericalism forms the basis of her feminism. Fell’s arguments for women’s 
right to preach arise out of her theological attacks on the Restoration Anglican establishment that 
oppressed and imprisoned her and almost all of the Quaker leadership in the 1660s. Fell is an 
early example of a woman writer able to intervene in meaningful ways in specific theological 
controversies to advocate for the rights of women. I situate Fell’s arguments for women’s role in 
her religion in the context of other Quaker writers, both male and female, who made related 
arguments in the face of often extreme oppression. I then turn to a Society of Friends’ pamphlet 
debate in the early eighteenth century both to demonstrate the importance of Locke to the 
Friends and to show how women formed the largest obstacle to Quaker attempts to normalize 
their doctrine to the Church of England. By the early eighteenth century, Quakers had lost much 
of the sectarian fervor that characterized their writings after the Restoration, and although this 
loss did not necessarily lessen their theological commitments, it did result in divergences in their 
thought about how to incorporate many of their earlier more radical stances. One surprising 
                                                 
30 Gerard A. Barker, “David Simple: The Novel of Sensibility in Embryo” Modern Language 
Studies 12, no. 2 (1982): 69. 
31 Patrick Müller, Latitudinarianism and Didacticism in Eighteenth-Century Literature: Moral 
Theology in Fielding, Sterne, and Goldsmith (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2009). 
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manifestation of this phenomenon is their reliance on Locke, the representative of a rational and 
restrained latitudinarian Anglicanism, in their attempts to better situate themselves in English 
culture. This chapter also analyzes Astell’s brief, but tantalizing, acknowledgment of the 
influence of dissenting women. Although Astell and other Anglican women writers like Masham 
and Trotter seldom mention the feminist path blazed by Fell after the Restoration, I argue that 
Fell initiates the method of using theological debate to argue for an enlarged role for women in 
English society. Moreover, I demonstrate that although some of her claims are characterized by 
the apocalyptic and millenarian rhetoric employed by her dissenting contemporaries, most of her 
arguments in favor of women anticipate those made by Astell, Masham, and Trotter. 
Chapter Two scrutinizes Mary Astell’s attacks on various deist ideologies and argues that 
these critiques formed an essential part of her feminist understanding of High Church 
Anglicanism. Astell’s longest and arguably most important work, her 1705 The Christian 
Religion, was primarily motivated by an anonymously published radical pamphlet, A Lady’s 
Religion, which argued that Christianity should be simple enough to be understood by women. 
From their earliest manifestations, arguments for deism invoked claims about women’s weaker 
reason and supposed inability to understand complex Christian theology. I argue that Astell’s 
recognition of the misogynistic foundation of deistic arguments was one of the most important 
motivations for her Tory High Church feminism. Her attacks on deism form the core of two of 
her most important works in the first decade of the eighteenth century. In addition to her 1705 
The Christian Religion, she also attacked the deism of Shaftesbury in her last published work, 
Bart’lemy Fair (1709). Throughout her work, Astell advances the powerful argument that 
Christianity is the greatest moral and sociopolitical support for English women. Astell’s rejection 
of deism complicates narratives of secularization that see deism as one of the most crucial 
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eighteenth-century stages on the way to modernity and doctrines of women’s equality. Astell did 
not equate the gradual lessening of the Bible’s authority in the eighteenth century with an 
enlargement of women’s rights; on the contrary, she argued that only the Bible properly 
interpreted could adequately sustain feminist arguments. 
Chapter Three examines two distinct periods in the philosophical career of Catharine 
Trotter: her conversion from Catholicism to Anglicanism in 1707 and her later moral philosophy. 
Like Fell, Astell, and Masham, Trotter’s engagement in detailed theological debate gave her the 
opportunity to advocate for her own interpretations of Christianity agreeable with her feminist 
positions. In particular, her conversion to latitudinarian Anglicanism opened a space for her to 
articulate her own rational understanding of religion, amenable to her feminism. Her conversion 
was also bound up with her attempts to ward off the sexual advances of the zealous Anglican, 
Thomas Burnet. Trotter (whose married name after 1708 was Cockburn) also wrote several 
important works of moral philosophy from the 1720s to the 1740s. The latter half of this chapter 
situates her moral thought in relation to Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. Trotter’s moral philosophy 
influenced other mid-century writers, both male and female, and her writings were seen as 
important enough to merit a collected works published by Thomas Birch in 1751. 
This dissertation concludes with an examination of several of Sarah Fielding’s novels. 
Chapter Four begins by demonstrating the importance of a theologically minimalist Christianity 
to both The Adventures of David Simple (1744) and its sequel Volume the Last (1753). This 
chapter also looks at Fielding’s theological relationships to her brother Henry and her friend 
Samuel Richardson, and in doing so establishes her as an essential pioneer of literature of 
sensibility. The latter half of this chapter analyzes her 1754 experimental novel The Cry, likely 
co-written with Jane Collier. Cylinda, the antagonist of the novel, experiments with many 
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different philosophical systems, including Shaftesburianism, before she ultimately settles on 
Christianity. Unlike Collyer, Fielding is hostile to Shaftesbury, and this chapter argues that The 
Cry should be understood as largely a criticism of the effects of his and other supposedly non-
Christian philosophies on women. In the novel Fielding enacts fictionally exactly the dangers 
that deism supposedly posed for women that Astell warned about earlier in the century. Both 
David Simple and The Cry demonstrate the complex connections among philosophy, theology, 
and fiction in the mid eighteenth century, and how women writers were able to use the 
theological work of earlier writers to help inaugurate the Culture of Sensibility and to argue for 
the rights of women. 
I close this introduction by briefly considering the work of Masham and Collyer, two 
writers who frame the central issues of this dissertation. Damaris Masham’s latitudinarian attack 
on Malebranche in her 1696 Discourse gives her the opportunity to argue that complex 
theological schemes pose great dangers to English women because they obscure the ‘reasonable’ 
Christianity and ‘plain’ understandings of the Bible that act as their largest support. As Chapter 
Three shows, Trotter, in particular, articulated similar sentiments. In her 1744 novel Felicia to 
Charlotte and its 1750 sequel, Mary Collyer fuses aspects of Shaftesbury, Locke, and 
latitudinarian Anglicanism to create an alternative to the licentious and predatory males of the 
Restoration theater and early eighteenth-century amatory fiction. Collyer’s fiction helped 
establish the parameters of sentimental literature while also demonstrating the importance of an 
exceptionally liberal Christianity to eighteenth-century feminism. 
As both Masham and Collyer argue, these seemingly arcane religious debates have real-
world force for women writers and their readers. Both writers are not simply arguing a group of 
abstruse theological points; they are emphasizing the crucial impact theological discourse has in 
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everyday life for women, Masham philosophically and Collyer fictionally. I turn, then, in this 
introduction to two examples of how women argued for feminist positions through religion and 
religious discourse. 
Damaris Masham, Religion, and Early Modern Feminism 
In her 1696 A Discourse Concerning the Love of God, Damaris Masham – the daughter 
of the famous Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth and the close friend of John Locke – argues 
against those who “carry their Zeal for the Doctrinal Part of Religion so far, that they seem to lay 
little Stress on the Performance of those Vertues recommended by our Saviour Christ.”32 For 
Masham, as for many liberal Anglicans, “the chief Aim of Christianity” is “a good Life,” a 
religiously motivated way of living virtuously and benevolently that dogmatic religio-
philosophical systems obscure and hinder.33 Masham’s text evinces several tropes typical of 
latitudinarian Anglicanism of the Restoration and early eighteenth century. Indeed, as Patricia 
Springborg points out, Masham’s contention that “a good Life” is the primary aim of Christianity 
is “quintessentially Latitudinarian.”34 Like other liberal Anglicans, Masham carefully situates 
her argument in opposition to superstitious Catholicism and fanatical non-conformity. In doing 
so, she rebuts characteristic straw-man criticisms of the Church of England and conflates 
Anglicanism with morality:  
Whatever Reproaches have been made by the Romanists on the one hand, of the Want of 
Books of Devotion in the Church of England; or by the Dissenters on the other, of a dead 
and lifeless Way of Preaching; I think it may be affirm’d, That there cannot, anywhere, 
be found so good a Collection of Discourses upon Moral Subjects, as might be made of 
                                                 
32 Damaris Masham, A Discourse Concerning the Love of God (London: 1696), 2. 
33 Masham, Discourse, 2. 
34 Patricia Springborg, Mary Astell: Theorist of Freedom from Domination (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 69. 
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English Sermons, and other Treatises of that Nature, written by the Divines of our 
Church.35  
Masham, like many of her contemporaries, saw the Church of England as occupying a 
reasonable, common-sense middle-ground that stressed virtuous behavior and rejected abstruse 
theological speculation, tyrannical authoritarianism, and enthusiastic emotional excess. She cites 
Edward Stillingfleet, the Bishop of Worcester, in support of her argument, a writer often taken to 
be the epitome of Anglican ‘common-sense’ theology, who argues “If once an unintelligible Way 
of Practical Religion becomes the Standard of Devotion, no Men of Sense and Reason will ever 
set themselves about it; but leave it to be understood by mad Men, and practis’d by Fools.”36 
Although her arguments against abstract philosophical speculations at the beginning of her 
Discourse are typical of liberal Anglicanism, for Masham, as a woman theologian, the stakes for 
embracing a ‘common-sense’ theology are even higher, as she recognizes later in her text. 
Masham’s Discourse is chiefly an attack on the occasionalist metaphysics of the French 
philosopher Nicolas Malebranche and his Anglican disciple John Norris, and to a lesser extent 
Norris’s correspondent, Mary Astell.37 Masham argues that occasionalism, which maintains both 
                                                 
35 Masham, Discourse, 1. 
36 Masham, Discourse, 6. The title of Stillingfleet’s modern biography by Robert Todd Carroll is 
The Common-Sense Philosophy of Religion of Bishop Edward Stillingfleet 1635-1699 (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975). I discuss Stillingfleet in greater detail in Chapter Three. 
37 Scholars disagree on the extent to which Masham’s Discourse is a response to Astell. 
Responding to earlier claims by Patricia Springborg and others that Masham had Astell in her 
sights, James Buickerood writes that this “interpretation suffers from crippling deficiencies of 
evidence, argument, knowledge of the context in which the work was written and published, as 
well as a lack of appreciation for the breadth of Masham’s knowledge and reading” in his 
introduction to The Philosophical Works of Damaris, Lady Masham, ed. James G. Buickerood 
(Bristol: Thoemmes Continuum, 2004), xvi-xvii. Springborg responds to Buickerood’s 
arguments by conceding that he is “right, that Masham’s philosophical concerns relate more to 
Norris than to Astell – and specifically to Norris’s Malebranchiste assumptions,” but also 
maintains that, to some extent, “the salient fact is that Astell, who tended to be paranoid about 
the reception of her works … [read] Masham’s Discourse as a personal attack” in Springborg, 
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that God can be the only true object of our love and that God is the ultimate cause of all of our 
sensations, is heretical and dangerous, especially when being irresponsibly “Preached to a 
Country Congregation” by Norris, an Anglican clergyman.38 Perhaps even worse for Masham, 
by promoting the ideas of the French Malebranche, Norris is introducing heterodox Catholic 
ideas into the Church of England. She writes that Norris’s contention “That God is the only 
proper Object of our Love” leads him to the preposterous idea “that every Act that carries our 
Desires towards the Creature is sinful: Which Opinion if receiv’d, and follow’d, must necessarily 
bring in the like unintelligible Way of Practical Religion, which the Bishop of Worcester 
[Stillingfleet] has justly censured in the Church of Rome.”39 For Masham, as for latitudinarians 
like Stillingfleet, “Practical Religion” was of the greatest importance because it promoted the 
importance of the sociability of humankind to morality and virtue. Catholic superstition, on the 
other hand, led to a perilous withdrawal from society: “those in the Church of Rome; Who 
having a better Relish of Religion, than to be satisfied with one consisting of nothing but idle, 
superstitious, and pompous Shows, have betaken themselves to … [a] Life of Contemplation.”40 
For Masham, mystical contemplation was directly opposed to proper Christian sociability: She 
argues that those who suppose “the Persecution of a Christian State to consist in Contemplation” 
assume “the Duties of a social Life (for which ‘tis plain Mankind were intended) to be low 
Matters.”41 Accordingly, Masham ends her Discourse by attacking “Monasteries, and Religious 
Houses” and those who would completely withdraw from the world for religious reasons by 
                                                                                                                                                             
Mary Astell, 69, 71. Although its composition predates her 1694 A Serious Proposal to the 
Ladies, Astell’s second published work was the correspondence between her and Norris on the 
subject of occasionalism, published as Letters Concerning the Love of God in 1695. 
38 Masham, Discourse, 80. 
39 Masham, Discourse, 9. 
40 Masham, Discourse, 3. 
41 Masham, Discourse, 4. 
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arguing “whatever Vices they might part with … they must necessarily oppose thereby, one great 
end that they were sent into the World for, viz. of doing good.”42 Masham highlights a key 
component of latitudinarian Anglicanism – the identification of Christianity with an active, 
benevolent morality; indeed, the central argument of her text is that theological systems (often 
suspected of originating from Catholic sources) unmoored from ‘plain’ readings of Scripture 
result inevitably in immorality and vice. Masham’s argument demonstrates how latitudinarian 
anti-Catholicism led to an emphasis on sociable benevolence at the expense of dogmatic 
theology, often deemed to be Popish. 
Masham’s text is representative of many of the ideological debates that occurred in 
English Christianity in the long eighteenth century. Crucially, these arguments often involve 
gender politics, a fact usually ignored in critical discussions of the period. Masham’s contention 
“that many who find Christianity a very Reasonable Religion in the Scriptures, would think it a 
very unaccountable one in a System” has particularly important consequences for women.43 As 
she translates and cites in her text, Malebranche’s argument that “the Desire we have to the 
Creature” is sinful leads him to conclude that women’s bodies are the foundations of sin. 
Masham writes that his “account how Adam’s Posterity came to be infected” with this desire at 
the expense of loving God is “By reason of the Union that Children have with their Mother,” and 
astutely observes that this infection “was not from Adam, as is commonly taught, but from Eve,” 
a shifting of the burden of original sin from Adam’s transgression to Eve’s female body.44 For 
Masham, Malebranche’s occasionalist philosophy is dangerous because through nothing “but a 
Chain of Consequences … depending upon the Supposition of our seeing all things in God,” the 
                                                 
42 Masham, Discourse, 125-6. 
43 Masham, Discourse, 71-2. 
44 Masham, Discourse, 74. 
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ultimate cause of human sinfulness is laid at the feet of female biology.45 Even worse for 
Masham is the implication that women are incapable of escaping this predicament, rendering 
their relationship to God moot simply because of their anatomy: She writes, “this no holiness of 
the Mother can hinder.”46 Masham emphasizes that the negative effects of Malebranche’s unique 
form of biological determinism primarily doom women. She wryly observes that “There seems 
to be some things in this Hypothesis very unintelligible” and argues “that it has Consequences 
intolerable to be admitted.”47 The orthodox Christian understanding of original sin thus becomes 
crucial to her feminism. There is a certain level of irony here because many seventeenth-century 
women writers like Margaret Fell, Aemilia Lanyer, and Rachel Speght defended women against 
misogynist attacks on their gender by writers relying primarily on Eve’s role in Adam’s 
corruption in the Garden of Eden. The foundation of Masham’s complaints against Malebranche 
and his followers is her contention that “Christianity … is a rational Religion, and needs no 
Inventions of Men to support it”; this assertion demands that, on some level, Christianity as 
“rational” is theoretically able to be understood by all regardless of rank or gender and is thus 
free from patriarchal assumptions.48 Masham foregrounds the argument for women’s rationality 
in her second work, Occasional Thoughts in Reference to a Vertuous or Christian Life from 
1705, and the importance of ‘reasonable’ Christianity to women was also made by Astell, 
Trotter, and others. 
Masham is so troubled by Malebranche’s stance on original sin that she again attacks it 
near the end of her Discourse. She argues that his contention “that we come into the World 
utterly uncapable to please God … not through any fault of our own, but for Eve’s” is 
                                                 
45 Masham, Discourse, 76. 
46 Masham, Discourse, 75. 
47 Masham, Discourse, 76. 
48 Masham, Discourse, 78. 
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unscriptural: “Concerning [Eve’s] Transgression any ways influencing her Posterity, the 
Scripture yet makes no mention at all.”49 Masham highlights what is one of the most essential 
arguments made by women writers attacking misogynist ideologies in the eighteenth century: 
properly interpreted, the Bible supports women against the patriarchal assumptions of wider 
European culture. In Masham’s case this means soliciting support for her arguments by 
associating Malebranche’s anti-feminism with Popish superstition. ‘Reasonable’ Christianity and 
‘plain’ understandings of scripture both become, in different degrees and manifestations, the 
cornerstones of the feminist arguments made by Masham, Astell, Trotter, and other women 
theologians of the Restoration and early eighteenth century. 
Mary Collyer, Religion, and Sensibility 
The critical neglect of Mary Collyer’s 1744 epistolary novel Felicia to Charlotte and its 
1750 sequel is indicative both of how overwhelming the influence of canonical works like 
Pamela and Tom Jones have been on understandings of mid-eighteenth-century fiction, and how 
modern genre categories can obscure the permeable boundaries between eighteenth-century 
fiction and philosophy. Until recently, Sarah Fielding shared the same critical fate as Collyer, 
and Jerry C. Beasley’s comment in his 1982 Novels of the 1740s is representative of older critical 
attitudes toward non-canonical mid-eighteenth-century fiction. Beasley writes that “Pamela, 
Joseph Andrews, Jonathan Wild, Clarissa, Roderick Random, and Tom Jones came out 
simultaneously with a great crowd of lesser works, of a remarkable variety. Most of these 
forgotten books are worthless, and deservedly neglected.”50 Felicia to Charlotte, however, was 
not forgotten in its time, as Beasley himself points out.51 In a favorable review of the sequel, The 
                                                 
49 Masham, Discourse, 108. 
50 Jerry C. Beasley, Novels of the 1740s (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1982), xii. 
51 Beasley, Novels, 169. 
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Monthly Review from January 1750 claims that “The first volume of these letters was published 
about four years ago, and met with so favourable a reception from the public, as not only to 
occasion a new edition in a short time, but to encourage the ingenious author to publish a second 
volume.”52 However, the review also condescendingly writes, “we forbear entring into more 
particulars concerning a work that is more peculiarly calculated for the ladies than the majority 
of our readers.”53 The misogynistic dismissal by The Monthly Review is puzzling because Felicia 
to Charlotte is certainly no less “calculated for the ladies” than Richardson’s fiction; moreover, 
Collyer’s novel and its sequel are concerned with many of the complex theological and 
philosophical currents of the early eighteenth century.  
Both Sarah Fielding and Mary Collyer could be included in Karen O’Brien’s narrative of 
Anglican Whig Feminism, yet her study has very little discussion of eighteenth-century fiction. 
Her book is representative of the overemphasis by modern scholars on the after-the-fact division 
between eighteenth-century fiction and philosophy. I analyze Fielding’s religiously motivated 
feminism and its implications for mid-century sensibility in Chapter Four, but a brief 
examination of Collyer’s fiction here will serve to show how closely linked women’s religiously 
motivated feminism and literature of sensibility were in the eighteenth century. O’Brien observes 
how Trotter acted as a philosophical connection between Masham and the mid-century 
Bluestockings; Collyer bridged the two in similar ways. Susan Staves argues that Felicia to 
Charlotte “is a novel of ideas, linking some of the aspirations of writers like Astell and others … 
to those of the later bluestockings and aiming to reimagine the amatory novel as the novel of 
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sensibility.”54 Although her formulation “aspirations of … Astell” is unspecific, Staves is right to 
point out the overlap between women philosophers of the early eighteenth century and Collyer’s 
fiction. Collyer establishes a Christianized Shaftesburian benevolent ethic as the foundation of 
her feminism in the novel.55
Despite the chauvinistic dismissal by The Monthly Review, Felicia to Charlotte appealed 
to the Bluestockings not because it was “peculiarly calculated for the ladies,” but precisely 
because of its philosophical character. In the year of the work’s publication, Elizabeth Carter 
asked Catharine Talbot (immediately after suggesting that people “are a much better  set of 
beings than some moralists, from a partial view, think proper to represent them”) if she has “seen 
… Letters from Felicia to Charlotte.”56 Because of its epistolary structure, the novel invites the 
protagonist Felicia to examine at length the moral logic that, she conjectures, undergirds the 
motivations and actions of the other characters; at one point she claims she “can moralize like 
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55 Part of the Collyer’s embrace of sensibility was no doubt derived from Marivaux. Her 1742 
translation of Marivaux’s Marianne as The Virtuous Orphan was very influential in the 
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any philosopher or divine.”57 The title page also emphasizes the novel’s philosophical character, 
and its overt didacticism: “Containing A Series of the most interesting Events, interspersed with 
Moral Reflections; chiefly tending to prove, that the Seeds of Virtue are implanted in the Mind of 
every Reasonable Being.” The full title of the novel suggests how fluid the boundaries were 
between philosophy and fiction: by explicitly attempting to “prove” a moral proposition, the title 
page of Felicia to Charlotte announces its philosophical character.  
Although the characters in both the novel and its sequel approvingly discuss Locke, the 
belief in a moral sense or faculty (“Seeds of Virtue … implanted in the Mind”) seems directly 
opposed to his empiricism, and much closer to Shaftesbury’s and his disciple Frances 
Hutcheson’s shifting ideas of an innate moral sense. Indeed, Locke’s rejection of innate ideas in 
the Essay would seem to preclude an instinctive moral sense.58 Nevertheless, the relationship 
between Locke’s philosophy and notions of innate virtue tended to be complicated. Hutcheson 
especially struggled with how his ideas of an innate moral faculty could fit within Locke’s 
scheme. Isabel Rivers writes that “[u]nlike Shaftesbury, Hutcheson was ambivalent in his 
attitude to Locke, and this ambivalence was to produce some curious contortions. On the one 
hand he wished to associate himself with the fashionable Lockean epistemology,” but he also 
“thought that dangerous use had been made of arguments from Locke with the effect of 
undermining discussion of the foundation of morals.”59 Shaftesbury, for his part, had earlier 
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cited Locke’s friend Jean Le Clerk in a note in his Miscellaneous Reflections included in 
Characteristicks on the relationship of virtue to innatism:  
For although, strictly speaking, there are no ideas fixed by nature in our minds, still, no 
one could deny that there are faculties of our minds which nature has so disposed that as 
soon as we have the use of reason, we begin in some way to distinguish truth from 
falsehood, bad from good. The appearance of truth is always pleasing to us, while that of 
falsehood is displeasing; we indeed prefer what is honest to what is dishonest, because of 
seeds implanted in us, which finally emerge into the light when we are able to reason, and 
bear the better fruit as our reasoning improves.60
The relationship, then, between ideas of innate virtue (“seeds implanted in us”) motivating a 
moral faculty and Locke’s epistemology was complex and shifting in the first half of the 
eighteenth century. This ambiguity is reflected in Collyer’s Felicia to Charlotte and its sequel. 
Collyer was evidently well-versed in both Shaftesbury and Hutcheson’s conceptions of 
an innate moral faculty. Lucius, Felicia’s benevolent love interest, claims that “The moral sense 
… is … that distinguishing faculty of the mind which makes us feel, – sensibly and strongly feel, 
– the harmony and discord of actions. It is the touch, the ear of the soul; while reason is the eye 
to regulate the exertions of this sympathetic faculty.”61 Collyer’s understanding of the moral 
sense as an instinctual and pre-rational judgment of the good is similar to Hutcheson’s: “we have 
a moral Sense or Determination of our Mind, to approve every kind Affection either in ourselves 
or others, and all publickly useful Actions which we imagine flow from such Affection, without 
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our having a view to our private Happiness, in our Approbation of these Actions.”62 It is 
precisely because Lucius voices these moral sentiments that he is the hero of Collyer’s novel. 
Both Hutcheson and (especially) Shaftesbury received a great deal criticism for the 
presumed heterodoxy of their views. Although critics have mentioned Collyer’s debt to 
Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, they have struggled to integrate this aspect of her novel with its 
explicit Christianity. Staves writes that “Lucius … aligns himself with the arguments of Anthony 
Ashley Cooper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury … and Francis Hutcheson,” but does not explore 
this connection at any length, only noting that they were “heirs to the Cambridge Platonists” and 
that “many theologically orthodox contemporaries considered the moral philosophies of 
Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume guilty of the Pelagian heresy.”63 Beasley writes, “[t]o the 
orthodoxy of Christian heroism, the story clearly engrafts modified Shaftesburian deism” and 
“attacks all formalist theologies, offering instead a ‘religion of nature.”64 Beasley is right to 
emphasize Collyer’s apparent disdain for theological systems; however, it is unclear from what 
“orthodoxy” the protagonists of the novel derive their “Christian heroism.”  
Although both Beasley and Staves point out the influence of Shaftesbury on Collyer, it is 
striking that neither he nor Hutcheson is named explicitly in either Felicia to Charlotte or its 
sequel, despite the novel’s numerous references to Locke and citations of much less well-known 
moral philosophers like Henry Coventry. I mentioned above the ambivalent and outright 
negative reactions to Shaftesbury by eighteenth-century women philosophers, even while they 
were sympathetic to his moral philosophy. Trotter, as I discuss in Chapter Three, agrees with 
Shaftesbury’s conception of humankind as naturally virtuous and sociable, yet cannot get past his 
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supposed deism. The belief that Shaftesbury’s emphasis on natural affections and a moral sense 
was tainted by his attacks on Christian orthodoxy was widespread in the first half of the 
eighteenth century. Rivers writes that “later Christian moralists who were indebted to 
Shaftesbury tended to play down that debt and to concentrate on clarifying and developing the 
implications of his thought.”65 Collyer seems to be writing in this vein; her Felicia to Charlotte 
appropriates Shaftesburian philosophy and overtly Christianizes it as a way to embrace its 
implications for human virtue while simultaneously (partly) emptying it of its irreligious 
character. Moreover, her embrace of this Christianized Shaftesburian moral philosophy allows 
her to craft a feminist sensibility for her heroine and love interest directly opposed (in her eyes) 
to that in amatory fiction.  
The sexual desire expressed by both Lucius and Felicia, like David Simple, is strikingly 
un-licentious. Although their conspicuously un-sexualized behavior can seem risible to a modern 
reader, characters like Lucius and David Simple are a reaction against the rakes and libertines of 
the Restoration theater and amatory fiction. In contrast to good looks, wit, and gallantry, it is the 
correctness of his philosophical and theological opinions and his benevolence that draws Felicia 
to Lucius. After hearing Lucius romantically rhapsodize on the pleasures of nature, Felicia 
“formed a most amiable idea of [his] person … though [she] had never seen him.”66 Deliberately 
eschewing an understanding of passion that relies on Lucius’s looks, she writes to her 
correspondent Charlotte that, “I shall forbear giving a description of his person, till I can give 
you that of his mind, and that must not be till I know him better.”67 Lucius, for his part, refuses 
to flatter Felicia, as Charlotte – a more typical eighteenth-century female character – seemingly 
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expects. Instead of showering Felicia with the expected “transcendent excellencies” and “infinite 
perfections” – flattery she deems “sublime nonsense” – Lucius impresses her with long 
philosophical speeches on the wonders of nature and God: he “is too good a christian to deify his 
mistress, and has too good an opinion of [Felicia] to think [she] should be pleased with such 
senseless homages.”68 Felicia likens overindulgent male flattery to heresy, and maintains that 
women should be courted by appeals to their understanding instead of “senseless” adulation. 
Lucius is contrasted to Felicia’s other love interest, the gallant but somewhat preposterous, 
though ultimately harmless, Mellifont, who “attack’d [her] vanity with incessant praises.”69 
Unlike Lucius, Mellifont “took [Felicia] for some deity.”70 Mellifont’s “life and gaiety” offers a 
contrast to the philosophical sensibility of Lucius, though Collyer strips him of any malevolence 
and ultimately he marries Felicia’s good-natured cousin, Amelia.71
The only overtly malicious character in the novel is Prudilla, an older woman whose 
hypocritical moralizing and manifest sexual desire are both ridiculous and repugnant to Felicia 
and her companions. Because of Prudilla’s aggressive sexual desire for Lucius, surprisingly in 
the sequel it is revealed that she seduced him in his sleep before his marriage, resulting in her 
pregnancy and ultimately a step-child for Felicia. Prudilla stands in stark contrast to Felicia’s 
straightforward intellectual virtue. Apart from her hyperbolic moralizing, what especially raises 
the ire in Felicia and her companions, however, is Prudilla’s unconcealed Calvinism. Upon their 
first meeting, “Prudilla began with a severe censure upon the weakness and depravity of human 
nature,” and she later duplicitously attempts to flatter Felicia by telling her that she “give[s] such 
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early proofs of … being one of the elect.”72 Her Calvinism prompts Lucius to express his 
Shaftesburian conceptions of a benevolent deity and an innate moral sense. In several places in 
both volumes of Felicia to Charlotte, Lucius’s theological scheme explicitly echoes 
Shaftesbury’s: God is “the universal parent, the friend of mankind, the patron of virtue, the most 
amiable, the most kind, and benevolent being in the universe.”73 Lucius’s language is similar to 
Shaftesbury in his Letter Concerning Enthusiasm, a text that, although intentionally ambiguous, 
was notorious for its profane character, and Prudilla likewise accuses Lucius’s “strange 
opinions” of not being “orthodox” because he seems not to “believe original sin.”74 Collyer 
evinces an evident anxiety with her novel’s Shaftesburian Christianity, and she reinforces its 
worth by suggesting that what often passes for orthodox Christianity conflicts with both nature 
and reason: Felicia and her friends have a conversation in which “the errors of christians 
sanctified by the venerable name of orthodoxy, were proved inconsistent with reason, with all 
our ideas of moral beauty and natural harmony.”75 Orthodoxy signifies not correct religious 
opinion, but instead reinforces those errors of Christianity that cannot be reconciled with “the 
generous, the friendly religion of the Bible.”76
Prudilla’s Calvinism is not only indicative of her poor judgment and bad character; it 
leads to her downfall. While near death in the sequel, Prudilla relates the circumstances of her 
previous misdeeds, especially her deceitful seduction of Lucius. She decided to “give way to her 
passion” because she “flatter’d herself, that, as she had such proof of her being one of the elect, it 
was impossible she should ever be a cast-away”; as a result, she “drank iniquity like water” and 
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went “from one crime to another.”77 Prudilla’s sexual depravity is a consequence of her 
convenient Antinomian understanding of herself as incapable of immoral actions. Collyer 
suggests that a benevolent understanding of God and morality is thus necessary to protect women 
from corrupting temptations: “religion, when rais’d upon false principles, had an influence in 
corrupting her heart.”78 Prudilla’s self-deceptive and fraudulent nature can be traced directly to 
her Calvinistic emphasis on God’s judgment at the expense of benevolence for others: 
“Censoriousness, inhumanity, and the indulgence of every selfish passion, are the natural 
consequences of her sentiments of religion; a religion, which, respecting only God, regards every 
duty to man as low and contemptible.”79 Astell, Trotter, and Masham, like Collyer, all attacked 
Calvinism on similar grounds: in their view, it tended to promote an inattention to both worldly 
concerns and morality, effects that disproportionally affected women. 
In contrast to Prudilla’s essentially straw-man Calvinism, Felicia and her companions 
tout a radically latitudinarian Protestantism verging on deism.80 Both Shaftesbury and liberal 
Anglicans advocated toleration and religious liberty. In his Letter, Shaftesbury sarcastically 
rejects “Uniformity of Opinion” as “a hopeful Project.”81 Lucius also attacks forced attempts at 
uniformity. One of the most significant episodes in the second volume of the novel involves the 
discovery of a disguised Catholic. Lucius and Felicia confront Dorothea, one of their servants, 
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after discovering in her room a “crucifix set with diamonds, and a chaplet of pearls, and a mass 
book in Latin and English.”82 Their initial anger at Dorothea, however, comes because they 
suspect her of theft, and not because of her Catholicism. Under questioning, Dorothea reveals 
that she is actually the daughter of a baronet, forced to flee because her “religious liberties were 
invaded.”83 Refusing to listen to arguments against Catholicism and to read the Bible for herself, 
she was ultimately forced by her father to “receive [the] addresses” of “a zealous churchman” 
who “seldom spoke of any thing but religion.”84 Fleeing before her forced marriage, Dorothea, 
“by performing what she thought [her] duty … incurred a father’s displeasure.”85 Dorothea’s 
forced conversion and forced marriage go hand in hand; sexual persecution is religious 
persecution. 
Dorothea’s situation gives Collyer the opportunity to illustrate at length the benefits of an 
expansive religious toleration. Dorothea fully expects Lucius and Felicia to act as her father has 
once her Catholicism is revealed: “Yet as I am a Roman, you will, probably, join with my father, 
and, while you preach to me of persecution and prejudice, sufficiently shew, like him, that you 
are capable of both.”86 To her surprise, however, Lucius claims he is “an enemy to persecution, 
and to every attempt to force the conscience,” and that “[a] true protestant, from principle, hates 
all religious tyranny.”87 In addition to yoking Protestantism with toleration, he also claims that 
his “is the religion of common sense,” returning to the understanding of liberal Anglicanism as a 
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middle-ground between two equally stifling and fanatical extremes, in this case Calvinism and 
Catholicism.88
When Dorothea is initially reunited with her father, he rants against her Catholicism: he 
“talked in favour of charity, with the rage of a bigot” and spoke “with all the intemperate heat, 
and enthusiasm of party.”89 He also “swore and preached in one breath, and uttered his 
sentiments with the positive assurance of a jesuit.”90 Despite being an Anglican, in his rage 
against his daughter’s religion, Dorothea’s father – with his simultaneous “enthusiasm” and 
Jesuitical false assurance – performs in ways nearer to the two extremes against which 
latitudinarianism tended to define itself. Once his “passion had subsided,” however, he is open to 
Lucius’s latitudinarian arguments in favor of toleration.91 It is only in his anger that he acted 
contrary to how an English Protestant country squire should behave. 
Lucius’s arguments for toleration are a curious fusion of Locke and Shaftesbury. He 
argues that “religious liberty” is “the birthright of every reasonable being” and quotes from 
Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration, calling it “of more value than a Peruvian mine.”92 
Lucius’s high praise of Locke’s Letter is somewhat ironic, because Locke famously, though 
implicitly, follows previous writers like Milton in refusing toleration to Catholics, because their 
church “is so constituted that all who enter it ipso facto pass into the allegiance and service of 
another prince.”93 Lucius’s denunciation of religious persecution, however, sounds much closer 
to Shaftesbury than Locke: 
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He … represented persecution as arraigning the infinite sagacity of the sovereign creator 
of all things, who, to make room for heaven-born charity, had wisely given such a variety 
of tastes, degrees of capacity and understanding, to the mind of man, from whence result 
the love of truth, and the test of every kind and benevolent affection. Uniformity of 
sentiment … is, I find, in his opinion, no more desirable, than the dull uniform prospect 
of a smooth, and wide-stretched, plain.94
Lucius emphasizes God’s benevolence at the expense of specific theological doctrines, an 
emphasis made greater by his description of God as a “sovereign creator.” Under Lucius’s 
scheme, toleration is not only acceptable, but is in fact an essential aspect of the divine character. 
In contrast to other “systems of religion,” the foundation of Christianity is its emphasis on 
reasoned inquiry.95 According to Lucius, “the impossibility of discovering truth from error, 
where no enquiry was made, [is] as great in the zealot of Rome and London, as in that of Turkey, 
or Siam.”96 Again, Catholics and dissenters are linked, this time with non-Christians. All are 
opposed to the reasoned inquiry that will lead naturally to a radically non-doctrinal Christianity 
founded on an expansive toleration. Ironically, in places Lucius’s language is close to that of 
seventeenth-century sectarians because of his refusal to draw a distinction between Anglican and 
Catholic persecution, which, “whether in Papist or Protestant, is a tempest raised by the breath of 
hell.”97
Before her exposure Dorothea claimed that she was scared to use her “own shallow 
reason” because “it might contradict the infallible doctrines” of her faith; but she vows to be a 
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Catholic “upon rational principles” after her acceptance by Lucius and his companions.98 
Predictably, however, after a month, Felicia learns “that what severity and restraint could not do, 
mildness and freedom have accomplished; that the amiable Dorothea is already a Protestant.”99 
After her ‘rational’ examination of Christianity, Dorothea’s conversion to an extremely broad 
latitudinarian Protestantism is inevitable. Both the restraints she placed on her own reason and 
the persecution by her father kept her Catholic; once these are removed, she quickly converts. 
Moreover, her conversion frees her to be pursued by Mr. Smith, a family friend who “hopes for 
the happiness of speedily possessing the lovely convert.”100 The end of Dorothea’s story mirrors 
the beginning with the threat of forced marriage and sexual violence removed; in both cases, 
however, her religious conversion is inextricably linked to her sexuality. 
Dorothea’s fictional religious travails have similarities to Catharine Trotter’s, as I discuss 
in Chapter Three. Thomas Burnet’s epistolary pursuit of Trotter as a marriage partner hinged on 
convincing her to abandon her Catholicism, and her eventual conversion was to a broadly 
latitudinarian Christianity, although Burnet’s advances were unsuccessful. Despite sometimes 
very different political and epistemological commitments, Christianity forms the basis of the 
feminism of the women analyzed in this study – and their arguments often cut across ideological 
lines. Although their interpretations of Christianity are radically different, both Margaret Fell and 
Mary Astell, for example, neutralized Pauline restrictions on their gender in similar ways. Astell, 
Masham, Trotter, and later women theologians drew inspiration from Quaker women and other 
female sectaries in the seventeenth century, even if their explicit acknowledgments to them were 
rare. In different ways, Astell, Masham, Trotter, Collyer, Fielding and later Bluestockings were 
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also very much motivated by Locke and the large number of responses to his work that arose in 
the first decades of the eighteenth century. As I discuss in Chapter One, Locke surpassed even 
Quaker authorities in early eighteenth-century debates about the role of women in Quakerism. 
Quaker interest in Locke, and vice versa, is one demonstration of the rich cross currents in early 
eighteenth-century English Christianity. 
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Chapter 1: Margaret Fell, Quaker Women, and Enlightenment 
In her essay on agency and eighteenth-century Quaker women, Phyllis Mack writes that 
“[b]y the 1730s Quakerism had evolved from a movement of radical visionaries into a 
community of respectable citizens.”101 The standard historical explanation of this change “is 
derived from a meta-narrative of secularization, whereby more retrograde Quakers lapsed into a 
contemplative spirituality called ‘quietism,’ while more progressive Quakers became capitalists 
and activists who were largely indifferent to religion.”102 While acknowledging that this 
“secularization argument is a powerful one,” Mack counters this view by noting that the most 
‘progressive’ Quakers in the eighteenth-century “were also the ones most deeply engaged in the 
quest for spiritual enlightenment.”103 Likewise, according to Mack, “[t]hose women who were 
most ardent in advocating educational reform and campaigning for independent women’s 
meetings were also those who sought a stricter religious discipline and a greater reliance on the 
Bible.”104 In other words, as Mack points out, for Quakers, worldly concerns were inseparable 
from religious concerns, even if their advocacy for secular reform was later foregrounded by 
scholars. As an alternative explanation Mack suggests that “the apparent quiescence of 18th 
century Quakers masked an internal struggle to integrate their Puritan and mystical religious 
heritage with their own Enlightenment values.”105 She calls attention to the critically neglected 
but crucial importance of eighteenth-century internal Quaker debate as the Religious Society of 
Friends struggled to align its once radical theology with emerging Enlightenment sensibilities, 
                                                 
101 Phyllis Mack, “Religion, Feminism, and the Problem of Agency: Reflections on Eighteenth-
Century Quakerism” in Women, Gender and Enlightenment, eds. Sarah Knott and Barbara 
Taylor (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 443. 
102 Mack, “Religion,” 444. 
103 Mack, “Religion,” 444. 
104 Mack, “Religion,” 444. 
105 Mack, “Religion,” 445. 
 36
and she highlights the uneasy way that narratives of secularization fit with this transition of the 
Friends from visionary Civil War sect of the 1650s to respectable bourgeois citizens of 
eighteenth-century England. By the early eighteenth century Daniel Defoe characterized Quakers 
as upright citizens in much of his fiction, but provided little if any discussion of their theology or 
doctrine. The unnamed Quaker woman of Defoe’s Roxana becomes the ethical foil for the 
protagonist’s depravity in the latter half of the text, but the distinguishing marks of her religion 
are not theological but external, such as her use of “thee” and “thou” and her plain clothing. 
Early modern stereotypes of Quakerism demonstrate why traditional secularization narratives are 
so tempting: Locke and other early critics condemned Quakers’ reliance on the supposedly 
unreasonable and enthusiastic inner light for spiritual guidance, but, by the first few decades of 
the eighteenth century, this stereotype had mostly given way to discussions of Quakers’ upright 
characters and different manners of speaking and dress. 
This conflict between unruliness and respectability was present from the earliest days of 
the Religious Society of Friends in the 1650s and 60s. The trajectory of a gradual conservatism 
taking root throughout the latter half of the seventeenth century is common in studies of 
Quakerism, and arguably the most important aspect of this steady recession of Quaker radicalism 
involves women. The establishment of separate women’s meetings and the more disciplined 
publication of tracts fundamentally altered Quaker women’s experience of their religion as the 
seventeenth century progressed. Yet, despite a more clearly defined theology and a more 
patriarchal church hierarchy in the early eighteenth century, internal debates about the proper 
role of both women and inspiration in Quaker doctrine continued raging. In the eighteenth 
century there was also a continued demand for writings by Quaker women. The most important 
Quaker publisher of the era Tace Sowle published an important collection of Margaret Fell’s 
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writings in 1710, an edition of Elizabeth Stirredge’s journal in 1711, and the report of Katherine 
Evans and Sarah Cheevers of their imprisonment in Malta by the Inquisition in the 1660s in 
1715. As Paul Salzman notes, “even during the later, sober period of Quaker development, 
testimonies that were still visionary and quite apocalyptic could be accommodated.”106 As late as 
1801, the Quaker William Rawes defended the right of women to preach in his The Gospel 
Ministry of Women, Under the Christian Dispensation, Defended from Scripture, and from the 
Writings of John Locke, Josiah Martin, &c. As the title suggests, Rawes relies for support on the 
writings of Locke and a Quaker pamphlet dispute from the second decade of the eighteenth 
century between Josiah Martin and Benjamin Coole.  
Quaker debates about both the proper role of inspiration and the proper role of women 
were bound together, and these debates directly contributed to emerging Enlightenment 
philosophy: Locke’s distaste for Quaker theology motivated what has come to be seen as a 
crucial text of Enlightenment sensibility, his negative portrayal of enthusiasm in the Essay. The 
first section of this chapter contextualizes the writings of the most famous Quaker woman, 
Margaret Fell, in the debates about women that occurred in the Religious Society of Friends 
between the 1650s and 1670s, and demonstrates how she appropriated anticlerical discourse to 
make a political argument in favor of the religious authority of woman. The second section 
discusses responses to women and charismatic inspiration in early eighteenth-century Quakerism 
by both Locke and other Quakers, and argues that representations of unruly Quaker women 
played a vital role in attempts to normalize Society ideology with Anglicanism. 
“Both Papists and Protestants”: Margaret Fell, the Defense of Women Preachers, and 
Anticlerical Discourse 
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The most influential Quaker woman writer of the seventeenth century was Margaret 
Fell.107 Fell’s 1666 Womens Speaking Justified has long stood as a paradigmatic text of early 
modern proto-feminism despite its relative brevity, her large output of other theological tracts 
from the 1650s to the 1670s, and the fact that it was written during a time when the Religious 
Society of Friends was responding to extreme oppression. Although Fell’s arguments for the 
religious authority of women have sometimes been divorced from their sectarian context by 
modern critics, they derive their force from her cogent and thoughtful attacks on the oppressive 
Restoration Anglican establishment. Fell couches her calls for female religious authority in 
anticlerical rhetoric that in many ways anticipates the arguments of the later generation of 
women theologians: Astell, Trotter, and Masham. 
On 11 January 1664 a young Quaker woman, likely Margaret Fell’s sixteen year old 
daughter Mary, confronted King Charles in the presence of Samuel Pepys. Pepys writes: 
This morning I stood by the King, arguing with a pretty Quaker woman that delivered to 
him a desire of hers in writing. The King showed her Sir J Minnes, as a man fittest for her 
quaking religion, saying that his beard was the stiffest thing about him. And again merrily 
said, looking upon the length of her paper, that if all she desired was of that length, she 
might lose her desires. She modestly saying nothing till he begun seriously to discourse 
with her, arguing the truth of his spirit against hers. She replying still with these words, 
“O King!” and she thou’d him all along.108
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The King’s coarse sexual joking to the young Mary Fell demonstrates how easily it was for 
masculine political and religious authority to dismiss women by sexualizing them. However, the 
incident also suggests how traditional stereotypes of religious women such as silence and 
modesty (which were repeatedly said by Anglican authorities to be threatened by unruly Quaker 
women) could act as a method of resistance: after Fell “modestly” remains silent in the face of 
the King’s crude humor, he is forced to respond to her religious arguments and “seriously … 
discourse with her.” The passage is especially striking for a modern reader because Mary Fell’s 
mother Margaret was imprisoned in Lancaster Castle for almost four years shortly after this 
encounter. It was from prison that Margaret Fell wrote her most famous text, Womens Speaking 
Justified. 
Both Pepys’s anecdote about Mary Fell and Mary Astell’s later representation of her 
Tory Anglicanism as “a Plain, Honest Matron” (discussed below) reveal the importance of early 
modern women claiming and refashioning for themselves the tropes of modesty and piety 
associated with religious women in masculine discourse. These tropes are particularly evident in 
the “Testimony” from Margaret Fell’s children that begins the extensive 1710 collection of her 
writings.109 Downplaying the more belligerent aspects of their doctrine in order to avoid 
aggravating authorities was important to the Friends as a whole after 1660. The persecution of 
Quakers during the early days of the Restoration was intense, and by 1672 George Fox had 
organized a sophisticated review and censorship apparatus of Quaker texts primarily run through 
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the Second-day’s Morning Meeting in order to avoid harassment by Restoration authorities.110 
The largest effect of this centralized control over Quaker publication was a new uniformity of 
message. As N.H. Keeble writes, the Second-days’s Morning Meeting, “was less to circumvent 
the law than to ensure the integrity of the Quaker message.”111 Although this self-censorship was 
crucial in allowing the Quakers to continue to function and avoid the fate of several other 
nonconformist sects, Paula McDowell points out that it also led to “the decline of a movement 
with the potential to effect radical social change into the respectable quietism of the eighteenth 
century.”112 As McDowell suggests, the transformation of Quaker print culture from its radical 
beginnings in the 1650s and 1660s to its strictly controlled output after 1672 largely contributed 
to eighteenth-century English society’s more worldly understanding of the Society of Friends. 
Yet Quaker censorship also created an important opening for women to shape Quaker thought. 
The official printer of Quaker texts after 1691 was a woman, Tace Sowle, who took over the 
business from her father Andrew Sowle. McDowell argues that “the occasional willingness of 
the Friends to leave publishing matters to Tace Sowle’s judgment is remarkable,” and it is clear 
that her control over all aspects of Quaker print culture after 1691 was widespread.113 
Importantly, as McDowell points out, Sowle used this influence to publish nonconformist 
women. Her first recommendation upon taking over the business in 1691 was for the publication 
of the works of Elizabeth Bathurst, and the press printed over one hundred works by women 
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authors, including Fell’s 1710 collected works.114 The publication of Fell’s works came during a 
time when Sowle’s press was consolidating the history of the Friends and publishing biographies 
and accounts of its early days. The enormously influential works of George Fox were published 
in three parts between 1694 and 1706, and in 1701 the first part of Piety Promoted, in a 
Collection of Dying Sayings of Many of the People Called Quakers, a compilation of early 
Quaker biographies, was published.115 Fell died in 1702, and Sowle and other Quakers obviously 
viewed her works as essential to the Quaker canon, particularly after the recent publication of her 
second husband Fox’s works. 
Fell’s 1710 Brief Collection was released while the next generation of women religious 
writers like Astell and Trotter were establishing different grounds for women’s religious 
authority, and its release was probably the high water mark of Fell’s influence. As Salzman 
observes, this substantial republication of Fell’s writings “certainly increased her visibility in the 
early eighteenth century” and also “mark[s] out the most significant moment for Fell’s writing, 
as it was not reprinted in either the eighteenth century or the nineteenth.”116 Although the 
majority of Fell’s writings were published between the 1650s and the 1670s, at least partly 
because of Sowle’s influence, they were still being read and discussed well into the early 
eighteenth century, part of a larger project of the Friends in the early eighteenth century of 
reconsidering their origins and mainstreaming their views. 
In the opening paragraph to her collected works, Fell’s children testify to her “Holy Life, 
and Pious Conversation”; she was a “loving Mother” who did “educate and instruct her Children 
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in the Nurture and Fear of the Lord.”117 Like Thomas Birch in his 1751 introduction to Catharine 
Trotter’s collected works (discussed in Chapter Three), Fell’s children ignore the argumentative 
side of her writings by constructing her as a virtuous and pious exemplar; their testimony 
obscures the spirited and confrontational nature of both Fell’s activities – she interrupted 
Anglican services and spent long stretches in prison – and writings.118 Discursively constructing 
both themselves and their beliefs as moral, pious, and rational was a critical move for Fell’s 
children and other Quakers. Claiming this ground was particularly crucial for Fell who had to 
overcome being stereotyped as a fanatic from both misogynist and anti-Quaker writers. In 1684, 
Fell even received mild criticism from within the Quaker community for her supposed lack of 
attention to the domestic sphere when William Penn’s wife Gulielma complained in a letter to 
her, “if thou foundest a clearness and freedom in the Lord it would be happy thou wert nearer thy 
dear husband and children but that I leave the Lord’s ordering and thy freedom.”119 Fell’s 
activities drew complaints from all quarters. 
Fell is most well-known for her 1666 tract, Womens Speaking Justified, Proved and 
Allowed of by the Scriptures, written while she was a prisoner in Lancaster Castle and reissued 
essentially unchanged except for a “Postscript” the following year. Although she is never cited 
directly, it is clear that her text influenced a defense of women’s preaching written by her 
eventual second husband, the Quaker leader George Fox, and she was well-known by almost all 
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influential Friends in the latter half of the seventeenth century.120 Womens Speaking Justified 
was reprinted in the 1710 collected edition of her work, although without the short but important 
1667 Postscript. Although there were several tracts published by Quakers – both male and 
female – in the 1650s defending the right of women to preach, this does not mean, as Salzman 
asserts, that “there was nothing new in Fell’s defence of women’s speech.”121 In particular, 
Quaker defenses of women’s speaking in the 1650s were less systematic than Fell’s 1666 
Womens Speaking Justified, which relied on extended scriptural exegeses as its primary support.  
The early Quaker Richard Farnworth writes in 1655, “the Woman or wisdom of the Flesh 
is forbidden to speak in the Church, that is, of the things of God, for that which is flesh is flesh, 
and the natural man knows not the things of God.”122 It is the “carnal minded man” who claims 
“that a Woman (or the female kind) ought not to speak in the Church.”123 Farnworth’s radical 
differentiation between literal women (“the female kind”) and the metaphorical “Woman” as 
used in the scriptures not only promotes women’s authority but also supports an anticlerical 
agenda by valorizing inspired utterances by both men and women. For Farnworth, “the 
Scriptures need not an Orthodox Key, for Holy men of God as they were moved they spoke them 
forth by the Holy Ghost.”124 Reading against orthodox interpretations of scripture was the critical 
first move of Quakers in defending the authority of women to speak. In a tract published the 
same year as Farnworth’s, Priscilla Cotton and Mary Cole use a metaphorical sense of “women” 
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to rectify an apparent contradiction in Corinthians, and in doing so they eliminate Paul’s 
prohibitions against women: 
thou tellest the People, Women must not speak in a Church, whereas it is not spoke onely 
of a Female, for we are all one both male and female in Christ Jesus, but it’s weakness 
that is the woman by the Scriptures forbidden, for else thou puttest the Scriptures at a 
difference in themselves, as still its thy practice out of thy ignorance; for the Scriptures 
do say, that all the Church may prophesie one by one, and that women were in the 
Church, as well as men, do thou judge; and the Scripture saith, that a woman may not 
prophesie with her head uncovered.125
Cole and Cotton’s text imaginatively deals with scriptural contradictions by arguing – like 
Farnworth and later George Keith – that certain parts of Paul’s Epistles must be read 
metaphorically. As Hilary Hinds observes, “this is an assertion that the Scriptures themselves 
require such metaphorical readings in order to make certain texts agree with other texts of the 
Bible.”126 Cole and Cotton exploit scriptural inconsistencies to limit Pauline prohibitions against 
women. This scriptural contradiction was also exploited fifty years later by both Locke and 
Josiah Martin to open a small space for women in the church, as discussed in the following 
section. Neither, however, would have accepted an interpretation so divorced from the literal 
sense of the language, and it is notable that neither Martin nor his antagonist Benjamin Coole 
mention either Cole and Cotton, Farnworth, or Keith.  
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The purpose of Farnworth’s and Cole and Cotton’s defenses of women’s authority was to 
attack the clergy and political establishment. This was also Margaret Fell’s larger purpose in her 
1666 Womens Speaking Justified, but, for Fell, writing after the Restoration, an attack on the 
political authorities was a different proposition than it had been for those writing in the 1650s. 
As Richard L. Greaves documents, the persecution of Quakers in the 1660s was intense.127 By 
the enforcement of the Quaker Act and the Clarendon Code, thousands of Quakers were 
imprisoned in the 1660s. Although following Fox’s pacifism the Society of Friends in the 1660s 
was overwhelmingly peaceful, authorities still feared and distrusted them. In a 1670 letter to 
William Popple, for example, Andrew Marvell reports that at the trial of William Penn and 
William Mead, husband of Fell’s daughter Sarah and co-author of the testimony that opens her 
1710 collected works, “The Jury not finding them guilty, as the Recorder and Mayor would have 
had them, they were kept without Meat and Drink some three Days.”128 As a prominent Quaker 
leader, Fell was especially susceptible to persecution. Her 1664 arrest was part of an 
(unsuccessful) attempt to rein in the Quakers by arresting their leadership.129 Her relatively 
elevated social status proved useful to the early Quakers, but she was still jailed several times. 
Fell’s 1666 Womens Speaking Justified was reissued less than a year later and “annexed” 
onto the end of her much longer anticlerical work, A Touch-Stone, or, A Perfect Tryal by the 
Scriptures, of all the Priests, Bishops, and Ministers. Womens Speaking Justified should be read 
in the context of this longer piece and its sustained critique against professional clergy of all 
types. Anticlericalism of course has long been recognized as one of the crucial components of 
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the push toward secularism and Enlightenment. The potential corruption inherent in religion as a 
profession was a particularly inviting vulnerability for critics of the Church of England to 
exploit. As Donald Spaeth writes in discussing the post-Restoration Church, “The clergy were 
denounced … for their use of religion for their own private aggrandizement, turning religion into 
a trade.”130 Although most studies of English anticlericalism focus on critiques made by 
freethinkers and liberal Whigs, Fell and other Quakers made similar charges against the clergy. 
Fell, in particular, found anticlerical rhetoric to be a powerful ally in arguments for women’s 
spiritual equality. Indeed, anticlerical rhetoric was the basis of her radical claims for the authority 
and spiritual equality of women. 
The full title, Womens Speaking Justified, Proved and Allowed of by the Scriptures, All 
such as speak by the Spirit and Power of the Lord Jesus, suggests both how biblically based 
Fell’s argument is and how she emphasizes the distinction between those women speaking under 
the influence of the holy spirit and those who are not. Surprisingly, Fell largely avoids any of the 
radically metaphorical readings of scripture advocated by Farnworth and Cole and Cotton. As 
George Keith’s The Woman-Preacher of Samaria demonstrates (discussed below), this 
metaphorical mode of argumentation was still in vogue in the 1670s, but Fell’s account is based 
primarily on straightforward readings of the Bible; however, it is often cast, like earlier Quaker 
tracts, in visionary and apocalyptic rhetoric. 
This often jarring juxtaposition of ‘enthusiastic’ and ‘reasoned’ rhetoric that characterizes 
her writing, and the ahistorical privilege often given Womens Speaking Justified because of its 
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focus on gender has resulted in a wide range of critical responses to Fell. In his early but 
influential study of Quakerism, William Braithwaite claimed that Fell’s “writings, as a rule, have 
little force: it is as a mother in her home, and as a mother in Israel, that she holds her unique 
place.”131 If early historians ignored or downplayed Fell’s writings in the history of the Friends, 
later critics have been eager to embrace the feminist or proto-feminist implications of her work; 
however, early feminist readings tend to ignore the larger historical and political contexts of her 
writing, and consequently to see her as either too revolutionary or too conservative. Margaret 
Olofson Thickstun, for example, finds Fell’s Womens Speaking Justified to be more politically 
effective than Astell’s Preface to Reflections because Astell ultimately “allows male 
interpretations of Scripture and of women to remain authoritative,” while Fell is “able to begin, 
at least, to wrest the interpretation of Scripture, and therefore of women, from patriarchal 
control.”132 Elaine Hobby, on the other hand, comparing Womens Speaking Justified to Cotton 
and Cole’s tract and other Quaker works from the 1650s, finds it to be “careful and conservative” 
and argues that Fell’s “judicious, rational presentation of Bible verses which counter Paul’s 
injunction to silence has none of the ecstatic fervour of Cotton and Cole.”133 Christine Trevett 
likewise writes that the text “lacks the charm and wit that we find in some other writings by 
women Friends.”134 More recent scholarship on Fell has yielded a more historically nuanced 
view of her work. Kate Peters persuasively argues that Fell’s writing “can be seen … as part of 
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an attempt by the Quaker leadership to normalize and legitimate the potentially disruptive public 
preaching of women in the Quaker movement.”135 While the rhetorical instability in Fell’s text 
troubled early critics eager to embrace either her secular rationality or her sectarian fervor, more 
recent criticism has argued that the binary between rationality and enthusiasm itself should be 
reconceived. Teresa Feroli argues that Womens Speaking Justified “appears to be the work of a 
masterful polemicist who skillfully alternates between rationality and enthusiasm to suit her 
purposes.”136 Salzman likewise observes that Fell’s tract relies on both “very sombre and judicial 
prose” and “visionary statements.”137 Sally Bruyneel has very recently read Fell’s work in the 
context of seventeenth-century Quaker theology and argues that “Women’s Speaking Justified 
represents the fruition of long reflection within the context of the larger Quaker movement and 
its eschatological fervor, prophetic ministry, and spiritual leadership by women among the 
Friends.”138 Bruyneel rightly foregrounds Fell’s sectarian concerns and highlights the way the 
text legitimizes both earlier Quaker tracts and the proselytizing of Quaker women in the 1650s 
and 60s.  
What is perhaps most striking about Fell’s writing in the 1660s is her lack of discussion 
of the inner light or related Quaker theological principles. In her study of seventeenth-century 
Quaker women, Catherine Wilcox persuasively argues that scholars often make too much of 
Quaker doctrine of the inner light, and that to see Quakerism as a homogenous ideology during 
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the course of the seventeenth century is a mistake.139 Locke’s stereotype of Quaker theology 
(discussed in the following section) was largely an out of date straw man by the time he made it 
in 1700, and ironically, as Wilcox suggests, modern scholars have often followed Locke and 
other Enlightenment critics in summarizing Quaker doctrine in simplistic terms. This 
heterogeneity in Quaker ideology partly reveals why Fell’s tract is relatively free of the 
apocalyptic rhetoric some expect. Bruyneel complicates Wilcox’s thesis by arguing, like several 
of the recent scholars discussed above, that Fell was aware of her discursive contexts and deftly 
shifted her rhetoric in ways appropriate for her intended audience.140 I largely agree that Fell was 
an exceedingly capable writer who was able to appropriate different modes of theological 
rhetoric to suit her needs; however, Fell was shaped by the sectarian contexts in which she 
operated, and much of her rhetoric is similar to contemporaneous sectarian writing. In particular, 
Womens Speaking Justified was written primarily as an anticlerical attack on religious authority 
from an imprisoned author, and the text has many similarities with other nonconformist 
anticlerical works. Fell’s response to the oppressive Restoration regime, however, further 
inspired her to argue for the improvement of the political situation of women. 
As noted earlier, the 1667 revised second edition of Womens Speaking Justified was 
“annexed” to Fell’s longest theological work, A Touch-Stone, or, A Perfect Tryal by the 
Scriptures, of all the Priests, Bishops, and Ministers, placing the text in a distinct anticlerical 
context, although this is rarely noted when Womens Speaking Justified is discussed or 
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excerpted.141 Although A Touch-Stone was published in 1667, a year after the first edition of 
Womens Speaking Justified, both were composed in 1666, along with several other pieces.142 
Because the second edition of Women’s Speaking Justified was published with A Touch-Stone, it 
is likely Fell saw the two as complementary, and she almost certainly formulated the similar 
arguments of each near the same time. Fell, like other Quakers, argues at length in A Touch-
Stone that the professional clergy act as fraudulent gatekeepers and that all true preaching is done 
by inspiration, not by institutionalized authority: “the Ministers they make are by Men, and of 
Men.”143 Much of the policing by orthodox authority is done through misleading and 
unnecessary teaching, contrary to the background of the first apostles: “Timothy did not go to 
Cambridge nor Oxford.”144 Although she argues that these educated clergy “have not the 
Inspiration of the Almighty, and Motion of the Spirit of the Lord God,” sentiments in line with 
mainstream Quaker doctrine, this criticism is particularly acute for Fell who, as a woman, could 
not attend Oxford and Cambridge.145 What is especially striking is how she repeatedly compares 
the Anglican establishment to the worst abuses of Continental Catholicism, frequently employing 
the phrase “both Papists and Protestants” for rhetorical effect.146 To Fell, the Catholic Inquisition 
and the oppressive Anglican hierarchy are no different: “both Papists and Protestants; one 
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striving with Inquisitions and Racks, and Tortures; the other striving and Terrifying poor People, 
with their Courts, and Chancellors, and Prisons.”147 Fell’s conflation of Protestant and Catholic 
serves to highlight the role that all Quaker believers, whether male or female or rich or poor, 
played in propagating doctrine in a religious system with no ordered hierarchy. As an alternative 
to these oppressive clergy and the corrupt church, Fell offers the Samaritan Woman of John 4, to 
whom Jesus “published and declared” that “the Worship of God performed in the Spirit, and in 
the Truth” was proper.148 She highlights the fact that Jesus declared to a woman the proper way 
to worship, a way that the English clergy “of Men” get disastrously wrong. The anticlerical 
arguments made by Fell in A Touch-Stone legitimate women as equal members of the true 
Christian church and solidify her position as a theologian. Anticlerical discourse works equally 
well for Fell within the framework of explicit arguments for women’s authority in Womens 
Speaking Justified. 
Fell begins Womens Speaking Justified by acknowledging “the ground” of the 
“Objection” by “the Clergy, or Ministers, and others, against Womens speaking in the Church,” 
the statements in 1 Corinthians 14:34-5 and 1 Timothy 2:11-12, but contends “they wrong the 
Apostles intentions,” and quickly pivots to more favorable scriptural passages.149 Citing Genesis, 
Fell argues that “God joyns [male and female] together in his own Image, and makes no such 
distinctions and differences as men do; for though they be weak, he is strong.”150 She denigrates 
the exegetical strategies of masculine clerical authority while arguing that what they deem as 
weak, God sees as a strength. She supplements this claim by citing Corinthians, thus maintaining 
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that the Bible is a uniform narrative from beginning to end and implying that by relying on just 
the few prohibitions against women in the Epistles, religious authorities are reading scripture 
against its proper “course and order.”151 Fell’s primary argumentative strategy early in the text is 
to turn misogynistic assumptions of the weakness inherent in women into a strength. Because in 
Genesis, God “hath put enmity between the Woman and the Serpent” she maintains that “if the 
Seed of the Woman speak not, the Seed of the Serpent speaks.”152 Fell’s reading of scripture 
does not just promote the prophecy of Quaker women, but asserts that Anglican authorities who 
“speak against the Woman” are aligned with Satan.153 The disparagement of female prophets is a 
particularly appalling manifestation of the irreligion of orthodox clergy in Fell’s eyes, but it is of 
a piece with the litany of complaints about their flawed and inauthentic understanding of 
scripture and God that she makes in A Touch-Stone and other works. 
Although Fell does not go as far as other Quakers in arguing for a radically metaphorical 
understanding of the word “woman,” she does divorce the term from its simplistic and 
derogatory meaning. While Farnworth and Cole and Cotton maintained that “woman” should be 
read as a “weakness” to be avoided, Fell urges those “despisers of the weakness of Women” to 
acknowledge that “Christ Jesus … makes use of the weak.”154 Misogynistic assumptions by 
orthodox religious authorities about the supposed weakness of women are heretical for Fell 
because biblically, any supposed weakness of women is a strength. Fell points out that the word 
“woman” has a multiplicity of referents in the Bible, and to cling stubbornly to only one is a 
mistake: “the Lord is pleased, when he mentions his Church, to call her by the name of Woman,” 
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then “those that speak against the woman speaking, speak against the Church of Christ.”155 Just 
as she does in A Touch-Stone, Fell argues that religious authorities misuse the word “church,” 
but, in this text, she implies that women constitute a core component of the true church: “Those 
that speak against … the Spirit of the Lord speaking in a woman, simply, by reason of her Sex, 
or because she is a Woman, not regarding the Seed, and Spirit, and Power that speaks in her; 
such speak against Christ, and his Church.”156 Likewise, she also uses the example of the 
“Woman of Samaria” of John 4 in Womens Speaking Justified, but emphasizes her gender: Jesus 
“was pleased to preach the Everlasting Gospel to her” which “is more than ever he said in plain 
words to Man or Woman (that we read of) before he suffered.”157 The anticlerical arguments that 
Fell makes in A Touch-Stone are also used in Womens Speaking Justified, but they foreground 
gender. The rhetoric of the text serves both to attack an oppressive and disciplinary Anglican 
establishment and to undermine mainstream objections to restricted political and cultural roles 
for women. 
Fell fills the first seven pages of the text with an abundance of scriptural references of 
positive portrayals of women before she returns to Paul’s explicit exclusion of women in 1 
Corinthians 14 and 1 Timothy 2. She encourages those reading 1 Corinthians 14 to “see the end 
and drift of the Apostle,” arguing that the people Paul addressed were “in confusion” and noting 
that “the Man is commanded to keep silence as well as the woman, when they are in confusion 
and out of order.”158 For Fell, those in confusion were “under the Law,” both men and women, 
and Paul’s prohibitions applies to them and not to those, like the Quakers, “that have the 
Everlasting Gospel to preach, and upon whom the Promise of the Lord is fulfilled, and his Spirit 
                                                 
155 Fell, Womens Speaking Justified, 4, 5. 
156 Fell, Womens Speaking Justified, 5. 
157 Fell, Womens Speaking Justified, 5. 
158 Fell, Womens Speaking Justified, 8. 
 54
poured upon them according to his word.”159 Although Fell separates women into those who 
“have the Power and Spirit of the Lord” and those who do not, she does the same for men, 
maintaining that the distinctions God makes essentially ignore gender; instead, God separates 
those who, like her fellow Quakers, are authorized to speak from those who are aligned with 
Satan.160 Those who oppress the Society of Friends are unable to interpret scripture properly, and 
one of the most egregious manifestations of this hermeneutical failure is the repression of 
women: “how are the men of this Generation blinded, that bring these Scriptures, and pervert the 
Apostles Words, and corrupt his intent in speaking of them.”161 Fell supports her extended 
interpretation of scripture by shifting to visionary rhetoric which gives her arguments in favor of 
women a divine mandate: the interpretive strategies of clerical authorities are not only wrong but 
motivated by Satan. In making this argument she implicitly disputes any meaningful difference 
between the Church of England and Catholicism, recasting the standard Anglican narrative of the 
Reformation as an escape from centuries of darkness by applying it to Anglicans themselves. It is 
Fell and her fellow Quakers, not Protestants more generally, who are the true path out of 
apostasy. Fell writes: 
But all this opposing and gainsaying of Womens Speaking, hath risen out of the 
bottomless Pit, and spirit of Darkness that hath spoken for these many hundred years 
together in this night of Apostacy, since the Revelations have ceased and been hid, and so 
that spirit hath limited and bound all up within its bond and compass, and so would suffer 
none to speak, but such as that spirit of Darkness, approved of, Man or Woman.162
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The oppression of women is just one symptom of the Satanically-inspired clerical abuse of 
Christianity. Those led by the “spirit of Darkness” have prohibited all who they have not wanted 
to speak, regardless of gender. Gender does not matter if one is on the side of the light. 
Fell ends the central section of Womens Speaking Justified by arguing that “the Lord 
Jesus hath manifested himself and his Power, without respect to Persons” and that the scriptural 
prohibitions against women, “which have been such a stumbling block” are the false 
interpretations of “the ministers of Darkness.”163 However, she evidently felt that her apocalyptic 
arguments against 1 Corinthians 14 and 1 Timothy 2 were insufficient because she added “A 
Further Addition in Answer to the Objection concerning Women keeping silent in the Church” to 
the end of the text. “A Further Addition” is a more straightforward attack on orthodox clerical 
practices and interpretation, and in it she synthesizes her more visionary discourse with literal 
interpretations of scripture. She observes that, read plainly, 1 Corinthians 14:35 – which exhorts 
women to learn from their husbands – cannot be about women in general, because, “If you tie 
this to all outward Women, then there were many Women … which had no Husbands.”164 It is 
not scripture, but “blind Priests” who “will not permit holy Women to speak.”165 Again 
emphasizing that the distinction God makes is not between man and woman but between good 
and evil, Fell urges religious authorities “to make a distinction what sort of Women are forbidden 
to speak, such as were under the Law, who were not come to Christ, nor to the Spirit of 
Prophesie.”166 Instead of dividing people by gender, the church should divide those who have 
“come to Christ” from those who have not. 
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Much of Fell’s critique of the Anglican clergy in A Touch-Stone centers on their 
interpretive practices and the application of these practices to their sermonizing. She objects to 
the common clerical preaching practice of “taking a part or portion of Scripture for a Text, and 
adding thereto their own Inventions, which they study out of their own Brain; and also bringing 
other Authors, who have done the like, many of them not Christians but Heathens.”167 In their 
uninspired sermonizing, the professional clergy depart from Scripture, and thus propagate false 
doctrine. In Womens Speaking Justified, Fell applies similar anticlerical rhetoric to her arguments 
for women’s religious authority. Fell describes both Elizabeth’s exhortation to Mary and Mary’s 
song from Luke 1:39-56 as a “Sermon,” and notes the incorporation of this portion of scripture in 
the Anglican Book of Common Prayer: “Are you not here beholding to the Woman for her 
Sermon, to use her words to put into your Common Prayer? and yet you forbid Womens 
Speaking.”168 Fell argues that “these two women prophesied of Christ, and Preached better then 
all the Blind Priests did in that Age, and better then this Age also, who are beholding to women 
to make use of their words.”169 Not only does the Anglican establishment silently appropriate the 
“preaching” of women, but the learned sermons of the Anglican clergy are inferior to inspired 
Quaker prophecy. Fell’s anticlerical discourse accommodates radical arguments about the role of 
women in “true” Christianity. For further support, Fell assembles a large list of instances of 
women speaking in scripture and argues that orthodox masculine preachers “make a trade of … 
womens words.”170 Her complaints in Womens Speaking Justified are similar to those she makes 
in A Touch-Stone about the professionalization of the Anglican establishment, but she also 
maintains that not only are the clergy corrupting Christianity, but they are doing it at the expense 
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of the true preaching of Holy women and men. For Fell, “in this True Church, Sons and 
Daughters do Prophesie” and “Women labour in the Gospel.”171
Surprisingly, Fell’s critiques of the irreligious preaching practices of the orthodox clergy 
anticipate those made by Whigs like Richard Steele who famously wonders why “the Heathen 
struts, and the Christian sneaks in our Imagination” in his 1701 The Christian Hero.172 Although 
the application of her arguments to the political situation of women was unique, Fell’s Womens 
Speaking Justified shares many concerns with more conventional Anglican works. The text is a 
fusion of well-reasoned scriptural exegesis and visionary rhetoric, and, apart from its customary 
Quaker and sectarian rhetoric, it arguably has more in common with the feminist religious 
writings of Astell and other early eighteenth-century women writers than it does with many of 
the Quaker texts from the 1650s. Although arguments about women’s role in Quaker doctrine 
invariably revolved around debates about the role of charismatic inspiration in Christianity – as 
the debate between Martin and Coole reveals – when Fell defended her own prophetic voice, she 
principally did so through restrained and cogent interpretations of scripture. Her visionary 
rhetoric served to give her scriptural hermeneutic a divine legitimacy, a legitimacy Martin 
ironically replaces fifty years later with the authority of Locke. When the next generation of 
women religious writers sought to legitimize their religious voice, they too like Martin eschewed 
apocalyptic rhetoric in favor of the support of famous masculine authorities like Locke and John 
Norris; yet, ultimately each argued that, read correctly, the Bible supported a religious role for 
women, and consequently they needed the liberty to interpret scripture free from clerical 
interference. 
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“Opposite and contradictory Lights”: John Locke, “Enthusiastic” Women, and The Religious 
Society of Friends 
Arguably the most crucial tract on women’s right to preach after Womens Speaking 
Justified was George Keith’s 1674 The Woman-Preacher of Samaria.173 Crucially, the text’s 
argument is framed by strident anticlerical rhetoric. For Keith, all who deny the right of women 
to preach are “Men-Preachers, of a Man-made Ministry, in the three Nations; whether 
Conformists, or Nonconformists.”174 These ministers falsely assert that “There should not be 
Women Preachers” because women “should keep them to the affairs within the House.”175 What 
makes Keith’s text so radical is that he centers his attack on the misogynistic assumptions about 
women’s domestic duties that more orthodox religious ideology used to justify women’s 
subordinate role. In contrast to these wrong-headed ministers, Keith, like Fell, invokes the 
example of the Woman of Samaria who – as John 4:5-42 relates – after a discussion with Jesus, 
converted Samaritans to his cause, and who Keith claims is a “Woman-Preacher.” In a manner 
that anticipates the disagreement between Coole and Martin over Locke’s Paraphrase forty years 
later (discussed below), Keith’s text reveals how much of the debate about women’s role in the 
Quaker community relied on parsing exact definitions of preaching. Keith presents an extended 
contrast between the Woman of Samaria (and by extension Quaker women), untainted by “the 
University,” and “the Ministers” of “both Conformists and Non-Conformists,” who, as 
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“Scholars,” replace true piety with “Natural Arts and Sciences.”176 Keith’s division of preachers 
not into the traditional categories of Anglican and dissenter, but into those of charismatic and 
educated but uninspired constructs women as ideal promulgators of Christianity because of their 
exclusion from university. Keith makes evident the stakes involved for women in debates about 
the appropriate role of charismatic utterances within the church. The text also reveals why 
Locke’s denigration of enthusiasm prompted such fervent responses several decades later. 
It is a “gross blindness and darkness,” Keith writes, to deny “immediate revelation” as 
orthodox ministers do.177 He again argues that orthodox misogynist attacks on women by the 
clergy lack the charity of those who listened to the Woman of Samaria; they did not tell her that 
she was “Ignorant and unlearned” and urge her to “Go home to [her] wheel … as men commodly 
now say to Women Friends.”178 Keith adapts Quaker anticlerical rhetoric to make a radical 
argument about the suitability and superiority of women preachers over their orthodox male 
peers. Keith addresses the prohibitions against women acting in the church in Corinthians and 
Timothy in a short postscript. He concedes Paul’s prohibitions against the authority of women, 
but, citing the authority of the Church Fathers Bernard and Augustine, argues that “women” in 
Paul should not be read as literal women, but instead as a metaphor for “the flesh”: “not onely 
Bernard … but Augustine … doth by the woman understand the flesh, and by her Children, he 
doth understand good works.”179 Although a similar argument for a sweeping metaphorical 
reading of Paul’s prohibitions against women was made by earlier Quakers, Keith observes that 
he is using orthodox methods of scholarship against orthodox theology and argues that despite 
the learning of the professional clergy, Quakers “have the Ancient Fathers more on [their] 
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side.”180 All orthodox traditions allow some amount of female participation in church, and he 
undercuts those who hold that there is a crucial scriptural distinction between preaching and 
speaking by observing that 1 Corinthians 14:34 reads, “Let your women keep silence in the 
Churches, for it is not permitted unto them to speak,” and thus “the Apostle useth this general 
word (to speak).”181 Keith’s argument for allowing inspired women to speak goes so far as to 
suggest that traditional domestic hierarchies can be overturned: “if the Spirit of the Lord 
Command or move a godly and Spiritually Learned Woman to speak, in this case she is the 
Lords, more than her Husbands, and she is to speak, yea, though the Husband should forbid her, 
for she ought rather to obey God than Men.”182 Keith legitimates precisely what orthodox 
authorities feared might happen if women were granted religious authority – the overturning of 
settled hierarchies.183
The debate about Quaker women in the early eighteenth century centered on this concern 
with female propriety and the appropriate religious role for women, a debate that directly 
concerned John Locke. The text that motivated Mary Astell to write her famous Preface to the 
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third edition of her Reflections on Marriage, John Locke’s A Paraphrase and Notes on the 
Epistles of St. Paul, was published posthumously between 1704-7. While not as conservative as 
earlier scriptural commentators, Locke largely limits women’s role in religious life. He 
paraphrases and comments on Galatians, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Romans and Ephesians. In his 
explanatory commentary on 1 Corinthians 11:2-16, Locke provides a lengthy discussion of the 
religious role of women, particularly in the church. He also discusses the role of women in the 
church in his commentary on 1 Corinthians 14:34-35. Locke’s prohibitions in his commentary on 
1 Corinthians 11 are so striking that Mark Goldie argues that they “constitute the starkest 
endorsement in any of his writings of women’s natural inferiority.”184
The discussion of women’s role in the church in the Epistles was notoriously difficult to 
interpret. Locke himself concedes that 1 Corinthians 11:2-16 is “as difficult a passage as most in 
St Pauls Epistles.”185 Arguments about the Epistles’ views on women centered on what terms 
like “church” denote, and one of Locke’s central concerns is properly interpreting what 
“praying” and “prophesying” represent in the Epistles. He argues that both are “the doeing some 
peculiar action in the assembly whilst the rest of the congregation only assisted.”186 According to 
Locke, “Prophesying as St Paul tells us” was “only when such speaking was a spiritual gift 
performed by the immediate and extraordinary motion of the holy ghost,” and “that the spirit of 
god and the gift of prophesie should be powerd out upon women as well as men in the time of 
the gospel is plain” from scripture.187 Locke admits that the seemingly clear scriptural 
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prohibitions against women speaking in church in 1 Corinthians 14:34-35 and 1 Timothy 2:11-12 
might seem to argue against his interpretation and he grants that Christianity forbids any “kind of 
equality” between the sexes; however, he also maintains that “this subordination which god for 
orders sake had instituted in the world hindered not but that by the supernatural gifts of the spirit 
he might make use of the weaker sex to any extraordinary function when ever he thought fit.”188 
While allowing him awkwardly to synthesize incongruent – and quite possibly differently 
authored – parts of scripture, Locke’s reading also divides Christianity along the competing lines 
of reasoned order and fanatical disorder, a long-established method of denigrating threats to 
political and religious orthodoxy 
For Locke, immediate supernatural actions or utterances – what he and others often 
pejoratively labeled “enthusiasm” – could not subvert God’s natural order which necessitated 
women’s “natural subjection to the men.”189 While women (and men) very rarely may be moved 
by the Holy Spirit according to Locke – and in his reading of 1 Corinthians 11:2-16 he seems to 
be almost exclusively talking about women and men “in the time of the gospel” – women’s 
“assume[ing] the personages of Doctors, or speak[ing] … as teachers” can never be legitimated 
because they may create “the appearance of superiority.”190 He makes this dichotomy between 
charismatic utterances and reasoned discourse explicit in his brief remarks on 1 Corinthians 
14:34-35 when he argues that the injunction for women to keep silent in the churches applies 
“only to reasoning and purely voluntary discourse, but suppose a liberty left women to speak 
where they had an immediate impulse and revelation from the spirit of god.”191 Significantly, 
Locke cites “for orders sake” as God’s justification for the subordination of the sexes, which 
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even women moved by the Holy Spirit may not usurp. Locke’s reductive validation of God’s 
“natural” subjection of women to the need for “order” is of a piece with the gradual 
transformation of Christian devotion to a more generalized personal morality that many scholars 
have identified as one of the foremost secularizing effects of the Enlightenment.  
Charles Taylor observes that “from the Cambridge Platonists through Tillotson to Locke 
and the eighteenth century” Western Christianity becomes “less concerned with sin as a 
condition … and more with sin as wrong behaviour,” and “[t]his morality … was cast in terms of 
the modern notion of order.”192 Correct personal conduct was one aspect of God’s all-
encompassing providential order, and from the Restoration onward this usually entailed a 
rejection of any behavior that could be construed as fanaticism or enthusiasm. Although 
accusations of disorder by religious orthodoxy were present even in the Bible itself, this method 
of attack became especially gendered in the seventeenth century. The supposedly reasonless faith 
and subsequent religious disorder increasingly cast aside in favor of a more secular, “reasonable” 
Christianity was regularly associated with women. As Patricia Crawford argues, after the 
Restoration, “[i]ncreasingly, faith and reason were seen to be in binary opposition, as female and 
male always had been” and “[b]elief was for women, reason for men.”193 For Locke in his 
Paraphrase, a woman “reasoning” was outside God’s design and potentially threatened the 
moral order. Even in the extraordinarily uncommon situation of a woman’s being moved by God 
to speak, she is still to be associated with enthusiasm. Masculine anxiety about dissenting women 
(especially Quaker) preachers motivated much of the gendered division of English Christianity 
that began during the Interregnum and continued into the early eighteenth century. Clement 
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Hawes argues that “the somewhat more egalitarian cultural space that female prophets were able 
to negotiate within the enthusiastic constellation made enthusiasm itself vulnerable to misogynist 
attacks.”194 Although Locke in his Paraphrase does allow a small space for women to participate 
in the church, it is only through occasional charismatic utterances, utterances which he famously 
denigrated just a few years earlier in the fourth edition of his Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding. As we shall see, early eighteenth-century Quakers were anxious about this 
tension in the thought of Locke between his later editions of the Essay and his Paraphrase 
because they viewed him as a potential ally. 
Throughout his life, Locke held a negative opinion of “enthusiasm.” In the 1700 fourth 
edition of his Essay one of the added chapters was an attack on enthusiasm entitled “Of 
Enthusiasm,” although he had written on the subject as early as 1682. He was motivated to do so 
by his reading of John Smith’s Select Discourses (1660) and his epistolary conversations with 
Damaris Masham.195 For Locke, enthusiasm is based on the same faulty circular logic as 
Catholic claims of infallibility (discussed in Chapter Three). Locke says his purpose is “to 
examine a little soberly this internal Light,” (a jab at Quaker theology of the inner light), and he 
argues that “this Light, they are so dazled with, is nothing, but an ignis fatuus that leads them 
continually round in this Circle. It is a Revelation, because they firmly believe it, and they believe 
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it, because it is a Revelation.”196 Locke’s attempt to establish a moderate Christianity based on 
reason that avoided both dissenting ‘enthusiasm’ and Roman Catholic ‘superstition’ was part of a 
long history, especially among Anglican divines and writers, with Jonathan Swift’s A Tale of a 
Tub being a prominent example.197 In The Spectator 201 in 1711, for example, Addison claims 
that dissenting enthusiasm and Catholic superstition are two sides of the same irrational coin and 
neither has the “strong steady masculine Piety” presumably held by the Anglican Church.198 For 
his part, Locke argues that enthusiasm “takes away both Reason and Revelation, and substitutes 
in the room of it, the ungrounded Fancies of a Man’s own Brain, and assumes them for a 
Foundation both of Opinion and Conduct.”199 According to Locke, “If they say they know it to 
be true, because it is a Revelation from GOD, the reason is good: but then it will be demanded, 
how they know it to be a Revelation from GOD.”200 Just as he does with claims for papal 
infallibility, Locke considers Quaker reliance on an inner light to be tautological and lack the 
proper grounding in “reason” that a tolerant, liberal Anglicanism exhibits. 
Despite Jordana Rosenberg’s claim that Locke’s “distaste for enthusiasm … stands to this 
day as the archetypal Enlightenment overturning of religious superstition,” the particular type of 
“enthusiasm” Locke had in his sights was not all dissenting Protestantism, but specifically 
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Quakerism.201 Although this section of his Essay was not added until 1700, throughout his life 
Locke considered Quakers “mad folk” and famously complained of the lack of reason he 
observed during the Interregnum by claiming “we are all Quakers.”202 Apart from 
epistemological concerns, Locke also had political reasons for disliking Quakers. In April of 
1687, James II issued his first Declaration of Indulgence which suspended the penal laws in 
England. Although many dissenters and liberal Anglicans were in favor of its sentiments, there 
was widespread suspicion of James’ Catholic motivations and of his exercising his prerogative to 
accomplish it. Writing to Locke in exile on the Continent, James Tyrrell reports that the 
Declaration “gives so generall a satisfaction that more are displeased at the manner of doeing it 
then at the thing it self,” and notes that he “find[s] few but the high Chur: E: men highly 
displeased.”203 Opinion quickly changed, however, and James’ order that all Church of England 
clergy read his April 1688 second Declaration of Indulgence sparked widespread outrage. 
Following the first Declaration powerful Quakers like William Penn and Robert Barclay 
embraced James and defended him.204 In an August 1687 letter to Locke, Tyrrell sarcastically 
calls Penn Locke’s “Friend” and says that he “is a great favourite at Court.”205 Initially, like 
Penn, many dissenters and others embraced James, but this enthusiasm quickly cooled as they 
grew suspicious of both his motivations and the means by which he granted toleration: “Whigs 
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and Dissenters largely concluded that James was offering religious liberty in exchange for 
surrendering civil liberty.”206 Crucially, although James lost the support of most dissenters, 
including many Quakers, Penn and those loyal to him largely continued to support James’ 
policies. Furthermore, after the Revolution Penn was involved in Jacobitism along with some 
other Quakers.207 This of course put Penn – the most prominent Quaker of his era – at odds with 
Locke and other enthusiastic Whig supporters of the Revolution. 
Locke thus had strong epistemological, theological, and, especially after the Revolution, 
political reasons to dislike the Religious Society of Friends. Yet, like his opinions on Catholicism 
(discussed in Chapter Three), Locke made clear distinctions between public Quakerism and the 
private belief of individual members of the Society of Friends. During his time on the Continent, 
he was influenced by his close friend, the Rotterdam Quaker Benjamin Furly. John Marshall 
observes that although Locke “spent the 1650s questioning the anarchic tendencies” of Quakers 
and “suggested that Quakers may need to be suppressed in the first three of his four drafts of his 
1667 ‘Essay on Toleration,’” he ultimately removed this passage in the final draft.208 Moreover, 
the vicious persecution of Quakers before 1689 and the desperate Quaker pamphlet literature this 
abuse created provided important ammunition for Locke’s arguments for toleration against Jonas 
Proast in the 1690s.209
Locke’s dislike of fanaticism also has important implications for understanding his 
writings on religion in the 1690s and 1700s, including his Paraphrase. Marshall argues that the 
“model of Lockean conversation” that was “strongly celebrated in the eighteenth century … 
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stressed ‘civility’ and ‘politeness,’ the prevention of dispute by stopping discussion which 
demonstrated ‘warmth’ on the part of participants, and the maintenance of charity,” evident in 
both Locke’s Reasonableness of Christianity, its Vindications, and Paraphrase.210 For Locke, 
Marshall maintains, this ethos entailed “a deliberate silence” on contentious theological issues, 
“a policy associated with toleration and civility as it allowed variant views to be inscribed at 
those points where Locke was silent.”211 Although in keeping with his latitudinarian disposition 
he strove to avoid theological controversy in the 1690s and early 1700s – and critics like 
Stillingfleet and Thomas Burnet claimed Locke’s silences as evidence of heresy – his inclusion 
of an attack on Quaker theology in the 1700 fourth edition of his Essay and his explicit claims of 
women’s subservient inferiority under the Law of Nature in his Paraphrase demonstrate the 
limits of civility for Locke and his latitudinarian circle. Tories often pointed out inconsistencies 
in Whig arguments for politeness and toleration. Astell, as I discuss in Chapter Two, argues in 
1709 that the Third Earl of Shaftesbury’s supposed arguments for order and civility in religion 
are not applied fairly and exclude those groups he finds distasteful. 
Locke’s readings of Paul’s Epistles in his Paraphrase were considerably influential 
throughout the eighteenth century. Despite his claims that women were prohibited from 
“reasoning and voluntary discourse” in the church and “were not to assume the personage of 
Doctors,” Locke had no problem with individual women theologians, even the Catholic 
Catharine Trotter. Locke’s close friend Damaris Masham was the author of several sophisticated 
theological pieces, and, as discussed in Chapter Three, Locke wrote to Trotter in 1702 thanking 
her for her 1700 defense of his Essay and praising “the strength and clearness of [her] 
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reasoning.”212 Given Locke’s multi-layered views on women and religion, it is not surprising 
that women writers viewed him differently. Astell spent the Preface to the 1706 third edition of 
her Reflections sarcastically attacking the “Ingenious Paraphrast who pleads so much for the 
Natural Subjection of Women.”213 On the other hand, Trotter enthusiastically looked forward to 
getting a copy of Locke’s Paraphrase; writing to Thomas Burnet of Kemnay in 1705, she 
declares “I am very desirous to meet with a book, which yet I have only heard of, A Commentary 
upon some of the Epistles, I think, St. Paul’s, written by Mr. Locke, which I am the more curious 
to see, because I imagine he would not write on such a subject, if he did not treat of it in some 
peculiar way.”214 There is no extant record of her response to the text, but it is likely she read it, 
and given her robust support of Locke well into the 1720s, she either ignored his prohibitions 
against women or was not bothered by them. 
Despite his rhetoric against Quaker theology, Friends held Locke in high esteem 
throughout the eighteenth century, especially with regard to their controversial practice of 
allowing women preachers. Although by the early eighteenth century women preachers were 
divisive even within the Society of Friends, women preachers also provided a convenient way 
for Anglicans to criticize Quaker theology, as Swift’s A Tale of a Tub demonstrates: linking 
Quaker “enthusiasm” to women made Quaker beliefs easier to disparage. Because their support 
of women preachers was one of their central vulnerabilities, it is not surprising that segments of 
the Society of Friends sought to limit the practice. Between 1715 and 1716 a short and relatively 
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civil pamphlet battle broke out between two Quakers, Josiah Martin and Benjamin Coole, over 
the issue of women preachers. Surprisingly, both relied on differing interpretations of Locke’s 
Paraphrase as the central support of their arguments.215 Coole, a Bristol Quaker preacher, began 
the dispute by attempting to restrict the role of women within the Society of Friends with his text 
Some Brief Observations on the Paraphrase and Notes of the Judicious John Lock: Relating to 
the Women’s Exercising their Spiritual Gifts in the Church in 1715. Martin responded in 1716 
with A Letter to the Author of Some Brief Observations on the Paraphrase and Notes of the 
Judicious John Locke, and took particular issue with Coole’s narrow interpretation of Locke’s 
understanding of what “prophesying” and “praying” entailed. 
Coole’s comparatively conservative rhetoric originated in his attempts to defend Quaker 
practice in the face of orthodox criticism. By the early eighteenth century, segments of the 
Society of Friends were distancing themselves from both enthusiastic utterances and women 
preachers leading some more radical Friends to escape Quaker discipline by joining other 
religious movements more closely aligned with their earlier charismatic practices. Early in the 
eighteenth century, several Quaker women and men joined the radical French Huguenot sect in 
London, the Camisards.216 Coole identified with the segment of the Society that sought to align 
Quakerism more closely with Anglicanism. Ten years before he became embroiled in his 
argument with Martin, he wrote a short anonymous piece in support of various doctrines of the 
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Society of Friends, A Letter from a Gentleman in the City to his Kinsman in the Country, 
Concerning the Quakers, which purports to be a letter from a sympathetic Anglican to an 
Anglican relative skeptical of Quakers.217 Coole’s text demonstrates both the Friends’ reliance 
on Locke and the divisiveness of women preachers. He appeals to Locke’s support of toleration 
and wishes his antagonist the “Universal Charity as dwelt in [Locke] at his last Moments; when 
he said he was In perfect Charity with all Men, and in a Sincere Communion with the Church of 
Christ, by what Names soever it might be Distinguished.”218 In relying on Locke’s latitudinarian 
ideals, Coole attempts to bring Quaker doctrine under the umbrella of Anglicanism. He 
maintains that accusations of Quaker “Mad Enthusiasm” are overstated and are simply criticisms 
of Friends’ “distinguishing Garb and Dialect,” when in fact, “their Plainness is a check to the 
extream Gaudy Fops that swarm in City and Country” who “Mortgage their Estates” to buy “a 
Perruke.”219 In the guise of a sympathetic Anglican, Coole attempts to make Quaker doctrine 
palatable to an Anglican audience; but in doing so, he carefully polices any radicalism that 
threatens to sever Quaker practice from Anglicanism. Although he labors to normalize much of 
Quaker doctrine with the Church of England, he is unable to do so with women preachers. While 
he attempts to diminish the common orthodox complaint that what distinguishes Quakers is 
enthusiasm originating in the “Petticoat-Fathers” who “thump the Gallery” by observing that 
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men are also capable of “Impertinent Rattles,” he is unwilling fully to support women 
preachers.220 Women preachers provided an uncomfortable reminder of Quaker radical otherness 
which had to be downplayed by Coole. He writes that “Their Extream Indulgence towards their 
Women, who Ramble about the Country, when they ought to be at Home, according to the 1 
Tim. 5. 14. is an Argument that their Rules of Fellowship or Discipline are not yet well 
digested.”221 Coole portrays women preachers not as integral to Quaker doctrine, but instead as 
outliers; they cannot be used to denigrate Quakerism because they already are an embarrassment 
to the Society itself. He continues in this vein, foreshadowing the debate he will have with 
Martin ten years later: 
I have Learn’d from some of their Female Advocates, that there are a sort of People 
amongst them, that seem to differ from the main Body or Society, about these Women-
Preachers, since they think ‘em preferrable to the Men; not only in point of the Charming 
Eloquence of some, and Jingles of others, but also in point of Authority, since they look 
upon ‘em to be pointed out by the Royal Prophet, in the 68th Psalm, and 11th verse, which 
some Learned Expositors have rendred to the Feminine Gender. But at the same time, 
they should consider the force of an undisputed Text, and that is, Isa. 3. 12.222
Coole inaccurately labels those who support female preachers within the Society of Friends as 
essentially separatists, and raises the issue that vexed Locke about women in the church – their 
supposed authority over men. He dismisses out of hand the rhetorical reasons given for women 
preachers, and – relying on verses not normally brought into the debate over women in the 
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church – organizes scripture into those texts which need “Learned Expositors” (which may 
provide support for women preachers if improperly interpreted) and those which are 
“undisputed” (which supposedly unequivocally forbid women any kind of religious authority). 
Ten years later, Coole found Locke an important ally in his attempts to normalize Quaker 
doctrine by limiting the role of women. As Huff observes, more than half of Coole’s Brief 
Observations was made up of direct quotations from Locke’s reading of 1 Corinthians 11.223 By 
calling Locke “Judicious” in the full title of his text, Coole also demonstrates the high esteem in 
which he held him: Locke, following Molyneux, had employed the term throughout his Second 
Treatise of Government to express his debt to Richard Hooker.224 Relying on Locke’s authority, 
Coole maintained in Brief Observations that a restricted ministry of Quaker women was allowed 
but not any kind of teaching or preaching.225 Coole’s text was popular enough to go into a 
second edition in 1716 and to provoke a response from his fellow Quaker, Josiah Martin. 
Like Coole, Martin also relies on Locke’s Paraphrase as his primary source; indeed, both 
astonishingly rely much more on Locke for support than scripture. Crucially, Martin is aware of 
the potential inconsistency in Locke’s stance towards Friends and enthusiasm, and unexpectedly 
attributes the supposed change in his position between his denigration of enthusiasm in the Essay 
and seeming acceptance of charismatic utterances in his Paraphrase directly to the influence of 
women preachers. He notes that he heard from “a Person of known Probity” that Locke was “so 
affected” with the testimony of a Quaker woman that he said “That something Divine and 
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Extraordinary attended the Preaching of that Woman.”226 Martin concludes that, “considering 
[Locke’s] Sentiments” in his Paraphrase are “so different from his former Writings, especially 
that Chapter on Enthusiasm, in his Treatise of Human Understanding,” it must be that “this 
Woman occasioned much of” Locke’s supposedly liberal understanding of women in the church 
in his Paraphrase.227 Such was the importance and influence of women preachers to Quaker 
theology for Martin that they supposedly could alter Locke’s philosophical and theological 
positions. Although Coole dismisses Martin as naïve, and suggests that he has been imposed 
upon by “designing People” to believe such a “Legendary Story,” Martin’s argument here –  
which ends his text – demonstrates both that Locke’s 1700 attack on Quaker theology troubled 
influential Friends and that women preachers were seen as essential to that theology.228  
Apart from his reading of Locke, Martin marshals both scriptural and empirical evidence 
in his defense of women preachers. Among other parts of scripture, he discusses “The Woman of 
Samaria” from John 4 – as discussed above, a popular text in seventeenth-century Quaker 
defenses of women – and also cites both William Tyndale and Martin Luther. He argues that 
“History furnishes us with large Accounts of Women, who have excel’d in Divine and Moral 
Vertues: Women who have shewn great Capacities for Learning and Science, and who have 
discharg’d with great Conduct and Magnanimity, the highest Functions in Civil Life.”229 His 
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arguments about the important role women have played in secular history echo those made by 
Astell and Trotter. Significantly, he also echoes the anticlerical rhetoric used by an earlier 
generation of Quaker women authors, especially Margaret Fell. Martin argues that clerical 
unscrupulousness is ultimately to blame for the restrictions placed on women in the church. 
“Women were deprived of the Priviledge of Prophesying or Preaching in the Church,” Martin 
writes, when “primitive Christianity began to be lost amongst its Professors.”230 According to 
Martin, “Priests … mistook the Design of the Christian Religion … which was to propagate 
Peace on Earth, and Good Will to all Men, and made it to consist almost entirely in Speculative 
Doctrine, in dry and empty Forms, and in Ceremonies which have no Manner or Tendency to the 
good of Mankind.”231 As I argued earlier in this chapter, anticlerical rhetoric was the most 
important way that earlier Quaker writers like Margaret Fell advanced political arguments in 
favor of women, and this strategy also drew heavily upon the deep well of anti-Anglican 
“priestcraft” arguments produced by both dissenters and skeptics in the seventeenth century. 
Although he relies on an apocryphal story of Locke’s being influenced by a woman preacher, 
notably Martin does not cite or even mention any Quaker women writers himself in his defense.  
Although Margaret Fell and other Quaker women wrote defenses of women’s religious 
authority in the second half of the seventeenth century, few writers, Quaker or otherwise, 
mention or cite them. The women writers in the generation that followed Fell do not mention her, 
and indeed offer little explicit mention of the feminist traditions carved out by her generation of 
Quaker women; however, despite the lack of explicit references, it is almost certain that Astell, 
Trotter and others were influenced by Quaker women authors. Although Astell in her Preface 
criticizes Locke’s arguments for the natural subjection of women in his Paraphrase she does not 
                                                 
230 Martin, A Letter, 30. 
231 Martin, A Letter, 30. 
 76
mention his limited support for women’s charismatic utterances, suggesting that she regarded 
this liberty granted by Locke as frivolous. On the one hand, this is unsurprising coming from 
someone as hostile to dissent as the Tory Astell was; yet, in her only explicit discussion of 
dissenting women, she is unable to dismiss the power accumulated by these women in the past 
half century. She was, as Melinda Zook points out, almost certainly aware of the numbers of 
female-authored texts written by Quakers for sale in the London bookstalls.232 In the “Prefatory 
Discourse” to her Moderation Truly Stated, Astell argues that “Religion [the Church of England] 
is a Plain, Honest Matron” who cannot compete with “Liberty of Conscience” because she “uses 
a little Art, goes Finer, has the better Address and more plausible Eloquence,” and as a result, 
“Dame Religion … is almost tore to pieces in the Croud.”233 Astell represents Christianity – both 
Anglican and dissenting – as feminine and denigrates dissent by sexualizing it, implicitly 
suggesting that its attractiveness to adherents is due in part to the seductiveness of its women. 
She follows this with an extended satirical dialogue between the Tory John a Nokes and the 
Whig William a Styles in which Nokes argues that “the Young and the Handsome, the Witty and 
the Gay, the Intriguing and Politick Ladies are all on the Factious Side, and only the Old and the 
Ugly, the Praying and the Women of Thought, are on the other.”234 Although Astell later 
criticizes aspects of Nokes’s arguments through “a Lady in the Company,” she again associates 
“Women of Thought” with the Church of England and dismisses dissenting women by eroticizing 
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them.235 However, despite this sexualized dismissal, her attitude toward dissenting women was 
ultimately ambiguous. Styles notes that dissenters include “not a few of the Female Sex” as well 
as numerous artisans: “these Tradesmen are mostly employ’d by the Female Sex, and if the 
Ladies should put themselves in the Head of these Multitudes, what a formidable Insurrection 
would it make!”236 Despite her hostility to dissent, Astell acknowledges the power dissenting 
women could potentially utilize. Moreover, as Nokes observes, “Dissenters … have had great 
Influence over the Female, ever since St. Paul wrote to Timothy.”237 With this crucial claim – 
notably placed in the mouth of a supposed enemy, a Whig – Astell downplays the impact of the 
strict limits on female authority given in 1 Timothy by blaming dissenters from the orthodox 
tradition inaugurated by Paul for female misbehavior. She links contemporary dissenters to these 
early rebels from the Pauline tradition, thus marking the Church of England as the heir to a 
Pauline orthodoxy amenable to feminine authority. Astell’s rhetorical strategy here of linking 
Pauline proscriptions as condemning unruly women rather than all women was one employed by 
Quakers as well. Astell, while not explicitly invoking any specific Quaker or dissenting woman, 
seems to recognize the authority carved out by these nonconformist women writers of the 
previous century even while she continues to denigrate dissent as a whole. 
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Chapter 2: Mary Astell, Gender, and Deism 
 
Deism is often identified as a crucial stage in the progress toward modernity in traditional 
narratives of secularism. In A Secular Age, Charles Taylor asks, “how did an exclusive 
humanism become a live option for large numbers of people?”238 According to Taylor, this 
“genesis comes through an intermediate stage, which is often referred to as ‘Deism.’”239 Because 
deism often functioned as a floating signifier of opprobrium in the long eighteenth century, 
precise definitions of the term are difficult to pin down. Although it is often viewed as a middle-
ground between widespread religious belief and widespread secular unbelief in discussions of an 
emergent Western secularism in the eighteenth century, deism was in fact a heterogeneous group 
of contested beliefs, values, and assumptions. In his recent study of English deism of the long 
eighteenth century, Wayne Hudson calls attention to the varied and multi-layered nature of 
English deists’ writings and argues that “the way they presented themselves and deployed ideas 
and materials is best explained in terms of institutions, political conditions and discursive 
practices, not by reference to a single world view or philosophy.”240 By thinking of these deist 
writers as advancing skeptical arguments that lead inevitably to a secularized public sphere, 
some scholars tend to obscure the wide-ranging and multi-faceted nature of deistic arguments, as 
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well as the slippage in rhetoric between skepticism and liberal, but mostly orthodox, 
manifestations of Anglicanism. Indeed, as Hudson argues, deist writers “advanced Christian 
arguments directed to all readers, but also hinted at more radical possibilities which more 
philosophically minded readers might like to consider.”241 However, of course, “more 
philosophically minded readers” in the early eighteenth century would necessarily include a 
gender and class component; those who were able to discern clearly the multi-layered and subtle 
skepticism inherent in deist writings would be those with the ability and leisure to work through 
the abstruse theological and historical arguments put forth by these writers in order to identify 
what David Berman calls “the art of theological lying.”242
Although they do not play a significant role in Charles Taylor’s study, the third Earl of 
Shaftesbury and John Toland are often identified as crucial proponents of belief systems that fall 
under the heading of deism; in particular Toland’s pantheistic naturalism and Shaftesbury’s 
arguments for the deity as an impersonal, aestheticized representation of the good are frequently 
placed into broad definitions of eighteenth-century deism. For example, in his influential study 
of Shaftesbury, Lawrence Klein writes that Shaftesbury is “well known as a deist of a strongly 
anti-ecclesiastical bent.”243 While Mary Astell is usually recognized as a critic of Locke, she was 
arguably a much more forceful critic of Shaftesbury and, to a lesser extent, Toland.244 Although 
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Astell’s relationship with Locke dominates critical conversations, Sarah Apetrei has recently 
argued that “John Toland … must now be numbered among her interlocutors, together with the 
Deist movement in general.”245 With her critiques of both Toland and thinkers associated with 
him like William Stephens, and Shaftesbury, Astell defended the High Church Anglicanism that 
was central to her feminist project against these skeptical challenges to Christian orthodoxy. In 
her spirited attacks on various strains of deism, Astell critiqued these important ideological 
foundations of secularism during the period of their emergence and argued against the 
exclusionary rhetoric often employed by deist thinkers. By examining Astell’s witty critiques of 
deist writers’ gender politics, this chapter argues both that Astell’s responses to deism are 
important for understanding her feminism and that a more careful look at what eighteenth-
century ideologies of secularism excluded is necessary. Paradoxically for the modern reader, 
Astell (like Fielding, discussed in Chapter Four) effectively divorces her feminism from deism 
and an emergent secular modernity by demonstrating that skeptical arguments often exclude the 
voices of women, and that – read properly – the Bible provides a more robust defense of 
women’s equality than any secular discourse.  
Astell’s Tory feminist arguments against deism complicate Jonathan Israel’s contention 
that the Spinozan “Radical Enlightenment” exclusively charted the path toward modern ideas of 
gender equality. In particular, Israel’s assertion that “only monist systems could supply criteria 
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capable of consistently underpinning a comprehensive doctrine of female equality” seems too 
simple in light of Astell’s arguments against Shaftesbury and Toland.246 Although Toland 
advanced radical arguments about women’s role in Christian history, as I shall discuss later in 
this chapter, he did not do so to argue for an expanded societal role for women, but instead to 
undermine Scriptural authority. In Astell’s view this secularizing of Scripture did not offer more 
freedom for women; instead, the desacralizing of Christianity by radical writers undermined 
what was, to her, the central role the Bible played in advancing both the sectarian and secular 
interests of women in English society. 
From Astell’s point of view, there was little difference between latitudinarianism and 
deism; for her, the former acted as simply a stop on the slippery slope to the latter. Indeed, Astell 
was particularly perceptive in her assault on the supposed toleration of liberal Whigs and 
latitudinarian Anglicans. In numerous pieces, but especially in her three works from 1704 
attacking occasional conformity, Astell pointed out how intolerant liberal Anglicanism really 
was.247 She also criticized the politically convenient use of anti-Catholic rhetoric by 
latitudinarian Anglicans. She was quick to point out the similarities between Locke’s 
latitudinarian arguments in Reasonableness of Christianity and more radical texts. Astell was not 
alone in linking Locke to more radical writers.248 The High Churchman Humfrey Michel, for 
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example, overtly associated “Topping Tolanders” with those “of the Hobbian, Lockian, and 
Machiavilian Stamp” in a 1701 sermon.249 Although Astell spent more time attacking radical 
writers like Shaftesbury, Toland, and William Stephens than she did Locke, to her they were all 
of a piece in threatening the cornerstone of her feminist theology, the sacred place of Christian 
Scripture. 
Astell, Shaftesbury, and Ideologies of Sensibility 
Astell had little good to say about popular fiction, especially with regard to women. In 
her 1694 A Serious Proposal to the Ladies, for the Advancement of Their True and Greatest 
Interest, Astell writes that since “the French Tongue is understood by most Ladies” they should 
study “Des  Cartes, Malebranch and others” instead of “reading idle Novels and Romances.”250 
For Astell, popular fiction served as an impediment to the improvement of women because it 
prevented the theological edification that could be gained through a study of writers Astell saw 
as promoting correct understandings of Christianity. The moral didacticism that later women 
writers such as Sarah Fielding saw in domestic fiction Astell locates in philosophy. Although her 
only literary work was a small volume of unpublished poems presented to the nonjuring 
Archbishop of Canterbury William Sancroft upon her 1689 arrival in London, several scholars 
have analyzed the ways in which her theological and gender critiques influenced aspects of 
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eighteenth-century literature.251 As early as 1913, scholars have suggested that Astell served as a 
potential model for Richardson’s Clarissa Harlowe.252 More recently, Helen Thompson argues 
that Astell’s “feminist physiology” elucidates the eighteenth-century domestic novel.253 If the 
primary – although certainly not only – links established by literary scholars between Astell and 
eighteenth-century fiction concern her influence on Richardson and the domestic novel, it is not 
surprising that scholars see her as an influence on the eighteenth-century ideology of sensibility. 
In his study The Culture of Sensibility, G.J. Barker-Benfield examines Astell’s Platonism 
and ambivalent attitudes towards an emergent consumer culture, arguing that the “linking of 
sensationalism to male appetite is one clue in understanding the appeal of Cambridge Platonism 
… in the ensuing sentimental culture of women, including its embrace of Shaftesbury.”254 
Barker-Benfield notes that although Astell “attacked Shaftesbury” in print, she “in effect was on 
the same side in posing Cambridge Platonism against the dangers embodied in the writings of 
Locke.”255 Although there were certainly affinities between Astell and Shaftesbury, particularly 
involving their critiques of Locke, Astell disliked aspects of Shaftesbury’s philosophy so much 
that she devoted her last work, Bart’lemy Fair or an Enquiry after Wit in which due Respect is 
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had to a Letter Concerning Enthusiasm, to attacking it, although when Shaftesbury’s Letter 
Concerning Enthusiasm was published in 1708 she was unsure of its author. Indeed, Astell 
viewed Shaftesbury as a far more dangerous enemy than she did Locke, whom she also praised 
several times.  
In Bart’lemy Fair, Astell devotes considerable time to attacking what she saw as a 
dangerous emergent culture of Whiggish consumerism. As Barker-Benfield argues, “Writers of 
sentimental fiction shared with early feminists an ambivalent response to commercial 
capitalism”; as evidence he claims that Astell, despite her critiques, “by no means rejected 
consumerism,” citing her immersion in the aristocratic world of Chelsea where she spent the 
final years of her life.256 Yet, in her published work, especially both editions of Bart’lemy Fair, 
Astell presents a scathing critique of consumer culture. If Shaftesbury is a crucial, or even the 
most crucial, influence on eighteenth-century ideologies of sensibility, then Astell’s critiques of 
Shaftesbury deserve greater scrutiny. Moreover, her attacks on Shaftesbury and Whig ideology 
in Bart’lemy Fair primarily take the form of arguments about how to talk about Christianity and 
theology. These arguments about the proper way to “do” theology have an important bearing on 
the rest of Astell’s work and about how we view her role in the genealogy of sensibility. Astell’s 
attacks on Shaftesbury’s flippant irreligion signal how crucial High Church Anglican orthodoxy 
was to her feminism. 
In his study of the “Enlightenment Bible,” Jonathan Sheehan argues that “for long 
centuries, the Bible had been a self-legitimating text,” but during the long eighteenth century, 
“biblical authority was reassigned to the world of human beings.”257 According to Sheehan, “the 
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Enlightenment Bible became authoritative by virtue of its connection and relevance to human 
morality, aesthetics, and history”; rather than unquestioning faith, “culture would be the new 
rock atop which the legitimacy of the Bible was built.”258 Although Sheehan does not mention 
him, Shaftesbury treated the Bible and Christianity as merely one text and one belief system in 
an ever-expanding arena of competing ideas; his relativism evoked considerable consternation in 
Astell and other thinkers aligned with more orthodox understandings of religion. As Stanley 
Grean writes, “Shaftesbury is anxious to convince his reader that no book in human language 
should be placed in the privileged category of being above criticism.”259 Astell, in contrast, 
privileged the infallibility of the Bible, not only because of her commitment to Anglican 
orthodoxy, but because she (usually) viewed the Bible as an infallible defender of women. She 
writes in her 1706 Preface to the third edition of her Reflections Upon Marriage “that One Text 
for us, is more to be regarded than many against us.”260 For Astell, “Holy Scripture considers 
Women very differently from what they appear in the common Prejudices of Mankind.”261  It 
was exactly this point about the privileged place of the Bible and High Church ideology in 
English society and its implications for women that, in part, provoked Astell to respond to 
Shaftesbury’s Letter Concerning Enthusiasm. 
Apart from Shaftesbury’s attack on all of scripture, what also motivated Astell as a High 
Church Anglican was her ideological investment in defending the Church of England. Her three 
Tory tracts in 1704, her 1705 The Christian Religion, and her 1709 Bart’lemy Fair all serve as 
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defenses of High Church Anglicanism. Astell writes that she is “a Member of the Church of 
England, not because [she] was Born in England, and Educated by Conforming Parents,” but 
because the Church of England conforms to “the Doctrine and Precepts of Christianity” and is 
“free from the Corruptions of Rome, and the Imperfections of Geneva.”262 According to Astell, 
without the Established Church, English Christianity descended into “Dissoluteness and 
Prophaneness”: when “those zealous Reformers” held sway in England during the Interregnum 
they “ridicul’d the Holy Sacrament of Baptism, by carrying their Horses to the Font” and made 
“the very Altar their Brothel.”263 A unified, hierarchical national church is essential for Astell 
because “Order, Decency, Unity, and Church Communion, tend to the perfecting of the Saints, 
[and] to the edifying of the Body of Christ.”264 Because “the Holy Ghost has made the Bishops 
Overseers of the Flock,” a Christian must “live in constant Communion with the Bishop.”265 For 
Astell, conforming to the Church of England is a Biblically mandated command: “separate 
Congregations among Natives” is unacceptable because “[t]he Doctrine of the Establish’d 
National Church” is “exactly agreeable” to the Bible.266 As a result, Astell writes that the 
“Christian Religion does no where allow Rebellion … and he that bawls out the Liberty of 
Conscience and Loss of Religion to vindicate his Rebellion, has too much Atheism in him, to be 
a true Christian.”267 Astell’s response to Shaftesbury came at the end of a decade in which she 
zealously defended Tory High Church ideology. She viewed his anti-ecclesiastical and deistical 
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attack on High Church Anglicanism as of a piece with those of her other Whig opponents in the 
first decade of the eighteenth century. 
Shaftesbury’s Letter was originally published in 1708, and was included in his three 
volume Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times in 1711. It originally was part of a 
private correspondence to Lord Somers, and was a response to the Camisard émigrés from 
France – Shaftesbury’s “French Protestants” – a zealous Protestant sect that arose in France after 
Louis XIV rescinded the Edict of Nantes in 1685. Members of the sect fled to England around 
1707.268 As Robert Voittle writes, the Camisards prophesied in public “in every possible antic 
manner – from trances, in languages unknown to the speaker, with all sorts of bodily contortions, 
even walking on hands,” and also issued various proclamations about the end of the world and 
the destruction of London.269 It was this type of public religious “enthusiasm” exhibited by the 
Camisards and some English dissenting sects that provoked ridicule from urbane Whigs and 
resulted in Shaftesbury’s attack on religion in his Letter. 
The Camisards were active in England during another flare-up of discussion about the 
limits of English religious toleration, in this case the debate about occasional conformity. 
Occasional conformity was intended to evade the political limitations placed on nonconformists 
by allowing them to attend a Church of England service once a year to become eligible for public 
office. Several bills to restrict the practice were introduced in Parliament between 1702 and 1705 
by the Tories, but none passed. This was a debate that Astell herself contributed to with her three 
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political tracts published in 1704. Shaftesbury takes the opportunity offered by the French 
Prophets to argue for a broad toleration in a unique way by maintaining “that provided we treat 
Religion with good manners, we can never use too much good Humour, or examine it with too 
much Freedom and Familiarity.”270 According to Shaftesbury, if religion “be genuine and 
sincere, it will not only stand the Proof, but thrive and gain Advantage from hence: if it be 
spurious, or mixt with any Imposture, it will be detected and expos’d.”271 Despite his weak 
disclaimer about the importance of “good manners” for his project, Shaftesbury’s contention that 
one should examine religion with “Freedom and Familiarity” effectively desacralizes religious 
ideology and equates its truth value with its ability to withstand scrutiny in the public arena. 
Shaftesbury’s famous “Test of Ridicule” negates the self-legitimating quality of revealed 
Christianity that believers like Astell saw as essential in favor of treating Christianity as one of 
many competing belief systems that are a part of English culture. For Shaftesbury, Christianity 
must be subsumed within a larger idea of a civil society if theological debates are not to end in 
disruptions of the social order. As Philip Ayres remarks, Shaftesbury’s “target … is obviously 
not the French prophets but dogmatic Christianity in its ‘revealed’ aspects.”272 Indeed, as 
Lawrence Klein observes, Shaftesbury’s criticism of enthusiasm “took a stock element of 
Anglican polemic and turned it against” High Church Anglicans.273 Astell obviously identified 
with High Church Anglicans and promoted the idea that Anglican theology essentially equated 
with reason. She also believed that Christianity outside of Anglicanism was outside of reason 
and thus can be tarred as enthusiasm. Astell, like Shaftesbury, had little sympathy for dissenting 
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sects and what she saw as their disruptions to both social and godly order, as evidenced by her 
1704 tracts which primarily targeted dissenters. However, Shaftesbury takes Astell’s logic to, 
what is to her, an extreme and unwarranted conclusion, by implying that essentially all belief is a 
mode of enthusiasm. 
Part of Shaftesbury’s project is to promote classical values and ancient learning and place 
it in competition with what he sees as Anglicanism’s reliance on ecclesiastical authority; there is 
an “affinity of spirit between the English cultural present and the classical past” for Shaftesbury, 
“for whom correct aesthetics go hand-in-hand with correct ethics and whose theistic philosophy 
conforms with the sentiments” of classical authors.274 In order to privilege classical learning, 
Shaftesbury attacks Anglican ecclesiology. Thus he complains that “we Christians … will allow 
nothing to poor Heathens” who “must be Infidels in every sense” even though “a Reverend 
Christian Prelate” may “believe in Fairys” – an implicit, but clear, attack on Anglican 
authority.275 He explicitly draws parallels between ancient theology and current Christianity, 
noting that “Muses” were “essential in [the ancient’s] System of Theology” and that because 
“Revelation … evidently made so well for their Art” it was not “the Business of Poets in those 
days” to question it.276 By explicitly promoting theology’s value as an aesthetic discourse at the 
expense of its status as the privileged means by which cultural and political questions are 
decided, Shaftesbury endorses what Sheehan describes as the secularizing project of the 
changing status of revealed religion in the long eighteenth century. Shaftesbury’s promotion of 
the aesthetic utility of religion is only one of several ways he explicitly and implicitly attacks 
revealed religion. 
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Shaftesbury’s arguments necessarily displace religion’s sacred role in the English public 
sphere. He claims that where “any … other Cause is powerful enough to restrain the Freedom of 
Censure in any part, it in effect destroys the Benefit of it in the whole,” and “’Tis only in a free 
Nation, such as ours, that Imposture has no Privilege”; even “the Awfulness of a Church” cannot 
“give her Protection.”277 Anglican ecclesiastical authority, suggests Shaftesbury, exists not to 
promote Christianity, but rather to shield it from proper ridicule. No “peculiar Custom or 
National Opinion,” he argues, should be “exempted from Criticism.”278 Since he argues that 
persecution would only play into the hands of dissenting sects, he ironically notes “how 
barbarous” it is that “we tolerating English Men” reject “the Honour of a Persecution” for the 
prophesying Camisards.279 In place of harassment, he famously proposes his “Bart’lemy Fair 
Method” whereby, like puppet shows at the Fair, supposedly disagreeable “Prophesying 
Enthusiasts” are made figures of mockery rather than martyrdom.280 More gallingly for his 
critics, Shaftesbury ironically extends his method from more easily mocked enthusiasts to 
Christians as a whole, claiming that had “the Jews” simply “taken the Fancy to act such Puppet-
Shews,” mocking Jesus and the apostles, “they might possible have done our Religion more 
Harm, than by all their other ways of Severity.”281 Although he acts the part of a concerned 
Christian, Shaftesbury’s implication is clear: the central tenets of Christian faith – the death and 
resurrection of Jesus, the Divinity of the Son – are fair game for mockery. Moreover, for 
Shaftesbury in his Letter, the supposed Anglican monopoly on Christianity merely serves to 
protect it from warranted scrutiny. 
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Shaftesbury’s explicit promotion of other avenues to truth at the expense of reason and 
traditional Christian apologetics strikes at the very epistemological foundations that Astell and 
other theologians use to argue for the legitimacy of Christianity. Shaftesbury does not simply call 
into question the arguments of theologians; instead, through his ironic treatment of the traditional 
rhetoric of validating religious claims, he questions their method of establishing truth. For 
Shaftesbury, traditional Christian arguments are inadequate in themselves because they neither 
accord with reason nor do they properly take into account human emotion. He makes this clear 
when he dismisses Pascal’s wager, a classic theological argument which relies on the threat of 
eternal punishment for its rhetorical strength: “our Reason … will never rest thorowly satisf’d on 
such a Bottom,” and, as a result, “we cannot but grow worse in our Religion, and entertain a 
worse Opinion still of a Supreme DEITY, whilst our Belief is founded on so injurious a Thought 
of him.”282 For Shaftesbury, a true examination of Christian truth claims requires not just the use 
of our reason, but also the proper frame of mind in pursuing the inquiry. Because Shaftesbury so 
greatly downplays traditional arguments from both Scripture and faith, as Astell and other critics 
contended, he reduces God to an ambiguous emanation of the human sense of the Good. 
Equating God with the Good was a standard theological move, but in the eyes of his critics 
Shaftesbury’s reduction of God goes too far because of its overemphasis on aesthetic value. 
In a passage that would have a lasting influence on the mid-eighteenth-century “good-
natured man” of Henry Fielding and others, Shaftesbury writes: 
This, my Lord, is the Security against all Superstition: To remember, that there is nothing 
in GOD but what is Godlike; and that he is either not at all, or truly and perfectly Good. 
But when we are afraid to use our Reason freely, even on that very Question, “Whether 
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He really be, or not,” we then actually presume him bad, and flatly contradict that 
pretended Character of Goodness and Greatness; whilst we discover this mistrust of his 
Temper, and fear his Anger and Resentment, in the case of this Freedom of INQUIRY.283
As Shaftesbury represents it, even questioning God’s existence should not be out of bounds 
because God’s essentially perfect and benevolent identity precludes his anger at the use of reason 
to determine the validity of religious truth claims. God’s perfectly good nature is incapable of 
anger at anyone’s searching after truth about the nature of divinity. Shaftesbury’s heavy-handed 
equation of God with goodness has important implications for his conception of how one uses 
reason to discover religious truths. Because God and goodness are linked so closely in 
Shaftesbury’s scheme, one is simply incapable of rejecting God’s existence through a 
disinterested search after truth. Thus, an atheist is not one who simply rejects Christian 
arguments but actually one whose nature will not allow him or her to accept the proper 
understanding of goodness: as Shaftesbury writes, “It is impossible that any besides an ill-natur’d 
Man can wish against the Being of a GOD” because “this is wishing against … one’s private 
Good.”284 It is not then simply rational argumentation that proves the validity of religion but it is 
instead one’s nature; as a result of Shaftesbury’s deistic rhetoric, theological argumentation is 
explicitly removed from its status as a privileged discourse in favor of concern over the 
subjective orientation of one’s passions. It is humanity that sets the standard for God in 
Shaftesbury’s rhetoric, not the other way around: “’tis hard to imagine, what Honour can arise to 
the DEITY from the Praises of Creatures, who are unable to discern what is Praise-worthy … in 
their own Kind.”285 The upshot of Shaftesbury’s scheme entails that “before we ascended in the 
                                                 
283 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, 1:22. 
284 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, 1:23. 
285 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, 1:26. 
 93
higher Regions of Divinity” we should “descend a little into our-selves.”286 For Shaftesbury then, 
it is ultimately humanity’s goodness which should set the standard for our understanding of “the 
DEITY,” a position that clearly infuriated the neo-Platonic Astell, who held with her 
correspondent John Norris, at least in part, that “GOD … is the only Object of our Love.”287
Shaftesbury claims his arguments are a “plain home-spun Philosophy,” but they are 
clearly meant to promote a radical skepticism.288 A proper regulation of one’s “Senses,” he 
maintains, will stop one from being “addicted to every upstart Sect or Superstition” and “may 
teach us to oppose more successfully those Delusions which come arm’d with the specious 
Pretext of moral Certainty, and Matter of Fact.”289 His reference to “moral Certainty” echoes the 
logical ground that Anglican theologians, most famously William Chillingworth, had long used 
to ground the validity of revealed Scripture, and Shaftesbury explicitly dismisses it as a 
reasonable basis for religion.290
Shaftesbury’s insistence on humanity’s role in defining supposedly divine standards 
results in a further (and interconnected) affront to Astell, an oblique attack on women. In his 
insistence that God be judged according to human standards, Shaftesbury raises the specter of 
gender, arguing that “impotent” women should not be the gender that we look to for divine 
attributes:  
Is the doing Good for Glory’s sake, so divine a thing? or, Is it not diviner, to do Good 
even where it may be thought inglorious, even to the Ingrateful, and to those who are 
wholly insensible of the Good they receive? How comes it then that what is so divine in 
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us, shou’d lose its Character in the Divine Being? And that according as the DEITY is 
represented to us, he shou’d more resemble the weak, womanish, and impotent part of 
our Nature, than the generous, manly and divine?291
Shaftesbury’s brusque throwaway attack in this passage on women’s natures is perhaps even 
more infuriating to Astell than the implication that God should be judged by standards derived 
from an examination of human nature. For Astell, Shaftesbury demonstrates the inherent dangers 
for women in removing God from a privileged position because once God is judged using human 
standards women are in danger of becoming marginalized by the refashioning of a deity in the 
image of a misogynistic culture. As I discuss below, her understanding of High Church Anglican 
ideology for Astell serves as the crucial defender of women’s interests against the misogynist 
presumptions of English culture. Shaftesbury’s arguments that displace divinity’s privilege then 
also greatly undermine Astell’s Tory theology that is an essential support of her feminism. 
Thus, although Shaftesbury is attacking all forms of revealed religion, his assault on High 
Church orthodoxy also threatens the basis of Astell’s feminist positions: he writes ironically that 
“Uniformity in Opinion (a hopeful Project!)” is promoted as the answer to irreligion, and as a 
result, “the very end of Government it-self” has become the “saving of Souls.”292 Shaftesbury 
attacks the foundation of Tory religious thought – the need for a universal, royally-sanctioned 
national Church as a support against irreligion and heterodoxy – as counter-productive because 
the authoritarianism of a coercive state church violates the necessity of free inquiry for the 
individual subject that is essential to establishing, by reason, God’s true goodness. The Tory 
Anglican Jonas Proast, for example, argued in his protracted debate with Locke over his 1689 
Epistola de Tolerantia that the usefulness of the state’s ability to coerce dissenters and others to 
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Anglicanism trumped the need for toleration.293 Although the attack on Tory religious arguments 
against toleration is unsurprising, what makes it unique is Shaftesbury’s rhetoric and style of 
argumentation, which is ironic, playful and highly sarcastic. Shaftesbury does away with the 
common ground generally found in religio-political arguments from both Whig and Tory 
propagandists by treating divinity itself as an object that must stand the test of public ridicule. 
Because of Shaftesbury’s ironic attack on High Church orthodoxy, it is no surprise Astell 
was provoked enough to write a furious reply, one of several to Shaftesbury’s controversial 
Letter.294 Astell’s response, Bart’lemy Fair or an Enquiry after Wit in which due Respect is had 
to a Letter Concerning Enthusiasm, was originally published under a borrowed name (Mr. 
Wotton) in 1709.295 Astell, not knowing the anonymous author was Shaftesbury, but suspecting 
the author was someone connected to aristocratic Whig circles, prefaced the text with an ironic 
dedication “To the most Illustrious Society OF THE KIT-KATS.”296 Astell republished the text 
in 1722, unchanged except for the title page, which identifies Shaftesbury as the author of the 
Letter, and an additional “Advertisement” appended to the beginning. In Bart’lemy Fair, Astell 
attempts to conjoin the High Church Anglicanism and virtue that Shaftesbury had disassociated, 
and does so by making an explicitly gendered argument. 
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Although An Enquiry After Wit was Astell’s last publication, it has received relatively 
little scholarly attention.297 In the “Advertisement” Astell added to the 1722 second edition, she 
deliberately positions herself as a Christian martyr because the 1709 edition resulted in mocking 
attacks on her in the pages of the Tatler.298 Her Whig antagonists have “her Thanks” because 
“Blessedness and Reward” are “promis’d to all who are revil’d and evil spoken of falsely for 
GOD’s Sake.”299 Astell rhetorically presents herself as the defender of Christianity against 
attacks from dissolute libertines: “in a Christian Country, professing so much Zeal for 
Reformation, there needs no Apology for chastising the Insolence of Profane Persons, however 
distinguish’d.”300 For Astell, Shaftesbury and other Whigs are threatening the vital Protestant 
ideology on which the High Church Tory conception of Englishness rests. More importantly, her 
defense should receive special support because its author is a woman. Because libertines 
especially corrupt women, it falls on virtuous “English Ladies” to fly to the support of English 
virtue and its Christian foundations. Astell thus turns her sex into an asset in her defense of her 
authorship: 
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When [the 1709 Enquiry] was wrote, that Sex which us’d to be honour’d with the 
Character of Devotion and Modesty, had not broke through this natural Barrier, to rush 
into the bold Licentiousness of the other. Their progress these last Seven Years, has 
exceeded all we have formerly seen or heard of English Ladies. It is necessary therefore, 
that some of the Sex shou’d enter their Protest against this horrible Indecency and 
Novelty, as well as Profaneness.301
With characteristic irony Astell suggests that “English Ladies” have embraced “Licentiousness,” 
thus forcing her, as a woman, to attack this “Profaneness.” She thus turns the tables on those she 
views as her enemies and defends herself against the sexist attacks leveled at her by The Tatler 
by positioning herself as the defender of English Protestant virtue and “Devotion” against those 
“Profane Persons” who would dare strip England of its most important ideological pillar – its 
Anglican faith – by violently decoupling Christianity and virtue.302
Crucially, however, Astell rejects the political significance of Christianity and wittily 
adopts the same strategy that Shaftesbury deployed in his Letter of appropriating a crucial term 
in the Anglican rhetorical arsenal; while Shaftesbury turned “enthusiasm” against High Church 
Anglicans, Astell uses Anglican rhetoric about “popery” against Low Church Anglicans. She 
observes that those “who tell us, that Popery is worse than Atheism, cannot think as they say, 
unless they think it better to live without GOD in the World.”303 “Popery” was an especially 
adaptable signifier in Anglican ideology throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
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Astell, while suggesting that any form of Christianity (even Catholicism) is better than atheism, 
recognizes the politicized appropriation of the term “popery,” arguing that “Let us in GOD’s 
Name, and with His Truths, heartily oppose the Errors of the Roman Church, but let not 
Christianity be banish’d from our Land, out of a pretended Fear of Popery.”304 For Astell, the 
English “shew as little Charity as we ascribe to the Papists, if we exclude from the Kingdom of 
Heaven, such of them as are invincibly ignorant of their Superstitions and Errors.”305 According 
to Astell, “under the Pretence of being good Protestants, by which no more is meant than 
declaring against Popery” those “Men of No-Religion” strike “against Christianity in general.”306 
Astell rejects the deployment of religious language used not just by Shaftesbury, but also by 
several generations of latitudinarian Anglican divines in their disputes with Catholic doctrine. 
This rehabilitation of religious argument is what motivates her Enquiry, and it requires the 
support of what are to her inarguably clear and rational defenses of Christianity’s truth claims. 
Astell thus articulates in the “Advertisement” to her Enquiry a more nuanced 
understanding of the relationship between the English state and Christianity than simple 
renditions of her as a High Church Tory might indicate. For Astell, the government can do 
nothing to support and protect religion if the virtue of its subjects is corrupted by powerful 
aristocrats: she writes that “humane Policies are not proper Methods to defend the Church of 
Christ, or to maintain the Truths and Holiness of the Christian Profession.”307 She makes a 
crucial distinction here and in the body of her Enquiry between the sociopolitical use of religious 
terms and true belief. In Astell’s scheme, one is a “BIGOT” who is “zealous for the Name and 
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Externals of Religion, without the Life and Power.”308 It thus is not foreign Catholics who are 
the largest threat, but rather skeptics who imperil the English state. She ends her 
“Advertisement” by pointing out that two of the most important tropes of Whig ideology, 
“liberty” and “property,” can mean nothing without both proper Christian morality and 
philosophy: “For when Men’s Principles are lost, and their Vertue corrupted, Liberty and 
Property become an easy Prey.”309 What makes Shaftesbury and his Whig colleagues so 
dangerous in Astell’s view is that the Letter – and its particular form of raillery – is equivalent to 
other irreligious publications because of its self-conscious flouting and misuse of formerly sacred 
terms.  
According to Astell, this misuse of religious language was characteristic of latitudinarians 
in their skirmishes with both Catholicism and High Church Anglicanism. Even though her 
immediate target is Shaftesbury, in her attacks on desacralized religious discourse, Astell yokes 
latitudinarian Anglicans and libertine, deistical Whigs. Because “the Letter concerning 
Enthusiasm (the civil Name they bestow on Christianity) is lately reviv’d” along with other 
“Impious Books that are publish’d with Impunity,” it is up to Astell again to enter the fray and 
republish her Inquiry.310 By explicitly identifying Shaftesbury’s irreligious motives in his 
implicit extension of enthusiasm to all of Christianity, Astell highlights her larger purpose: 
articulating a depoliticized Christianity supported by reason. Obviously Astell was no stranger to 
political theorizing, and also not above making religio-political arguments herself, especially in 
the three works she published against Occasional Conformity in 1704. In her Enquiry, however, 
part of Astell’s concern is to depoliticize religious discourse and provide its truth claims with 
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what she viewed as solid evidentiary support.311 Crucially, Astell equates deism and atheism in 
her “Advertisement,” and because her attacks are now leveled at both, Astell downplays the 
political rhetoric that was so important to her previous polemical works against dissenters and 
latitudinarians. 
One of Astell’s key moves in Enquiry is to oppose Shaftesbury’s wit to reasoned 
argumentation, and she does so by explicitly invoking gender.312 According to Astell, “our Men 
of Wit” are able to “prove there is no GOD, or that GOD is such an insignificant Idol as the 
Letter describes, let them be as Merry with Him as they think fit”; otherwise it is “the very height 
of Folly and Madness to treat Him irreverently” until “Proof is made.”313 Reasoned 
argumentation must come before raillery for Astell. Throughout the Enquiry, she is concerned 
with opposing Shaftesbury’s wit by a counteracting move toward the register of reasoned 
discourse. Shaftesbury ironically attacks traditional methods of theological dispute by both using 
Scripture superficially and by dismissing without qualification Pascal’s Wager, a standard of 
traditional Christian apologetics. For Astell, Shaftesbury’s refusal to participate in traditional 
methods of theological dispute signals his abdication of his masculine, aristocratic duty. 
Implicitly revisiting Shaftesbury’s throwaway remark about “the weak, womanish … part of our 
Nature,” Astell accuses her Whig antagonists of first not being gentlemen, and second of acting 
in an unmanly fashion. She articulates both a rank-based attack that Shaftesbury and his circle 
lack honor, and a gender-based critique that he is acting unmanly:  
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WHETHER the Adversaries of Religion be Gentlemen or no, one knows not; they give 
us Reason to think they are not, since ‘tis evident they do not Act like Men of any Honor, 
or tolerable Breeding. Nothing more Disingenuous and Unmanly than their Attaques; for 
to wound Religion by Insinuations and fly Suggestions, which is Calumny and 
Detraction; to Laugh when they cannot Reason, and turn into Ridicule the Arguments 
they cannot Answer; is as cowardly and foul, as to stab a Man in the Back, whom you 
dare not meet with Sword in hand. But that an irreligious Man should be a Coward is no 
wonder; if you want Instances look on the Crouds in the Chocolate, Coffee and Gaming-
Houses, who if they were not Poltrons, wou’d be serving their Queen and Country in a 
Camp.314
By assailing religion through mockery and insinuations, Astell’s Whig adversaries are neglecting 
their “manly” duty, which comes as no surprise, since instead of serving under Queen Anne, they 
spend their days in leisure in the traditional bastions of the secular public sphere. Shaftesbury’s 
wit is in fact a cover for his lack of actual arguments against the truth claims of Christianity. As 
she says earlier in the Enquiry, “Wit … is a much more uncertain and arbitrary thing than either 
Reason, or Religion.”315 Shaftesbury, and by implication the dissolute, masculine Whiggish 
public sphere of which he is a part, have ceded the theological high ground to the female, High 
Church Astell. She directs her fierce rhetoric at what she thinks gives Shaftesbury and his Whig 
allies their legitimacy, their “breeding,” a crucial tenet for Shaftesbury. By questioning their 
civility and honor by identifying them with lower-class “Poltrons,” Astell emphasizes how her 
Whig enemies have renounced their masculine obligation to defend England’s Protestant virtue. 
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Astell’s preoccupation with reasoned argumentation throughout the Enquiry was thus not 
only motivated by the fact that she sincerely believed it was the best means of robustly 
supporting Christian truth claims, but also because the wit and mockery used by Shaftesbury and 
his contemporaries, emanating from the “Crouds in the Chocolate, Coffee and Gaming-Houses,” 
was unavailable to Astell as a woman. She explicitly devalues Whig arguments by linking them 
to irreligion and cowardice, and attempts to do what she claims they cannot – defend Christian 
truth claims through reason. As a result, Astell works to offer an evidentiary basis for 
Christianity. She not only criticizes Shaftesbury’s rhetorical methods, but also spends pages 
modeling an alternative. 
Astell writes that “Witty Men” know nothing of Christianity “because they will not apply 
their Thoughts to the Study of it, nor themselves to the Practice,” thus defining the two positions 
that are crucial to her understanding of Anglican ideology.316 In her magnum opus, The 
Christian Religion, discussed in the latter half of this chapter, she is concerned largely with the 
practice of Christianity, in the Enquiry she is more concerned with apologetics. As a way of 
protesting the “Profanely Saucy” manner in which Shaftesbury treats “the King of Heaven,” 
Astell offers several arguments in favor of Christianity; she seeks to demonstrate that “Reason … 
is the Judge of Wit; and Religion, which is only Improv’d Reason, is a Privileg’d Subject, not to 
be touch’d by Raillery.”317 By maintaining that reason is a secondary reflection of religion, 
Astell seeks to set Christianity above the realm of public debate and mockery where Shaftesbury 
thrusts it. For Astell, mockery cannot delegitimize religious discourse, and a “reasoned” attack 
on Christianity is a logical impossibility because “Religion … is only Improv’d Reason.” 
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Through her defense of the reasonableness of Christianity, Astell relies on contemporary 
scientific discourse to add legitimacy to her claims. She writes that “Mathematics as well as 
Divinity” have disproved the world’s self-existence without a divine maker.318 Because none can 
accuse “Sir Isaac Newton” of “Priestcraft,” he “will Demonstrate this to you, as well as any 
Divine” assuming “your Reason is sublime enough to understand him.”319 “Priestcraft” served as 
an important term for Whig attacks on both the Restoration Church and High Church 
Anglicanism. Mark Goldie argues that “the cynosure of Whig anticlericalism [was] the birth of a 
new word in the political lexicon, ‘priestcraft.’”320 Astell recognizes the importance this term has 
to her Whig antagonists, but ironically enlists Newton, an important Whig, to mitigate its power. 
For Astell, the self-evident nature of Newton’s work could seemingly be divorced from his 
politics. Astell asks, “Will you ascribe Self-Existence to the first of Human Race?”321 Likewise, 
she argues that the “Gravitation” that is so “necessary to the very Being of the Universe, in that 
form we now behold it, or at least to our Solar System, and as far as our Observations and 
Reasoning can carry us,” demonstrates evidence of a divine maker. By invoking Sir Isaac 
Newton in 1709 Astell – somewhat surprisingly for a High Church Tory – participates in what 
was becoming a crucial defense of early enlightenment Christianity: natural philosophy. 
Newtonian natural philosophy, especially as it was promulgated by Newton’s follower 
William Whiston in his 1696 New Theory of the Earth (an attack on Thomas Burnet’s earlier 
Sacred Theory of the Earth), provided Anglican divines with an important weapon in their 
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assault on the increasing tide of irreligion in the early eighteenth century.322 Indeed, James E. 
Force maintains that “the perceived strength of the design argument in the first decades of the 
18th century” was so powerful that “Whiston can argue that it is impossible to be a true atheist, 
given all the elements in the Newtonian system supporting an inference to a divine architect.”323 
Whiston, the latitudinarian divine Samuel Clarke, and other Newtonians argued that advances in 
natural philosophy were so indisputable that speculative atheism was practically impossible, and 
thus deists were functionally atheists who were incapable of formulating rational arguments 
against Christianity and were forced to rely on mockery and scoffing.324 Following his 1691 
death, Robert Boyle left a modest endowment for a series of lectures for “proving the Christian 
Religion against notorious Infidels,” and these lectures served to propagate Newtonianism in 
defense of Christianity.325 Samuel Clarke writes in his 1705 Boyle Lectures that “their bantering 
and ridiculing, without and before examination … without at all considering the main Body of 
Religion … show plainly and undeniably, that they are not really Deists, but mere Atheists.”326 
Similarly Whiston writes in his 1717 Astronomical Principles of Religion, Natural and Reveal’d 
that deism is “taken up of late, not by honest Enquirers, impartially searching after Truth,” but is 
instead “chiefly fallen into of late, by some Irreligious Persons, in the Distress of their Affairs, 
and upon that surprising and overbearing Light, which Sir Isaac Newton’s wonderful discoveries 
                                                 
322 On William Whiston, see especially James E. Force, William Whiston: Honest Newtonian 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). On Newtonianism and early modern discourse, 
see especially Robert Markley, Fallen Languages: Crises of Representation in Newtonian 
England (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). 
323 James E. Force, “The Newtonians and Deism,” in Essays on the Context, Nature, and 
Influence of Isaac Newton’s Theology, eds. James E. Force and Richard H. Popkin (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990), 45. 
324 See Force, “Newtonianism and Deism,” 43-6. 
325 Ezio Vailati, introduction to Samuel Clarke, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of 
God and Other Writings, ed. Ezio Vailati (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), x. 
326 Quoted in Force, “Newtonianism and Deism,” 45. 
 105
have afforded; whereby they have perceived that Natural Religion, with its Foundations, were 
now become too certain to bear any farther Opposition.”327 For Whiston, Christianity supported 
by Newtonian natural philosophy is essentially unassailable. Although she is attacking 
Shaftesbury, a different deistical opponent from those targeted by Clarke and Whiston, Astell 
equates deism and atheism and relies on Newtonian natural philosophy in a similar way to 
construct arguments against Shaftesbury’s mocking dismissal of Christianity. The High Church 
Astell, like Whiston and the Low Church Clarke, contends that in light of the advances of natural 
philosophy, the mocking of religion by deists is a desperate and empty gesture designed to cover 
up the lack of any positive arguments in favor of their “irreligion.” 
Astell was so intent on attacking Shaftesbury that she broke with many of her 
conservative fellows to marshal Newtonian arguments against skepticism. Newton (and both 
Whiston and Clarke) had heterodox interpretations of Christianity. Indeed, Newton, Whiston and 
Clarke were all anti-trinitarians to different degrees, and despite the usefulness of Newtonianism 
for countering skepticism, it could also be used to promote deism. Jonathan Israel argues that 
while Newtonianism “entailed a full-scale revolution” in “all erudite endeavour” it also 
contained an inherent “desacralizing Deistic tendency.”328 Moreover, Newton’s religion and the 
extent to which he held to Anglican orthodoxy has been the subject of scholarly debate. Richard 
S. Westfall argues that while he “differed from the deists” because of his lack of the “essentially 
negative spirit” of writers like John Toland and Matthew Tindal, he ultimately “arrived at 
conclusions remarkably similar to theirs.”329 More recent criticism has argued against the thesis 
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that Newton had deist sympathies, but in any case his theology was unorthodox.330 Unlike Astell, 
many High Church Anglicans viewed Newtonianism suspiciously, believing that it contributed to 
deism and irreligion, and thought it was political as much as it was religious. Astell’s 
correspondent, the High Church non-juring George Hickes wrote that “It is their Newtonian 
philosophy wch hath Made … so many Arians … and that Not onely among ye laity but I fear 
among our devines.”331 In addition to his religious unorthodoxy and connections to latitudinarian 
divines, Newton was a Whig member of Parliament in 1689-90 and he served as Chancellor of 
the Exchequer under William and Mary. Indeed, Newtonianism is often associated with 
Whiggish politics.332 Astell’s use of Newton’s natural philosophy, then, as one of the crucial 
supports of her apologetics in her assault on Shaftesbury indicates both how fluid Newtonianism 
was in the early eighteenth century, and how depoliticized Astell’s theology was in her Enquiry, 
despite its polemical tone. Astell set aside her Tory High Church political and theological 
allegiances in the text because Shaftesbury’s deistical assault on Christianity threatened both the 
basis of English society and her feminism. 
                                                 
330 See especially James E. Force, “Biblical Interpretation, Newton, and English Deism,” in 
Scepticism and Irreligion in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, eds. Richard H. Popkin 
and Arjo Vanderjagt (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1993), 282-305. On Newton’s religion, see the essays in 
James E. Force and Richard H. Popkin, eds., Newton and Religion: Context, Nature, and 
Influence (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999) and the essays in James E. Force and Richard H. Popkin, 
eds., Essays on the Context, Nature, and Influence of Isaac Newton’s Theology (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer, 1990). On Newton’s anti-trinitarianism, see especially T.C. Pfizenmaier, “Was Isaac 
Newton an Arian?” Journal of the History of Ideas 58, no. 1 (1997): 57-80. 
331 Quoted in Force, “Biblical Interpretation,” 286n9. On the never published Astell-Hickes 
correspondence, see Apetrei 139-46. 
332 Margaret C. Jacob argues that Newtonianism was crucial for Whig politics in her The 
Newtonians and the English Revolution, 1689-1720 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976). 
Anita Guerrini counters Jacob’s thesis by arguing that Newtonianism “was not confined to a 
particular political or religious frame of mind in the early eighteenth century,” and that “it is 
difficult to define in sweeping terms a ‘Newtonian ideology’ in this period” in “The Tory 
Newtonians: Gregory, Pitcairne, and Their Circle,” The Journal of British Studies 25, no. 3 
(1986): 290. Astell’s appropriation of Newtonianism in her Enquiry seems to reinforce this 
claim. 
 107
If Shaftesbury’s Letter “conflates the public with the Whigs,” as David Alvarez observes, 
then Astell’s Enquiry is an attempt to demonstrate an alternative by overlooking Newton’s 
Whiggish allegiances and by arguing for the universalizing potential of natural philosophy in 
defense of Christianity.333 Astell highlights the exclusionary ideology behind the desacralized 
Christianity promulgated by Shaftesbury, available only to those men with enough social power 
to avoid censure, and argues instead for reason supported with natural philosophy as a more 
universalizing discourse.334 She promotes Newton and emergent discourses of scientific 
empiricism because in her view, Newton is unable to be easily tarred with accusations of 
“priestcraft,” the broad-based and increasingly common attack on High Church Anglican clergy 
made by both Whigs and freethinkers. 
As she did in the end of the “Advertisement,” Astell also turns Shaftesbury’s 
argumentative strategies against him by willfully appropriating the logic of her enemies. She 
accuses Shaftesbury of foolishly ascribing “the Natural Effect of Sin, to Religion,” a position 
Astell obviously finds absurd.335 She sarcastically applies his logic against the Whiggish 
ideological privileging of property, writing “for the same Reason, the Laws of the Land are the 
Cause of all the Robberies and Thefts committed in it; since if there had been no such thing as 
Property, every Man wou’d have had a Right to every thing he cou’d lay his Hands on!”336 She 
argues that if sin is simply a reaction against overly prescriptive religious dictates, then the same 
argument applies to the laws put in place by the state to protect property rights. By 
demonstrating the incoherence of Shaftesbury’s arguments against religion when they are 
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applied to Whiggish philosophy, she implicitly argues against the discursive equivalence he 
makes between Christianity and other areas of English society.  
Astell ends her Inquiry by criticizing the slippery rhetoric Shaftesbury and other deists 
rely on: he “[does] not take care throughout his Letter, to distinguish duly between Religion and 
Enthusiasm.”337 Although throughout her text, Astell wittily turns Shaftesbury’s rhetoric and 
arguments against him, she also attempts to move the discussion of religion into the sphere of 
reason and logic and away from irony and ambiguity. When she claims in her final sentence that 
to “attaque” Christianity in the oblique ironic manner Shaftesbury does is “Unmanly,” she is 
doing more than accusing him of acting in a manner not typically coded as masculine; she is also 
pointing out that, far from promoting tolerance, Shaftesbury’s ironic rhetoric works through the 
exclusion of voices not associated with his aristocratic Whig circle. 
Scientific Rhetoric and the Limits of Scripture 
If Astell promotes natural philosophy as a universalizing discourse in her engagement 
with Shaftesbury, she also saw its strategic efficacy as a method of promoting her feminist 
interpretation of the Bible in her 1706 Preface to the third edition of her Reflections upon 
Marriage. Specifically, her reference to the Copernican controversy lent rhetorical force to her 
attack on Locke’s use of Corinthians to argue against women’s equality in his 1705-07 A 
Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St Paul. Astell’s attack on Locke’s Paraphrase in her 
Reflections has been critically neglected, partly because Locke was identified only recently as 
her target in the text.338 As Goldie notes, Locke’s conclusions about women’s role in Christianity 
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in his Paraphrase were “ambiguous.”339 As discussed in the previous chapter, although Locke 
claims that “that the spirit of god and the gift of prophesie should be powerd out upon women as 
well as men in the time of the gospel is plain from Acts. II.17,” he also argues against any kind 
of equality between the sexes in everyday life.340 He writes that “The Christian religion was not 
to give offence by any appearance or suspition that it took away the subordination of the sexes 
and set the women at liberty from their natural subjection to the men.”341 Locke’s use of 
“natural” is especially galling for Astell because, to her, Locke has no authority to speak for the 
Law of Nature, and in fact his reading of Paul’s prohibitions against women demonstrate that he 
does not know what he is talking about. Astell sarcastically attacks “That Learned Paraphrast … 
who lays so much stress on the Natural Subjection” of women, and argues that, contra Locke, 
Paul “forbids Women to teach in the Church … not because of any Law of Nature.”342 In her 
attacks on Locke’s reading of Corinthians, part of Astell’s strategy is surprisingly to 
circumscribe, in a manner similar to Catharine Trotter and other Whiggish theologians, the limits 
of Scripture by emphasizing its utilitarian role as a moral guide, and in doing so, she 
unexpectedly draws on the deep well of religious skepticism created by natural philosophy. In 
promoting the view of an attenuated Scripture which serves primarily as a moral guidebook, 
Astell has perhaps more in common with latitudinarian Whig Anglicans than she would have 
liked to admit. In a passage following a long discussion of the New Testament’s views on sexual 
equality, Astell writes that she: 
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is of Opinion that Disputes of this kind, extending to Human Nature in general, and not 
peculiar to those to whom the Word of God has been reveal’d, ought to be decided by 
natural Reason only. And that the Holy Scriptures shou’d not be Interessed in the present 
Controversy, in which it determines nothing, any more than it does between the 
Copernican and Ptolomean Systems. The Design of those Holy Books being to make us 
excellent Moralists and Perfect Christians, not great Philosophers. And being writ for the 
Vulgar as well as for the Learned, they are accommodated to the common way of Speech 
and the Usage of the World.343
Astell’s view of Scripture in this passage has evoked surprise among critics, partly because it 
conflicts, at least in part, with opinions she voices elsewhere. Goldie writes that it “is striking 
that Astell here adopts the characteristic position of the Enlightenment rationalist speaking 
against scriptural fundamentalism” and notes that she “turns the screw by invoking Locke’s own 
principles in the Reasonableness” against him.344 Likewise, Apetrei argues that “[t]here is 
clearly a tension in Astell’s thought between a dualism divorcing natural from spiritual 
knowledge, and a Platonic conception of the unity of Scripture, human Reason and the ‘universal 
Reason.’”345 Rhetorically, however, using the Copernican controversy to undermine Scriptural 
authority had a history among Tory women writers. 
Springborg notes that Astell’s reference to the Copernican dispute is most likely a 
reference to William Whiston’s 1696 A New Theory of the Earth, and as mentioned above, Astell 
was clearly familiar with Newtonianism, but clashes about the role Scripture played in 
adjudicating astronomical and other scientific disputes had been ongoing throughout the early 
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modern period.346 In particular, Aphra Behn responded to the controversy in her translator’s 
Preface affixed to her translation of Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle’s Entretiens sur La Pluralité 
des Mondes, published in England in 1688 with the title A Discovery of New Worlds. After 
discussing Fontenelle’s defense of the Copernican system and wryly claiming that she “cannot 
but take his part as far as a Woman’s Reasoning can go,” she argues “that the design of the Bible 
was not to instruct Mankind in Astronomy, Geometry, or Chronology, but in the Law of God, to 
lead us to Eternal Life” and that “when any thing of this kind is mentioned, the Expressions are 
always turned to fit our Capacities, and to fit the common Acceptance, or Appearances of things 
to the Vulgar.”347 Behn’s claim that Scripture should accommodate the “Vulgar” is, for her, a 
skeptical attack on its role as the privileged text of early modern Europe. Similarly, near the end 
of her Preface, Behn writes that: 
as to other things contained in the Holy Scriptures relating to Astronomy, Geometry, 
Chronology, or other liberal Sciences, we leave those Points to the Opinion of the 
Learned, who by comparing the several Copies, Translations, Versions, and Editions of 
the Bible, are best able to reconcile any apparent Differences; and this with all 
Submission to the Canons of General Councils, and Decrees of the Church. For the 
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School-men agitate and debate many things of a higher Nature, than the standing still, or 
the Motion of the Sun or the Earth.348
As commentators have noted, Behn uses her Preface ironically and subtly to undermine 
Scriptural authority. Robert Markley argues that she “subjects the text of the Old Testament to a 
wry and even corrosive skepticism.”349 Admittedly, Behn’s intentions behind her implicit 
impugning of Scriptural authority are much more skeptical and ambiguous than Astell’s; 
however, it is striking how similar their rhetoric is. Both authors use the Copernican controversy 
to circumscribe the authority of the Bible. Astell, like Behn, highlights the polemical nature of 
Biblical translation, traditionally the sole domain of masculine authors: “Scripture is not always 
on their side who make parade of it, and thro’ their skill in Languages and the Tricks of the 
Schools, wrest it from its genuine sense to their own Inventions.”350 By attacking both the 
interpretation and translation of Scripture, Astell simultaneously could maintain its privileged 
status while also arguing that it was vulnerable to corruption by masculine culture. She writes 
that “Women without their own Fault, are kept in Ignorance of the Original, wanting Languages 
and other helps to Criticise on the Sacred Text, of which they know no more, than Men are 
pleas’d to impart in their Translations.”351 Implicit in Astell’s argument is the astonishing 
suggestion that biblical translation and interpretation are so vulnerable to masculine interference 
that it is possible that women lack access to an uncorrupted Christianity because they don’t know 
Latin and Greek. It is possible that in these passages Astell is again deliberately using Locke’s 
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arguments against him, but crucially adding a gendered component; in the Preface to his 
Paraphrase, Locke claims that “it would be no very extravagant Paradox to say, that there are 
fewer that bring their Opinions to the Sacred Scriptures to be tried by that infallible Rule, than 
bring the Sacred Scripture to their Opinions, to bend it to them, to make it as they can a Cover 
and Guard of them.”352 As Astell points out, if what Locke says is true, then women are at an 
extreme disadvantage, being denied access to determine what Scripture says, except through the 
mediation of partisan masculine clergy and scholars. 
The similar strategies of both Astell and Behn’s skeptical attacks on Scripture 
demonstrates the adaptable nature of skeptical arguments and the flexibility with which women 
theologians were able to apply them. What is for Behn a veiled and sophisticated attack on 
religion itself becomes for Astell a way to limit Scripture in determining questions of gender 
equality, but not a wholesale attack on Christian revelation.353 Indeed, in these passages Astell 
sounds closest to her contemporary, the latitudinarian Whiggish Catharine Trotter (discussed in 
Chapter Three), who highlights Scripture’s utilitarian moral role at the expense of a rigid 
orthodox and masculinist interpretation. Astell’s attacks on Locke and Shaftesbury required 
different strategies. Against Shaftesbury, Astell maintains that natural philosophy provided a 
priori legitimation of Christianity’s truth claims and as such demonstrated Christianity’s 
availability to all subjects regardless of social position or gender, while three years earlier in her 
Preface to Reflections, she argued that scientific speculation was outside the bounds of Scripture. 
In both cases, however, scientific rhetoric provides an extra-scriptural way for all to access, what 
is to Astell, the gender-neutral rationality of the Christian subject, regardless of what Scripture or 
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religious authorities may maintain. In her battle with deism in her 1705 The Christian Religion, 
the question of Scriptural authority and gender is thrust front and center. 
Deism and Gender 
The author who motivated Astell to write her magnum opus, The Christian Religion as 
Profess’d by a Daughter of the Church of England (1705), was not John Locke, but rather an 
anonymous author, “a Divine of the Church of England,” who published a short work in 1697 
(second ed. 1704) entitled A Lady’s Religion: In a Letter to the Honourable My Lady Howard. 
Included with the 1697 edition was a “Prefatory-Epistle,” most probably written by John Toland, 
and the author of the work was likely Toland’s patron and an associate of Shaftesbury, William 
Stephens.354 Stephens was a “radical Whig cleric” and author of the 1696 An Account of the 
Growth of Deism in England, which gives a sympathetic account of how the intransigence of 
High Church ideology – especially clericalism and divine right – paradoxically leads to 
freethinking.355 In The Christian Religion, Astell responds to the second edition of A Lady’s 
Religion, which replaced Toland’s Prefatory Epistle with an abbreviated English translation of 
the Preface affixed to the French translation of the first edition; this Preface likely was written by 
Pierre Coste. Coste’s translated French Preface contains the only explicit mention of gender, 
apart from the title of the work, in the text, but his discussion seems to have colored Astell’s 
response. Apart from gender, Astell had a further reason for being irritated with A Lady’s 
Religion: the second French edition was published with a French translation of Locke’s 
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Reasonableness of Christianity.356 The similarity in strands of argument between Locke’s 
Reasonableness and A Lady’s Religion was noted by Astell: she writes in her The Christian 
Religion that “the Ladies Religion seems to be little else but an Abstract of the Reasonableness of 
Christianity, with all those disadvantages that usually attend Abridgements.”357 The resemblance 
between the two texts is yet another demonstration of the similarity in rhetoric Astell saw 
between the moderate latitudinarian Anglican position advocated by Locke and the radical 
deistic arguments advanced by Stephens and Toland. 
Coste writes in the translated French Preface that, if he is not “mistaken,” the goal of the 
author of A Lady’s Religion “was to make appear, that the Christian Religion ought to be 
levelled and accommodated to the reach of the meanest Capacity.”358 According to Coste, the 
author has written a text “full of Wisdom, easy to be explain’d, and every way adapted to the 
Capacity of the Illiterate, of Women, and of the meanest sort of People, that is to say, of the 
greatest part of Mankind.”359 Coste shockingly conjoins women with illiterate and low-rank 
men. Furthermore, Coste writes that “no one … will be so bold as to deny” that “Religion is for 
the use of the vulgar.”360 As we have seen, in her 1706 Preface Astell also maintained that 
Scripture was “writ for the Vulgar as well as for the Learned,” but did so in order to argue that 
Scripture, in a broad sense, supports her view of gender relations. Two years earlier, Coste uses 
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the same argument not to circumscribe Scripture’s value in determining questions of gender 
equality, but instead to endorse a radically attenuated form of Christianity; moreover, in doing so 
he explicitly maintains that women are to be equated with the “Simple and Illiterate.”361 Coste 
thus grounds his endorsement of Stephens’s deistic attack on revealed religion on the supposed 
inability of women, “poor Country People,” and other marginalized members of society to 
understand theology.362 Astell is quick to point out in her 1706 Preface that, for women, this 
inability derives ultimately from the unequal societal conditions created by masculine authorities 
and their complete control over scriptural interpretation and translation. 
A particular irony of Coste’s Preface is his endorsement of Christianity as useful only as 
a moral guide because, “to pronounce decisively upon the Disputes of Divines, one must plunge 
himself over-head in reading a great many large Volumes, full of barbarous and unintelligible 
Terms.”363 Implicit in Coste’s suggestion that theological “Disputes” require the ability and 
desire to read “large Volumes” is that theology is inappropriate for women. Yet, it is clear from 
Astell’s work that this is exactly what she does; her writings are filled with citations to 
voluminous works of seventeenth-century religious controversy. Moreover, as I argue in the 
following chapter, one of the central ways Catharine Trotter promotes her religious and 
intellectual independence is through the appropriation of arguments culled from these “large 
Volumes.” Neither Astell nor Trotter would dispute Christianity’s central role as the 
authoritative instructor of virtue; however, both are careful, in their own ways, to also graft onto 
their conceptions of Christianity more orthodox conceptions of faith. In addition, they both 
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mined the rhetoric and arguments of a large number of theological texts to articulate their 
feminist positions. 
It is the lack of any type of orthodox discussion of faith that marks A Lady’s Religion as a 
deistic text. Stephens advances a version of Christianity that is essentially an ethics rather than a 
revealed religion. He argues that “the wisdom of the Christian religion appears first by its being 
practical” and “secondly by being plain.”364 According to Stephens, “Doctrine” is only 
important as “a means to enforce the Gospel moral upon our Practice.”365 The death of Jesus 
simply serves as an “Example … to do Good in spight of all Discouragements,” an argument that 
shockingly devalues the central claim of Christianity that salvation results from Jesus’ death on 
the cross.366 Stephens is nearly Spinozan in his flouting of Christian orthodoxy, and his argument 
“that if you shall thus consider Deity as the vital Spirit of the Universe, you will find sufficient 
Encouragements to the Love thereof, from every Observation you will make upon Nature” is 
very close to being heretical.367 Stephens thus promotes in his A Lady’s Religion a radically 
stripped-down version of Christianity, useful only as an example of virtuous living and with little 
or no discussion of Christ’s divinity, the role of Providence, or the Trinity. 
Astell was motivated to respond to a 91 page work with a long defense of her High 
Church Anglican principles, The Christian Religion: the second edition of 1717 runs to 351 
pages. In addition to responding to Locke’s Reasonableness of Christianity and Stephens’s A 
Lady’s Religion, Astell also attacks at least one more deistic work, the anonymous 1704 The 
Principle of the Protestant Reformation Explain’d, in a Letter of Resolution Concerning Church-
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Communion which was probably written by John Toland.368 Like A Lady’s Religion, Principle 
was also addressed to a woman and is yet another invective against priestcraft and an argument 
for a radically circumscribed version of primitive Christianity. Ironically, in his attacks on 
revealed religion in Principle, Toland makes radical arguments about Christianity and women by 
suggesting that the “Primitive Church-Communion” may “have been performed by a Woman as 
well as a Man.”369 He further observes that “there were some Women who followed Christ … 
and saw what he did” and argues that “had … these Women written a Narrative of what she had 
seen and heard concerning our Saviour Christ, that Narrative of hers had been part of the 
Gospel.”370 Toland slyly argues for women to hold clerical authority and advances the radical 
argument that the New Testament itself might have had a female author, arguments that neither 
Astell nor Trotter ever used. Toland’s argument, however, is but one of several he deploys in 
Principle as a means to devalue Scriptural transmission. At the end of the text, for example, he 
writes that “you are not bound to believe our English Translation, any otherwise than as you 
shall see Cause so to do.”371 Although Toland, unlike Stephens, argues for a radically attenuated 
version of Christianity not by denigrating women but by arguing for their central place in 
Christian history, he does so with a similar agenda.372 Both use gender as a means of 
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undermining Scriptural certainties, certainties that Astell viewed as vital to protecting women’s 
interests.  
Astell, then, was largely motivated to write The Christian Religion by deists’ 
appropriation of women for their own skeptical ends. To counter these writers’ portrayals of 
women, she sets out all that she believes Christianity should be, especially with regard to 
women. She writes that the “main Design” of the work is “to put Women upon Thinking.”373 
Although she sarcastically disputes the very notion of “a Lady’s Religion” as distinct from that 
of man’s, she attempts to lay out what “a Woman ought to Believe and Practice, and 
consequently what she may.”374 The work presents in great detail how Astell believes 
Christianity should be practiced and how its theology should be defended, and it revisits many of 
the arguments of her previous writings. In addition she infuses the work with invectives against 
specific patriarchal inequalities and an unabashed defense of women’s rationality as equal to 
men’s: “If GOD had not intended that Women shou’d use their Reason, He wou’d not have 
given them any, for He does nothing in vain.”375 Universal reason was crucial for Astell in 
undermining misogynistic assumptions about women’s supposed weaker understanding of 
Christianity. She attacks Locke, Stephens and others who argued that Christianity must be 
understood by all to be comprehensible by arguing that the beliefs of the individual Christian are 
completely distinct from Christianity’s truth claims: Just as how if “a Ploughman, may as 
peremptorily as he pleases, deny all the Propositions in Euclid” does not make these propositions 
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“cease to be True,” so with Christianity.376 If Astell can then demonstrate both rationally and 
empirically – as she attempts to do in both The Christian Religion and Bart’lemy Fair – the 
validity of Christian truths and the rightness of her interpretation of those truths, then 
Christianity is an irreproachable bulwark against gender inequality. As in her attack on 
Shaftesbury’s caustic skepticism, Astell’s Christian apologetics function for her as an implicit 
but vital defense of women. By noting that if she were to question in print Caesar’s authorship of 
his Commentaries or Marcus Aurelius’s authorship of his Meditations the way skeptical writers 
attempted to undermine Scriptural transmission this skepticism would be dismissed as “the 
whimsey of a very Woman,” she calls attention to the fact that skeptical men are able to use their 
gender as a defense in a way unavailable to women writers. 
As in her other writings, scientific discourse provides Astell with a similar line of defense 
in The Christian Religion. Like Catharine Trotter, Astell argues that women, more so than men, 
are in the ideal position to pursue scientific inquiries. She does so by ironically foregrounding the 
domestic expectations men place on women: “Except in the Duties of our Christian Calling, and 
the little Oeconomy of a House, Women’s lives are not Active, consequently they ought to be 
Contemplative.”377 Because women “ought to be Retir’d” and are “design’d by Providence for 
Speculation,” Astell argues “great Improvements might be made in the Sciences, were not 
Women enviously excluded from this Proper Business.”378 She points out that women’s forced 
domesticity could thus serve as an ideal place for scientific work and philosophical speculation, 
and she implicitly revisits the thesis of her first published work, A Serious Proposal to the Ladies 
from 1694. As she notes in several places throughout her work, Astell herself serves as a model 
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of emulation for women, and is also aware of the drawbacks associated with female authorship. 
Near the end of Christian Religion, Astell observes how critics of the work “perhaps will think 
there’s too much of the Woman in it, too much of my particular Manner and Thoughts.”379 
Acutely aware of the stranglehold men have on theological discourse, Astell is able to use male 
domination of all aspects of society to buttress her arguments against societal customs which 
degrade women and turn England away from its proper Christian duty. 
Because Astell argues women are allowed to write history, she uses it to make a larger 
point about the imperfect and unequal nature of scholarly endeavors. After first noting that she 
advises women “to study to improve [their] Mind” because they are clearly “capable,” she 
spends several paragraphs discussing what areas it is proper for women to pursue.380 Astell 
writes: 
some Men say that Heraldry is a pretty Study for a Woman, for this reason, I suppose, 
that she may know how to Blazon her Lord and Master’s great Achievements! They 
allow us Poetry, Plays, and Romances, to Divert us and themselves; and when they would 
express a particular Esteem for a Woman’s Sense, they recommend History … since the 
Men being the Historians, they seldom condescend to record the great and good Actions 
of Women; and when they take notice of them, ‘tis with this wise Remark, that such 
Women acted above their Sex. By which one must suppose they wou’d have their 
Readers understand, that they were not Women who did those Great Actions, but that 
they were Men in Petticoats!381
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Again Astell dismisses popular fiction as unfit for serious study and observes how men literally 
write women out of history. Her striking image of men’s denigration of women in history calls 
attention to the ways in which the historical narrative is corrupted by unreliable masculine 
authorities.382 Although she is not explicit in this section of her text, Astell implies that the 
counterpoint of fallible historical and cultural narratives is Christian Scripture, and her reading of 
the role of prominent women in the Bible in her 1706 Preface to Reflections acts as a counter-
text to the patriarchal histories written by men that Astell highlights in The Christian Religion. 
Her recognition of the way historical narratives can be shaped by masculine authorities to 
exclude marginalized voices helps to explain why she struggled so hard to prevent the Bible 
from succumbing to the secular trajectory of becoming a mere cultural and historical touchstone 
rather than an authoritative guide to spiritual and moral matters.  
Paradoxically for the modern reader, then, Astell defends the Bible as a more enlightened 
historical text than any produced by her rapidly secularizing Enlightenment culture. Her critique 
of irreligion and deism demonstrates how slippery religious rhetoric was in the Restoration and 
early eighteenth century. The freethinking rhetoric employed by writers such as Shaftesbury and 
Toland was indistinguishable in many places from that used by more liberal Anglicans like John 
Locke. Crucially, however, Astell highlighted the exclusionary ideologies promoted by writers 
who relied on skeptical arguments against Anglican orthodoxy. As Astell demonstrated 
throughout her work, far from inaugurating any kind of gender equality, emergent discourses of 
secularism often functioned through misogyny and exclusion. The debates about Scripture’s 
sacred place in society in the long eighteenth century signaled more than a crisis of faith in 
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English culture for Astell; it also marked the de-legitimation of the Bible’s ability to act as an 
irreproachable safeguard of women’s rationality and place in society. 
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Chapter 3: Catharine Trotter, Religious Rhetoric, and the Moral Sense 
Scholarship on Catharine Trotter is often split along disciplinary lines. Historians and 
scholars of philosophy have – in a very limited way – considered her contributions to early 
eighteenth-century debates about the ideas of John Locke and the development of British 
empirical and moral philosophy. The primary critical work done on Trotter in literary studies, 
however, usually considers just the five plays and one novella she wrote early in her life as 
opposed to her later philosophical and religious works. In a sense, this critical dichotomy reflects 
the two parts of her career. Although she began her writing career as a playwright, after 1706 she 
stopped publishing literary works altogether to focus on writing philosophy and leading a semi-
retired life as a wife and mother. Literary scholars, in particular, have neglected Trotter’s 
contributions to the philosophy of the early eighteenth-century and her role in helping to 
establish the eighteenth-century ideology of sensibility. In the only extended book-length 
consideration of Trotter’s entire career, Anne Kelley argues that because “the image of her as an 
obscure, dull and prudish learned lady … has been constructed over the last three hundred 
years,” her philosophical work as “been overlooked or misunderstood.”383 Like Mary Astell’s 
perceived political conservatism, the traditional aspects of Trotter’s personal life and career 
(although her religious and political convictions were less “conservative” in many ways than 
Astell’s) has no doubt added to the critical neglect and misunderstanding, especially in literary 
studies. In this chapter, I analyze two periods of Trotter’s career: her early negotiations with 
Catholicism in the first decade of the eighteenth century and her synthesis of competing strands 
of British moral philosophy published in several works in the 1740s and 1750s. I argue that 
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Trotter’s early Catholicism (and the criticism it entailed) and her eventual conversion to the 
Church of England played crucial roles in the development of her unique gendered theology and 
that her Christian fusion of rationalist and affective strands of moral discourse, informed by both 
her understanding of Locke and Samuel Clarke and her renunciation of Catholicism, is a 
significant but critically neglected contribution to eighteenth-century sensibility. 
A Discourse Concerning a Guide in Controversies as Intellectual Autobiography 
Trotter’s non-dogmatic theology has important consequences when considered in the 
context of the contentious debates occurring in the English church in the late seventeenth and 
early eighteenth centuries. B.W. Young argues that Christian liberty and the right to private 
judgment were the lynchpins of a long tradition of latitudinarian Anglicanism. According to 
Young, “‘Christian liberty’ was the rallying cry of an antidogmatic tradition which took the form 
of a consciously Erasmian plea for the right of private judgement to prevail over the rigidity of 
dogmatic divines.”384 Trotter is clearly an inheritor and important (though critically neglected) 
contributor to this important strain of Anglican thought. Kelley has a brief mention of Trotter’s 
connections to the multi-faceted and complex latitudinarian Anglican tradition, noting that her 
associations with Locke and Gilbert Burnet and her Discourse demonstrate “sympathy with this 
approach.”385 Broadly considered, Trotter’s siding with the liberal churchmen against more 
dogmatic divines (and also, indirectly, against Astell) is crucial, particularly because she formed 
the greater part of her association with both Locke and Burnet and latitudinarian thinking while 
still a committed Catholic (a position that even the relatively tolerant Locke considered beyond 
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the pale in his Epistola de Tolerantia), and considering her later influence on mid-century 
Bluestocking authors. 
In contrast to her more famous contemporary Mary Astell, who ended her career loathing 
John Locke, Catharine Trotter is perhaps best-known as a philosopher for her lifelong defense of 
Locke. She entered the world of eighteenth-century theological debate in 1702 with arguably her 
most important work, A Defence of Mr. Locke’s Essay of Human Understanding. While 
historically significant because of its status as an early, robust, and female-authored defense of 
Locke’s controversial philosophy, part of its significance lies in the fact that Trotter was still five 
years away from renouncing her Catholicism for the Anglican Church when she wrote it. 
Trotter’s early professed Catholicism constitutes an important aspect of her own philosophy that 
needs to be incorporated into larger discussions of her thought. In her critical biography of 
Trotter (whose married name after 1708 was Cockburn), Kelley persuasively argues that 
Trotter’s “consistent defence of John Locke … identifies her as a radical thinker, outside the 
traditional conventions of High Church Toryism,” and notes Trotter’s close connections to other 
thinkers aligned with liberal Anglican advocates of religious toleration, especially Gilbert 
Burnet.386 Although Trotter’s connections with Locke and latitudinarian thinkers were indeed 
“radical” for a woman writer in the first decade of the eighteenth century, neither Locke nor 
Burnet were politically sympathetic to Catholicism. Locke implicitly denied toleration on 
political grounds to Catholics in his 1689 Epistola de Tolerantia, and Burnet was well-known as 
an enemy of politicized Catholicism, having dissuaded a wealthy benefactor from funding 
Astell’s religious retirement for women because “it would look like preparing a way for popish 
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orders.”387 Though both Burnet and Locke held Trotter in high regard despite her Catholicism, 
her religion invited attacks from enemies and remonstrances from friends. Trotter’s 
correspondence with Thomas Burnet of Kemnay, in part, led her eventually to question her own 
religious commitments, culminating in her 1707 A Discourse Concerning a Guide in 
Controversies, a short attack on Catholic infallibility, which marked her conversion to the 
Church of England. Focusing on Trotter’s correspondence and her Discourse, this section 
clarifies Trotter’s complex relations to Anglican theology before and after her conversion and 
situates the Discourse historically and biographically. In her Discourse, the liberal Anglican 
emphasis on individual judgment and toleration becomes a form of intellectual autobiography for 
Trotter. 
The exact circumstances of Trotter’s conversion to Catholicism are unclear.388 Although 
Trotter was raised as an Anglican, Thomas Birch writes that “notwithstanding her education in 
the protestant religion, her intimacy with several families of distinction of the Romish persuasion 
exposed her, while very young, to impressions in favour of that church, which not being removed 
by her conferences with some eminent and learned members of the church of England, she 
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followed the dictates of a misguided conscience.”389 If Birch is to be believed, Trotter followed 
the path of several prominent Anglican theologians, including William Chillingworth, who 
converted to Catholicism before ultimately returning to Protestantism. Notable in Birch’s 
account of her conversion is his remark that Anglican divines could not convince Trotter to 
return to Anglicanism despite their “conferences” with her. As we shall see, Trotter portrays her 
reconversion to Anglicanism as rational and deliberative, a result of her own study of the 
relevant theological texts and not as a result of persuasion.390  
Indeed, Trotter carefully deflects the gentle persuasions of her correspondents and friends 
to leave Catholicism. Birch’s discussion of Trotter’s “misguided conscience” is of a piece with 
his anxious portrayal of her early Catholicism. He tells us that Trotter had “so strict an 
observance of [Catholicism’s] fasts, as proved extremely injurious to her health.”391 Several of 
Trotter’s friends also were anxious about her Catholicism. Gilbert Burnet’s wife Elizabeth wrote 
to Locke in 1702, “I know not by what misfortune of ill compeny both the writer of the late book 
                                                 
389 Thomas Birch, “The Life of Mrs. Catharine Cockburn,” in The Works of Mrs. Catharine 
Cockburn, Theological, Moral, Dramatic, and Poetical,” 2 vols. (London: 1751), 1:v. Kelley 
speculates that Trotter may have been influenced by the Earl of Perth who was related to her 
mother and who converted to Catholicism in 1685, the year of the ascension of James II, in 
Kelley, Catharine Trotter, 146. 
390 For a consideration of Trotter’s philosophical and theological writing, see Kelley, Catharine 
Trotter, chap. 5; Jacqueline Broad, Women Philosophers of the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), chap. 6; Martha Brandt Bolton, “Some Aspects of the 
Philosophical Work of Catharine Trotter” in Hypatia’s Daughters: Fifteen Hundred Years of 
Women Philosophers, ed. Linda Lopez McAlister (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1996), 139-64; Patricia Sheridan, “Reflection, Nature, and Moral Law: The Extent of Catharine 
Cockburn’s Lockeanism in her Defence of Mr. Locke’s Essay, Hypatia 22, no. 3 (2007): 133-
151; Patricia Sheridan’s introduction to Catharine Trotter Cockburn: Philosophical Writings, ed. 
Patricia Sheridan (Peterborough: Broadview, 2006), 9-27; Kathryn J. Ready, “Damaris Cudworth 
Masham, Catharine Trotter Cockburn, and the Feminist Legacy of Locke’s Theory of Personal 
Identity,” Eighteenth-Century Studies 35, no. 4 (2002): 563-576; and Mary Ellen Waithe, 
“Catharine Trotter Cockburn,” in A History of Women Philosophers, Vol. III, Modern Women 
Philosophers, 1600-1900, ed. Mary Ellen Waithe (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
1991), 101-25. 
391 Birch, “The Life,” 1:xx-xxi. 
 129
[Trotter’s 1702 Defence] and her sister turned papist and are so I think at this time, your 
Champion is unmarried, and having as you see a more then comon genius write three plays … 
but as you will allow by her late litle book, ‘tis great pety her studys are not better directed, and I 
can’t but admier that one of such clear thoughts can be of a religion that puts such schacles on 
the exercies of thought and reason.”392 Elizabeth Burnet echoes Anglican theologians in 
promoting reason as a crucial component of religious belief and claiming that Catholicism 
hinders the use of that reason. Burnet also hopes that Locke “could be an instrument to free her 
from those erors” because Trotter “would perhaps pay more difference to you then to any other, 
which would be not only a kindness in its self, but make her more capable of the asistence and 
incouragment of her Frinds.”393 Trotter’s apparent refusal to convert, despite evident pressure, 
perplexed Elizabeth Burnet. She obviously thought Trotter’s esteem for Locke might convince 
her to accept the Church of England. Yet it is clear from her 1702 Defence and her published 
correspondence that Trotter herself, at least until 1707, did not see Catholicism either impeding 
her freedom of conscience or damaging her social standing. Nor was her Catholicism an 
intellectual barrier to her friendship with the Burnets. Moreover, when Locke did write to Trotter 
in late 1702, he thanks her for her Defence in the most effusive terms and does not mention her 
Catholicism.394 Trotter’s friendship with the Burnets and her unequivocal defense of Locke 
while still a committed Catholic suggest how fluid religious categories were for individuals at the 
beginning of the eighteenth century, and also show that drastic religious differences seem to have 
fewer personal and social consequences than are sometimes assumed. 
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Trotter’s religion attracted notice from another quarter early in the eighteenth century as 
well. Trotter was a colleague of, and had a “close friendship” with, the playwright and Tory 
propagandist Delarivier Manley.395 Both Trotter and Manley were attacked in the anonymous 
satire The Female Wits: Or the Triumvirate of Poets at Rehearsal.396 By 1709, however, Manley 
began assailing her former friend in print. Trotter appeared as “Daphne” in New Atalantis (1709), 
“Lais” in Memoirs of Europe (1710) and “Calista” in The History of Rivella (1714); in the latter 
Manley accuses Trotter of “Insincerity” and hypocrisy: “CALISTA who was the most of a Prude 
in her outward Professions, and the least of it in her inward Practice, unless you’ll think it no 
Prudery to allow Freedoms with the Air of Restraint.”397 As several scholars have noted, 
Manley’s motivations stem from personal, professional, and political disagreements with Trotter, 
whose associations with the Marlboroughs, a prominent Whig family, especially incensed 
Manley.398 In New Atalantis, Manley first accuses Trotter of having an affair with the Duke of 
Marlborough (Count Fortunatas) and then asserts that she “assumed an air of Virtue pretended” 
and “fitted her self with an excellent mask called religion, having as often changed and as often 
professed her self a votary to that shrine, where was to be found the most apparent interest, or 
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which priest had the greatest art of persuading.”399 By claiming that Trotter’s virtue is false, that 
her religious convictions are simply a “mask,” and that cynical opportunism brought about by 
clerical influence motivates her vacillations between Catholicism and Anglicanism, Manley 
intentionally challenges her sincerity as a Christian and theological writer. Ironically, she also 
anticipates the critiques that Birch levels against Trotter’s Catholicism, although he attacks 
Manley in his “Life” in order to defend Trotter. Birch, as I have noted, like Manley, claims 
Trotter’s conversion to Catholicism resulted from her being misguided by the powerful 
influences of prominent Roman Catholic families.  
Manley attacks Trotter by eroticizing her. By casting Trotter as a character in a fictional 
or semi-fictional narrative, she refuses to take Trotter’s religious convictions seriously. Trotter’s 
turn from writing plays to writing theology seems especially to have irritated Manley, and in her 
assault on Trotter, Manley confronts the gendered value judgment implicit in her turn to theology 
after the supposedly morally ambiguous profession of playwriting: 
But Daphne’s marriage crossed her delights. How does she exclaim against that breach of 
friendship in the fair? How regret the authority of a husband, who has boldly dared to 
carry his wife into the country? Where she now sets up for regularity and intends to be an 
ornament to that religion, which she had once before abandoned and newly again 
professed. She will write no more for the stage; ‘tis profane, indiscreet, unpardonable. 
Controversy engrosses all her hours: the Muses must give place.400
For Manley, theology is worse than playwriting. She notes that “Controversy engrosses all her 
hours,” despite her retreat from the “profane” London stage. By shrewdly relating criticism 
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leveled at the stage to criticism arising from theological disputation, Manley overturns what she 
sees as a false dichotomy between the controversy surrounding plays and that surrounding 
theology. For Manley, Trotter’s escape into marriage, the country, and theological writing and 
away from London and the stage is a sign of her gullibility in buying into the strictures of a 
masculine, whiggish paternalism. Herman notes that Manley “was first and foremost a 
Protestant,” who by this time was also a paid Tory propagandist.401 Yet, their friendship while 
Trotter was still a Catholic suggests that religious differences did not play a major role in 
dissolving their friendship until motivated by political and personal factors. This disparity 
between private friendships among Anglicans and Catholics and often shrill public animosity in 
print was a common one in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries and offers a key 
insight for understanding how a Catholic could write a defense of Locke. Indeed, Trotter’s 
friendship with the Marlboroughs, Gilbert Burnet and Thomas Burnet of Kemnay vividly 
illustrates this difference between private relationships and public doctrinal disagreements 
between Anglicans and Catholics. In particular, Trotter’s published correspondence with Thomas 
Burnet reveals the unique theological and political positions she held before she renounced 
Catholicism in 1707.402  
Manley’s foregrounding of Trotter’s erotic qualities is surprisingly similar to Thomas 
Burnet of Kemnay’s refusal to take Trotter’s Catholicism seriously in their correspondence; 
Burnet sees Trotter’s Catholicism as the stumbling block to their potential marriage, despite her 
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evident disinterest in him as a marriage partner. From 1701 until after her marriage in 1708, 
Trotter exchanged letters with Thomas Burnet, who was travelling the continent; as Kelley notes, 
much of their correspondence concerns differences between Protestantism and Catholicism, 
because for a time Burnet clearly considered Trotter as a potential wife if he could convert her to 
the Church of England.403 In a letter dated 5 July 1704, Burnet wrote to Trotter that her Defence 
is “the best picture of [Trotter’s] philosophical mind,” but he “desire[s]” a picture of her 
“corporeal features of face.”404 Trotter refused his request because, she says, a picture is 
“generally thought a mark of gallantry” and she “is uncertain what hands it might fall into.”405 
Trotter’s refusal to send Burnet her picture is an almost explicit rejection of his eroticization of 
their epistolary relationship and an attempt to reframe their discussion around a theologically 
unspecific Christianity. Trotter “would … advise” Burnet not to “place too much” hope for 
happiness in her because “there is always a danger in desiring very ardently even the greatest 
good this life affords”; instead, Trotter writes, they should have “a pious resignation to the will 
of him, who is the author and disposer of all.”406 Trotter’s appeal to Godly submission – while 
undoubtedly genuine – is primarily a means to ward off Burnet’s advances. Much of their 
correspondence, nonetheless, involves erotically charged theological debate; if Burnet can 
convince her to return to the Church of England, presumably he can also persuade her that he is a 
suitable marriage partner. When forced to defend her Catholicism from his attacks, Trotter 
significantly does not defend Catholic dogma, but instead articulates a tolerant Christianity 
stripped of doctrinal differences. While an aspect of her motivation is annoyance at Burnet’s 
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sometimes awkward advances, Trotter crafts an extremely liberal and tolerant theology in 
defending her Catholicism.  
In her first letter to Burnet, Trotter asks that their further correspondence avoid tedious 
theological disputes: “Curious questions even in theology tend very little to edification; and no 
doubt the best study, and the best religion, is the knowledge and practice of our duty, in the 
belief of all God has revealed to us.”407 Later in the letter, she writes: 
But as for the name of any church, I know indeed none necessary to the being of the 
church, but that of catholic, nor any form of government, but in obedience to one catholic 
visible head for unity sake; which if you think not necessary, and that all other 
differences between particular churches are but indifferent things, there is no occasion for 
any dispute between us. For I am not fond of such controversies, where going upon 
different grounds, we are neither of us likely to convince the other. And if you please, I 
would profit by the reflexion upon the madness of studying the controversial part of 
religion, rather than the positive and clear. Let our correspondence be on useful and 
moral subjects.408
Trotter’s defense of her Catholicism avoids any mention of doctrine and instead champions the 
basic principles of Christian toleration – “the positive and clear” – that partly rests on utilitarian 
as well as moral ends. As she acknowledges, there are some essential aspects of Christianity that 
all must subscribe to, and not all aspects can be “indifferent”; however, her understanding of 
what is “indifferent” differs from Burnet’s. Yet, in her correspondence, Trotter avoids delving 
into the enormously vexed question of Christian essentials at any length and instead discusses the 
religious fundamentals that she hopes unite all Christians.  
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In a letter dated 2 Feb. 1704, Trotter puts forward loosely defined essentials – “the 
doctrine and authority of Jesus Christ” – and repeatedly emphasizes the moral utility of 
Christianity as the common ground between herself and Burnet: 
I consider nothing in the opinions of my friends, but what is likely to influence their 
morals; and provided they worship the true God, and acknowledge the doctrine and 
authority of Jesus Christ, I think we are sufficiently united in religion for all the ends of 
friendship. To say the truth, I have of late almost forgot all distinction of churches; for 
having had some occasion of observing more than before the great growth of infidelity; 
that there are many, who disbelieve, and more, who doubt, that there ever was any divine 
revelation, I have employed myself much in considering the proofs, and defending the 
truth of the Christian religion; which has so entirely engaged my concern, that when I am 
with those, who sincerely submit to the authority of Jesus Christ, what sense soever they 
understand him in, I am satisfied, and really think myself with one of my own 
communion.409
Trotter defends her Catholicism through ecumenical appeals and by promoting a doctrinally 
minimal Christianity that evades even the supposedly huge chasm separating Protestant and 
Catholic belief. According to Trotter, the great enemy of Christianity is not the difference 
between Protestantism and Catholicism; it is instead the supposed growth of “infidelity”: 
Anglicans and Anglo-Catholics need to make common cause against irreligion and skepticism. 
Trotter also gives an indication that she is studying the “proofs” of Christianity, a study that 
leads three years later to her reconversion to Anglicanism. Trotter’s claim that she is in 
“communion” with anyone who accepts “the authority of Jesus Christ, what sense soever they 
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understand him in” is an astonishingly broad ecumenical plea, even if it is partly motivated by 
Burnet’s epistolary harassment. 
Trotter’s pleas, however, were in vain. Burnet responds to her by implicitly insulting 
Trotter’s Catholic family and friends: “I wish you may not continue to be the only miracle of that 
religion, to wit, that a philosopher of your sense should not leave those of that way, that are all 
either ignorant, or given to a reprobate sense.”410 Burnet’s rhetoric here seems unduly harsh, and 
in her response, it is obvious that Trotter is annoyed: 
I wish indeed there was no such thing as distinction of churches; and then I doubt not 
there would be much more real religion; the name and notion of which I am sorry to 
observe being confined to the being of some particular community, and the whole of it, I 
am afraid, placed by most in a zeal for those points, which make the differences between 
them, from which mistaken zeal, no doubt have proceeded all the massacres, 
persecutions, and hatred of their fellow Christians, which all churches have been inclined 
to when in power; and I believe it is generally true, that those, who are most bigotted to a 
sect, or most rigid and precise in their forms and outward discipline, are most negligent 
of the moral duties, which certainly are the main end of religion.411
Trotter’s rhetoric in response to Burnet’s insensitivity becomes even more insistent, especially 
her argument that “mistaken zeal” is responsible for “massacres” and “persecutions.” She makes 
a forceful distinction between political Christianity and active, lived Christianity: theological 
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differences between churches, exacerbated by the abuse of power, hinder the practical, moral 
duties of Christians. This distinction, emphasizing the experience of the individual believer, is a 
significant one for the period and helps explain the distinctive theology Trotter articulates. If 
Christianity has little hope of being united in theological specificities, it can then hope to 
transcend these differences by appealing to the common moral register of all believers.  
Burnet’s response ignores her appeals, and his logic anticipates the position Trotter 
defends in Discourse: “You know every thing well but religion; which you will never understand 
truly and surely by any method so well, as by reading Scripture in any language you understand, 
and chusing for yourself.”412 Burnet falls back on standard Anglican apologetic, disregarding 
Trotter’s doctrinally minimal defense of her religion. Because Burnet either repeatedly ignores or 
willfully misinterprets Trotter’s ecumenical appeals and her doctrinally minimal Christianity, her 
rhetoric becomes more charged in the letter of 8 Aug. 1704; she begins painting herself into a 
rhetorical corner by refusing to defend Catholic doctrine in favor of an ultra-liberal church with 
vaguely defined essentials. Not a skeptic herself, Trotter defends her Catholicism and her own 
freedom of belief through the type of slippery, ambiguous theological language that notorious 
free-thinkers like John Toland employed. Indeed, in her Discourse, where she strenuously argues 
against Catholic claims of infallibility in favor of the Protestant liberty of private judgment, her 
interlocutor accuses her of arguments that destabilize the entire foundation of Christian belief 
itself. 
In a later letter, Burnet condescendingly informs Trotter that her financial difficulties 
could be eased by marrying “an honest man.”413 Such a man, he continues, “would gladly seek 
you, if you were to be found in the church of England; whereas now they must bring you home 
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like the straying lamb into the mother church of England, before they can rejoice over you, and 
lay you in their bosom.”414 Burnet’s insistent eroticizing of religious conversion causes Trotter to 
signal her irritation by responding, “I cannot imagine, what concern you suppose I might be in 
about settling my person,” and claims that she has “been always very fearful of putting my 
happiness entirely in the power of any one, though a difference in religion is what I have least 
apprehended would destroy it.”415 Trotter’s language against marriage is powerful; a married 
woman is forced to place her happiness “entirely in the power” of her husband. Marriage 
according to Trotter – at least as she portrays it for Burnet – signals a woman’s abdication of 
freedom, intellectually as well as economically.416 She also sarcastically turns Burnet’s logic 
against him – demonstrating how it collapses when applied to marriage – by arguing “if there 
were any uneasiness” about a marriage between a Protestant and a Catholic, “it should be on the 
Romanists side, since to think any one communion absolutely necessary, seems to me not very 
agreeable to the principles of the reformation, where every one is allowed to be in all points the 
only judges for themselves.”417 In addition to her deflection of Burnet’s advances by her 
emphasis on their “friendship,” she also reiterates the Latitudinarian-inflected arguments she had 
made previously.418 She “cannot think myself at a great distance from the communion of any 
Christians; esteeming an agreement in the duties of practice, in the worship of one God, and faith 
in Christ, the only essentials sufficient to establish an union in friendship”; and she goes on to 
emphasize that “when one is satisfied, that the church, of which one has professed one’s self, 
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teaches all necessary truths, which none can deny of ours; it is better to continue in it, than to 
make a noise in the world with changing.”419 Although she is loathe in her correspondence to 
define “all necessary truths,” she puts forward the claim, without qualification, that “none can 
deny” the Catholic Church adheres to these truths – a claim that it is not at all clear Burnet or 
other Protestant apologists would accept. Two years after this letter was written, however, 
Trotter did “make a noise in the world” and renounced her Catholicism with the publication of 
her Discourse, an extended attack on the doctrine of infallibility. In 1707, Trotter reconciled her 
religious affiliation with the arguments she formulated to Burnet, which arose both from her 
attempts to evade his advances and her Lockeanism. The arguments in her correspondence 
anticipate those in her 1707 Discourse. 
By 1707, Trotter had publicly abandoned Catholicism for the Church of England, was on 
the verge of marriage, and had stopped writing plays. Despite her appeals to doctrinal 
minimalism in her correspondence with Burnet, Trotter’s Discourse is structured as an attack on 
the Catholic doctrine of infallibility. Kelley argues that the “views [Trotter] expresses in her 
correspondence are completely in accord with” her 1707 Discourse because both argue for 
“religious toleration and a doctrinal approach which is accessible to the layman.”420 Although 
generally accurate, Kelley’s claim downplays the extent to which Trotter’s more strident public 
statement in her Discourse differs from her personal reservations, as they were expressed to 
Burnet, about disrupting religious unity for the sake of doctrine. After her conversion and the 
publication of her Discourse, Burnet wrote triumphantly to Trotter that “you have foiled the 
adversaries so with their own weapons, and have wrested their own arguments out of their own 
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mouths.”421 Trotter responds with thanks and an admission of her own previous stubbornness: “I 
am glad you are so well satisfied with the reasoning in my [Discourse], and wish they may be as 
convincing to those, who need them; but I know too well the power of strong prejudices, to hope 
for much effect from them, or greatly to wonder, that others do not see what seems sufficiently 
plain to me.”422 Her rhetoric signals the personal nature of her Discourse. The arguments that 
Trotter deploys are not simply the strongest she can bring against Catholic doctrine, but those 
that seem to have overcome her own former obstinacy. She thus reveals to Burnet the 
autobiographical nature of the work, despite its original anonymous publication. 
Trotter’s downplaying in her private correspondence, then, of theological differences 
between Protestantism and Catholicism stands in sharp contrast to the more vociferous public 
attack she presents in Discourse. Yet this disparity between public stridency and the personal 
wavering of belief and acceptance of private religious commitments reflects the complexities of 
English Church-State relations. Even if individual conversions were not uncommon, the public 
differences between Catholicism and Protestantism were great. As numerous scholars have 
argued, anti-Catholic discourse did an enormous amount of cultural and ideological work in 
Great Britain during the long eighteenth century. Linda Colley argues for the importance of 
Protestantism to the evolution of British nationalism along with an equally important anti-
Catholicism; she argues that “the most striking feature in the religious landscape” of 1700s 
Britain was “the gulf between Protestant and Catholic.”423 Although Colley’s analysis has been 
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criticized, among other reasons, for minimizing dissent and treating English Protestantism as a 
hegemonic ideology, the vast amount of anti-Catholic propaganda produced by Anglican 
apologists in the latter half of the seventeenth century suggests how important this rhetoric was 
to English identity.424 As significant as anti-Catholic rhetoric was for ideologies of British 
nationalism, distinctions were very often made between attacks on politicized Catholicism – 
often signaled by the term “anti-popery,” a “free-floating term of opprobrium” in the words of 
Peter Lake – and the Catholicism of individual British subjects.425 Colin Haydon contends “that 
the fear of Popery was not incompatible with good relations between individual Protestants and 
Papists.”426 In his recent study of the Revolution of 1688, Steve Pincus argues that “there is good 
reason to believe that for all of their rhetoric against ‘popery,’ many of the Williamite bishops 
had no such animus against Roman Catholics” and specifically points out that despite “normally 
taken to be the fiercest of English opponents of Catholicism,” Gilbert Burnet, “was in fact 
explicit in his pleas for moderation and toleration.”427 This distinction between politicized 
“popery” and the beliefs of individual Catholic believers is one that Trotter makes in her 
correspondence with Burnet. Discussing her reading of Swift’s A Tale of a Tub, Trotter writes 
that the book “is intended a ridicule both of Popery and Calvinism” and that she found it “very 
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diverting,” evidently because she could distinguish his satire of Popery from her own 
Catholicism.428
Locating the distinction between politicized Catholicism and Catholic belief was central 
to debates about toleration of Catholics. John Marshall writes that “Locke was desirous during 
the period of composition of [A Letter Concerning Toleration] to find a way to distinguish 
between some Catholic worship and belief as tolerable and some Catholic political commitments 
as intolerable”; Gilbert Burnet also struggled with this issue.429 One of the important sticking 
points, both politically and theologically, for Protestant defenders of toleration was the issue of 
the infallibility of the Pope and Catholic councils. Indeed, debates about whether some version of 
infallibility was necessary for Christian truth consumed theological writers in the seventeenth 
century. Concern over what remains to ground Christianity if theologians reject infallible 
certainty helped motivate many of the important works by seventeenth-century defenders of 
Protestantism such as William Chillingworth and Edward Stillingfleet.430 Once an authoritative 
interpreter of scripture is removed, what remains is, in Christopher Hill’s memorable phrase, 
“logically a doctrine of individualist anarchy.”431 Containing this interpretive anarchy was the 
business of Anglican apologetics throughout the latter half of the seventeenth and into the 
eighteenth century. With the 1707 publication of A Discourse Concerning a Guide in 
Controversies, Trotter strides into this debate by arguing for the primacy of the individual 
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believer. Although often neglected, the text is important because it is one of the few places where 
Trotter explicitly discusses Protestant apologetics and Catholic doctrine.432
Discourse is a concise attack on the Catholic doctrine of infallibility, and Trotter is able 
to draw on a long history of debates about infallibility that helped shape English Protestant 
thought.433 One of the arguments against infallibility that Trotter encountered is found in Book 1 
Chapter 4 of Locke’s Essay. Locke writes: 
The Romanists say, ‘Tis best for Men, and so, suitable to the goodness of God, that there 
should be an infallible Judge of Controversies on Earth; and therefore there is one: and I, 
by the same Reason, say, ‘Tis better for Men that every Man himself should be infallible. 
I leave them to consider, whether by the force of this Argument they shall think, that 
every Man is so. I think it a very good Argument, to say, the infinitely wise God hath 
made it so: And therefore it is best. But it seems to me a little too much Confidence of our 
own Wisdom, to say, I think it best, and therefore God hath made it so; and in the matter 
in Hand, it will be in vain to argue from such a Topick, that God hath done so, when 
certain Experience shews us, that he hath not.434
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There are echoes of this argument in Trotter’s claim in Discourse that “without proving, that God 
has given us another determined guide, this is only arguing, that he should have done something, 
which he has not done.”435 For both Locke and Trotter, Catholics assume their own infallibility 
and then project it onto a ‘false’ image of God. After thoroughly studying the matter, Trotter was 
unable to see any place scripturally or empirically where infallibility could be located.  
Seventeenth-century debate about Catholic infallibility helped shape English Protestant 
thought long before Locke, and his understanding of William Chillingworth’s 1638 The Religion 
of Protestants A Safe Way to Salvation influenced his 1695 The Reasonableness of 
Christianity.436 As Frederick Beiser argues, “’the infallibility controversy’ of the early 
seventeenth century” was for Chillingworth and his circle at Great Tew, “the cauldron from 
which their essential beliefs and ideals sprang.”437  Chillingworth argued in The Religion of 
Protestants that “moral certainty,” although not absolute infallible certainty, in scripture was 
sufficient for salvation in contrast to Catholic claims that without infallibility, salvation was 
uncertain.438 According to Henry G. Van Leeuwen, the “moral certainty” of Chillingworth “is 
described as the certainty a sane, reasonable, thoughtful person has after considering all available 
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evidence as fully and impartially as is possible.”439 Chillingworth’s moral certainty in scripture 
results in his well-known statement in The Religion of Protestants that “The BIBLE, The BIBLE, 
I say, The BIBLE only is the religion of Protestants!” 440 This belief in the primacy of the Bible 
came “after a long (and as I verily believe and hope,) impartiall search of the true way to eternall 
happinesse.” 441 In her Discourse, Trotter echoes the idea of an impartial search for truth leading 
one away from infallibility and to the Bible that Chillingworth embraces. She also relies at least 
implicitly on arguments that he and others had made, including Edward Stillingfleet, who in 
numerous works from 1665 onwards spent a great deal of time attacking Roman Catholic 
doctrine, especially infallibility.442 In fact, Stillingfleet’s polemics against the Catholic Church 
partially motivated the Catholic work that Trotter responds to in Discourse, Abraham 
Woodhead’s The Guide in Controversies; Woodhead in fact singles out Stillingfleet, along with 
Archbishop Laud, as an opponent on his title page. It is unclear how much of Chillingworth and 
Stillingfleet Trotter had read; although she quotes neither author in the Discourse, her reading of 
Woodhead’s text would have made her at least familiar with their arguments. 
These seventeenth-century works debating infallibility were catalysts for Trotter’s 
conversion. In his “Life,” Birch presents a partial account of Trotter’s conversion to the Church 
of England and the composition of her Discourse: near the end of 1706 or the beginning of 1707, 
Trotter’s “doubts about the Romish religion, which she had so many years professed, having led 
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her to a thorough examination of the grounds of it, by consulting the best books on both sides of 
the question, and advising with men of the best judgment, the result of it was a conviction of the 
falseness of the pretensions of that church.”443 Birch claims that “a Guide in Controversy was 
particularly discussed by her” and the first letter of her Discourse is a response to this text.444 
According to Birch, Trotter was so concerned with the issue of infallibility that she “procured” 
Elizabeth Burnet to consult Samuel Clarke about the issue, “and shew him a paper, which had 
been put into her hands, urging the difficulties on that article on the side of the papists.”445 
Clarke’s response is given in an undated letter from Elizabeth Burnet to Trotter, included in 
Birch’s “Life.” According to Elizabeth Burnet, Clarke: 
says, the fact is false; for, besides that tradition can much more assuredly convey down a 
book, than any unwritten doctrine, how concerning soever, as is plain by the early 
corruption of that great and fundamental article of the belief of one God, which while 
men lived to see the third and fourth generation, was yet corrupted and lost in the idolatry 
of the greatest part of the world: besides this probability, it is certain in fact, there never 
was so clear, so uninterrupted a tradition for any thing, as that, which conveys to us the 
scriptures. On the other side, there is not any tradition at all, that will support the 
infallibility, as now taught in the Romish church. The reason he said, as now taught, was, 
because they falsely wrest some antient passages of fathers to the point disputed; for that 
was only meant, that Christ should always have a church on earth, men professing 
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Christian doctrines; and that all those powers, that then let themselves to persecute and 
destroy it, should not be able to do it.446
Clarke’s arguments for the primacy of scripture as a bulwark against corruption, the privileging 
of the written tradition over oral traditions, and the lack of scriptural support for infallibility are 
echoed in Trotter’s Discourse. The brevity of Trotter’s Discourse (the original 1707 edition is 
only 43 pages) in contrast to the voluminous seventeenth-century works that she draws on 
suggests the ways in which eighteenth-century writers were compacting and mining the 
capacious theological treatises of the seventeenth century; Gilbert Burnet commends the 
Discourse by suggesting that, “many readers being encouraged to seek for information in pieces 
of this size, who have neither the mind nor the leisure to go through large volumes.”447 Although 
Burnet claims the Discourse was not originally written for the public, there was a second edition 
published in Edinburgh in 1728, which, as Kelley notes, “suggests that Trotter may have made 
the decision to print the second edition.”448 If Trotter did indeed have a hand in the 1728 edition 
of the Discourse, it suggests that she felt the work was an important theological defense of 
Anglicanism more than twenty years after its original publication. 
The structure of Discourse is complex. It was published together as two letters with an 
anonymous preface by Gilbert Burnet. The first letter, as reprinted in Birch’s Works, is addressed 
to “Mr. B------t a Romish Priest,” evidently someone Trotter contacted to discuss the theological 
controversies about infallibility.449 The second letter is from Trotter to a “Mr. H -------, who had 
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procured an Answer to the foregoing Letter from a Stranger to the Author.”450 Trotter begins the 
second letter, as reprinted in Birch’s Works, telling her new correspondent that she is “sorry” Mr. 
Bennet’s “indisposition hindered him from answering” her letter and thanks him for finding a 
new respondent.451 The respondent’s objections to Trotter’s first letter are not included, but may 
be discerned from her responses, as Burnet notes in his preface.452 Because the Catholic 
objections are framed by her responses, Trotter asserts rhetorical control over the arguments. 
The first letter is a response to Abraham Woodhead’s 1667 The Guide in Controversies, 
or, A Rational Account of the Doctrine of Roman Catholicks, Concerning the Ecclesiastical 
Guide in Controversies of Religion, which itself is primarily a response to writings by Laud, 
Stillingfleet, Chillingworth, and other Anglican writers.453 Woodhead (1609-1678) was a prolific 
Roman Catholic author and theologian who published numerous and lengthy controversial works 
on Catholicism, church government and other topics.454 At the beginning of her Discourse, 
Trotter claims that she “read that concerning the Guide in Controversies twice,” and then 
expounds on what will be the major theme of her criticism: the necessity to judge religious truths 
for oneself.455 She writes that the Catholic maxim of doubt as a mortal sin “gives great prejudice 
against those, who hold it, as the best security of error, and the most effectual bar against the 
discovery of truth; for which a very different disposition is requisite, viz. A readiness to submit to 
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the evidence of truth, how opposite soever to our present persuasions.”456 It is noteworthy that 
she claims she read the text twice, given its large size and dense prose, and that she felt willing to 
counter its arguments with a short letter, later printed as a pamphlet. Trotter is responding to a 
work nearly forty years old, from a time when the threat of Catholicism to the English state was 
much more acute. Not surprisingly, then, her tract generally follows the logic of many of its anti-
Catholic predecessors from the previous century. Discussing anti-Catholic and Anglican 
apologetic works of primarily the 1680s, Raymond Tumbleson demonstrates that “[t]ract after 
tract organizes its attack on Rome into three headings: that it is contrary to scripture, to antiquity 
or the primitive Church, and to reason,” and that “[t]he book of God, the book of nature, and 
inward guidance formed a conventional rhetoric of Anglican apologetic.”457 As Tumbleson 
demonstrates, what was particularly troublesome for Anglican theologians was the problem of 
attacking Catholic ideas of infallibility while still maintaining the ideas of Anglican authority 
that were essential to the defense of England’s Established Church: “It was the task of the 
Anglican ideologues … to find a ‘middle ground’ in which hierarchy could remain stable despite 
the displacement of its papal capstone.”458 In her Discourse, Trotter primarily wrestles with this 
issue of what grounds Christian authority in the absence of a coercive infallibility, and, in doing 
so, embraces the latitudinarian Anglican position that she had sympathy with while still a 
committed Catholic which relies on a believer’s reasoned interpretation of scripture. 
Throughout her theological writings, one of Trotter’s primary concerns is ending 
Christian strife caused by what she considers the inconsequential disagreements that obscure 
“true” Christianity and its moral ends. In this regard, she ironically shared the same goal as 
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Abraham Woodhead, who saw in the infallibility of a universal Catholic Church the tool to end 
discord.459 It is tempting to think that one of the promises Trotter found most reassuring in 
Catholicism was exactly this hope for unity, but by 1707 when she rejected infallibility, she is 
intent on seeking another way. A common strategy for Anglican divines was to substitute the 
supposed authority of reason for that of Papal authority; as Tumbleson notes, “In the absence of 
mechanisms of authority such as Catholicism’s councils and popes, conformity demands that 
reason itself must be uniform.”460 Locke attempted in The Reasonableness of Christianity to 
distill Christianity to its fundamental essence (belief in Jesus as the Messiah) and argue that 
agreement with only a doctrinally minimal Christianity was essential. As we have seen in 
Trotter’s letters, she follows a similar strategy, deemphasizing to a large degree doctrinal 
differences between Catholic and Protestant in favor of loosely defined essentials and an appeal 
to the moral utility of Christianity. Her discussion of these issues with Thomas Burnet met with 
little specific criticism from him; however, in the second letter of Discourse, she responds 
perceptively to the criticism, both Catholic and implicitly High Church Anglican, that she is 
destabilizing the entire foundation of religion itself. 
In the first letter of Discourse, Trotter focuses almost exclusively on the discussion of 
infallibility in The Guide in Controversies. Much of her argument challenges Woodhead’s 
readings of the Bible – his contention that scripture gives the church a promise of infallibility – 
with her own biblical exegesis, supported by her familiarity with other Protestant critics of 
infallibility. In doing so, she elevates the individual believer and subjective religious beliefs 
above both church hierarchy and tradition. Like Woodhead, Trotter argues that if scripture gave 
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its readers “the least hint of any person, or number of persons, whom, in case of divisions, all 
Christians are obliged to follow” then certainly there would be more “peace and order”; 
however, in contrast to Woodhead, Trotter argues that this authority is nowhere to be found in 
the Bible.461 Trotter points out that his arguments depend on “human reason and probabilities,” 
and thus fall far short of infallibility.462 In arguing that supposed infallible statements are merely 
probable, she echoes Chillingworth, who logically argued that “the claim to make propositions 
which are metaphysically or absolutely certain, can never be based on probable reasons.”463 
Trotter echoes Locke’s argument in Two Treatises of Government – a cornerstone of Whig 
political philosophy – by claiming that Protestants “are not tied to … obedience in all cases: ‘tis 
a human constitution; and whenever any of those, (tho’ otherwise their lawful superiors) depart 
from their sole infallible rule, the Scriptures, the people are not obliged to follow them.”464 
However, she finds herself drawn by her logic to the common trouble spot of Anglican 
apologetics: if not in the Church, where does religious authority rest? For Trotter, as for many 
liberal Anglicans and dissenters, it is in the individual believer’s own interpretation of scripture: 
“we are to (try the spirits) examine all doctrines, and as they agree or not to that rule [scripture], 
accordingly to receive, or reject them; which if it resolve at last into every man’s private 
judgment, is it not vain to urge absurdities or inconveniences from that?”465 Trotter’s arguments, 
though, are more than a restatement of liberal Anglicanism because the dilemmas she describes 
and the conclusions she reaches reflect what she experienced. In arguing against Catholic claims 
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of authority by asserting the primacy of private judgment as essential to Christianity, she is 
describing her own intellectual journey from committed Catholic to liberal Protestant. For 
Trotter, privileging private judgment necessitates a liberal, tolerant church: “Those divisions, that 
are now among Christians, seem not the necessary consequence of a diversity of opinions, but of 
mens having made the terms of communion straiter than God has made the terms of 
salvation.”466 Here, Trotter again echoes Chillingworth, who writes, “the greatest Schismatiques, 
who make the way to heaven narrower, the yoak of Christ heavier, the differences of Faith 
greater, the conditions of Ecclesiasticall government harder, and stricter, then they were made at 
the begining by Christ and his Apostles.”467 For both Chillingworth and Trotter, Christianity is 
not responsible for division and strife; rather, it is schismatics who create problems by corrupting 
church teachings away from the original, unifying message preached by Christ and the first 
apostles. 
The unpublished response to Trotter’s first letter largely consists of an accusation that her 
logic removes any possible ground of Christian belief; as she writes, quoting from her 
respondent, her “objections against a living infallible guide, equally overthrow the infallibility of 
Scripture itself.”468 Part of Trotter’s response, in the well-trodden path of her Anglican 
predecessors Chillingworth and Stillingfleet, is to emphasize that the responder’s argument is 
circular: “the gentleman must grant, whether he will have the Scriptures believed on the 
authority of the church as infallible, or the church on the authority of the Scriptures; for one of 
them must be received on a moral certainty, unless he will argue in a circle.”469 Trotter’s use of 
the term “moral certainty” also hearkens back to Chillingworth; she notes that either the church 
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or scripture must be accepted with something less than absolute, infallible certainty.470 As 
Trotter’s own conversion demonstrates, her acceptance of the primacy of scripture without the 
need for an infallible interpreter is more than academic; it is instead a hard won point that she 
arrived at by the study of seventeenth-century theological texts. 
Trotter asserts that the responder’s argument has very dangerous consequences: “it would 
only prove, that the authority of church and Scripture are equally uncertain; a sort of arguments, 
which I wish none would make use of, but those who design to overthrow Christianity itself; 
which I would no means suppose to be the gentleman’s aim, notwithstanding his hard 
insinuations of me.”471 Trotter defends herself against her respondent’s accusations of skepticism 
by vigorously defending the truth of the scriptures. Biblical truth rests on the authority of the 
early Christian witnesses: “the Scriptures could never have been received, as books written by 
inspired men, if the first Christians, to whom they were delivered, had not known the great facts 
contained in them to be true.”472 Authority rests, then, in the written word, and not in a secretive 
conclave of priests. She also returns to her central argument from the first letter and again relies 
on Lockean political philosophy to articulate her most important point: 
for there is an obligation of subordination and submission to [parents and sovereign 
princes], laid upon all children and subjects, by God’s express order. … But if they will 
go beyond that, by commanding any thing contrary to the word or will of God, in that we 
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must not obey them; and consequently we must have a liberty of judging for ourselves, 
whether they do so or not. Now if this is true, with relation to our natural and civil 
governors (as I believe every body will allow that it is) why is not the same limitation as 
consistent with our obligation of obeying spiritual governors? No doubt, this liberty of 
judging for ourselves may be abused in all those relations: wicked children and rebels, as 
well as Hereticks, may make this a pretence for throwing off their duty; but that does not 
make the rule less true, or hinder those from being justified by it, who act sincerely in 
it.473
At the heart of Trotter’s theological position is the necessity for individual religious judgments, 
even if those judgments differ from those of the church hierarchy or established religious 
authority. It is not a coincidence that her respondent recognizes that her argument has potentially 
radical implications. For Trotter, Catholic arguments rest on a coercive authority which needs to 
be rejected by the liberty-loving English who resist tyrannical authority, even if, as she concedes, 
the English can more easily be seduced by “Hereticks” who reject all Christian authority. 
Trotter’s equation of civil and spiritual governors may be usefully compared to the position on 
church authority argued by the Tory Mary Astell, who, as Patricia Springborg observes, “fell 
short of denying the individual believer the right to divide the Church by private opinion.”474 
Astell writes “that to acquiesce in the Authority of the Church” is “[t]he calling in to our 
assistance the Judgment and Advice of those whom GOD hath set over us” and ” in such 
disputable points as we’re not able to determine for our selves” we should submit “to the Voice 
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of our Guides.” 475 Trotter is less willing than Astell to obey clerical authority and consequently 
foregrounds the liberty of the individual believer over the authority of the church, a position she 
began articulating in her correspondence with Thomas Burnet. Despite being published 
anonymously in 1707, her Discourse is thus the culmination of her own path from Catholic to 
Protestant, a kind of intellectual autobiography as well as Protestant apologia. In condensing the 
lengthy seventeenth-century Anglican arguments that were crucial for her own personal 
conversion, she implies that her own intellectual and religious change of heart can serve as an 
example to others. 
If, for Trotter, the final ground of religious judgment is the individual, ultimately the crux 
of the Discourse is hermeneutical: how should one interpret scripture? According to Trotter, 
when read in an un-biased manner, scripture interprets itself: “’Tis true, the Scriptures have been 
misunderstood, or perverted, and that in matters of great importance: but this is no argument, that 
they are not plain in such things; for those, who have misinterpreted them, have not done it, by 
adhering to the plain and obvious sense of them.”476 For Trotter, “all the mistakes about the 
meaning of Scripture only shew the great danger, of being too careless, too curious, or any way 
biassed in studying them.”477 In arguing for the accuracy and plainness of the Bible – as in her 
asserting that early Christian witnesses provide unassailable evidence for the accuracy of 
scripture – Trotter bypasses what was becoming a central tenet of free-thinkers: a criticism of the 
veracity of scripture. She spends little time discussing scriptural accuracy, and her interpretive 
strategy is to emphasize its “plain and obvious sense,” an argument that she extends to other 
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texts, including her own. For Trotter, to interpret scripture properly, one must approach the text 
free of ideological predispositions and preconceived ideas.478
By highlighting private judgment to such a high degree, Trotter places herself in the 
tradition of a liberal Anglicanism that, in part, had its genesis in Chillingworth’s Religion of 
Protestants. Such a position has obvious benefits for a female writer entering the masculine 
dominated world of theological debate. By arguing for both the need to approach scripture free 
from bias and that there is no requirement for an interpretive authority as crucial for acting as a 
true Christian, she elevates her stance to a theological position. Even her own texts (which might 
normally be ignored because of the gender of the author) must be read in a similar manner to 
Protestant scripture, completely (if ideally) free from bias. Trotter makes this connection explicit 
in Discourse when she sarcastically notes that her previous letter “does not need an infallible 
interpreter; though the gentleman, for want of a little care, has mistaken my meaning, in more 
places than I have mentioned.”479 Throughout the Discourse, Trotter continually asserts her 
Protestant duty to interpretive freedom within the idea of a Christian sense of conscience. 
Through her short, sober autobiographical assault on Catholic infallibility, she argues for her 
own legitimacy as a religious contestant and for her own individual moral and spiritual authority. 
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Moral Philosophy, Benevolence, and Sensibility 
A related legacy of Trotter’s philosophy for mid-century writers was her discussions of 
benevolence and morality. Her sense of Christian benevolence is a crucial strain of thought that 
has implications for the later, mid-century development of sensibility. Crucially, Trotter’s 
thoughts on Christian benevolence are drawn in part by her understanding and promulgation of 
her feminist views. Martha Brandt Bolton speculates that the reason Trotter defended Clark’s 
moral philosophy against marginal figures such as Edmund Law and William King is because 
she had a practical political aim of defending a non-dogmatic Christianity from those writers 
within orthodox Christianity who advocated more dogmatic positions because to her, strident 
defenses of Christian dogma ended up inadvertently supporting the work of skeptical writers. As 
a result, Trotter’s philosophy – especially her writings on morality – were (and certainly are 
today) less well-known than they might have been had she devoted more time to attacking better 
known writers such as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson.480 Nevertheless, the fact that Trotter did have 
an impact on her contemporaries is perhaps best exemplified by the fact that Birch published her 
collected works and Bluestocking writers viewed her as an inspiration for their own work and 
looked forward to the publication of her collected works.481 Furthermore, in a citation 
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unmentioned by Kelley or Brandt Bolton, the moral philosopher Richard Price cites and 
recommends Trotter’s correspondence with Thomas Sharp, Archdeacon of Northumberland, 
published in her Works. Sharp writes in the first edition of his 1748 A Review of the Principal 
Questions and Difficulties in Morals that “The letters which passed between the judicious and 
candid Dr. Sharp and Mrs. Cockburn, published in the second volume of the works of the latter, 
deserve to be consulted.”482 Price’s recommendation of Trotter’s correspondence is important 
because it supports Margaret Atherton’s claim that Trotter’s “published works can be seen as 
outgrowths of the activity exemplified in her letters.”483 Eighteenth-century moral philosophers 
viewed Trotter’s arguments in her published correspondence as valuable contributions to moral 
philosophy. Significantly, Price is associated with the rationalist side of eighteenth-century moral 
philosophy, and he believed that ultimately what grounded morality was a subject’s ability to 
guide his or her behavior by a rational perception of right and wrong conduct. He sums up this 
position in eighteenth-century moral thought in Review (and also demonstrates why he is so 
concerned with accurate terminology) when he states, “whether our moral ideas are derived from 
the understanding or from a sense; it will be necessary to state distinctly the different natures and 
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provinces of sense and reason.”484 The distinction between sense and reason was ground for 
much of the debate in eighteenth-century British moral philosophy, a debate that figures 
prominently in Trotter’s letters. 
In his work tracing the philosophical influences and antecedents of arguably the most 
important trope of eighteenth-century sentimental literature, the good-natured man, John K. 
Sheriff discusses this division between sense and reason in eighteenth-century moral thought: 
The rationalists were convinced that they founded morality on human nature in that man 
has as his fundamental characteristic the ability to reason, and thereby the ability to 
understand truth. To follow reason and to follow nature were for them the same thing. 
The sentimentalists stoutly maintained that in order to follow human nature one ought to 
follow it naturally, instinctively, automatically.485
Sheriff notes that this division was not absolute: “the debate between the rationalists and the 
sentimentalists is a bickering within a single camp, and both camps valued both reason and 
benevolence, but in varying degrees.”486 Nonetheless, according to Sheriff, “As the century 
progressed, the sentimentalists won the field in ethical theory. The progression seems to have 
been from a morality based on God’s commandments, to a morality based on nature, to a 
morality based on feeling and social custom. In the Cambridge Platonists and Latitudinarians, in 
Shaftesbury, Hume, and Smith, sentimental ethics had a continuous development.”487 This shift 
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in ethics went hand in hand with an increased emphasis placed on interpretive freedom by 
latitudinarian writers. As Trotter argues in her Discourse, the only way to posit the coherence of 
an individual’s interpretive authority is to presuppose a commitment on his or her part to ethics. 
Sheriff does not consider contributions from Trotter or any other period female philosopher to 
either the development of sentimental ethics or their contributions to the culture of sensibility; 
however, as a writer firmly within latitudinarian Anglican circles and as a central contributor to 
eighteenth-century moral discourse, Trotter needs to be included in this critical narrative. 
Significantly, although largely in the rationalist camp, she drew inspiration from latitudinarian 
thinkers, especially the Burnets. As I have noted, this inspiration primarily came while she was 
still a professed Catholic. Moreover, although a defender of the rationalists Locke and especially 
Clarke, Trotter had many affinities with thinkers aligned with sentimental ethics, particularly 
Francis Hutcheson. Trotter is firmly entrenched on both sides of the critical division in 
eighteenth-century moral thought, moral thought that was the primary philosophical antecedent 
to the eighteenth-century culture of sensibility. 
 Patricia Sheridan identifies this complexity in Trotter’s thought when she notes that in 
her writings, “we find elements of moral sense theory integrated into a rationalistic fitness 
theory,” and her “fusion of these seemingly divergent strains of thought may serve to shed some 
light on Hutcheson’s moral sense theory with respect to rationalistic moral theories.”488 
However, she does not explore this connection at any length. Trotter’s brief comments on 
Shaftesbury and Hutcheson demonstrate her multifaceted views of sentimental ethics as she 
simultaneously appropriated aspects of their thought while distancing herself in important ways 
from their larger projects. Her unique synthesis of a rationalist and sentimental ethics provides an 
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important contribution to the philosophical precursors of the eighteenth-century ideology of 
sensibility. Trotter argues that this synthesis demands a practical Christian benevolence, an 
aspect that was drawn, in part, from her intellectual engagement with Catholicism, and that 
serves as perhaps the primary marker of later eighteenth- century fictional representations of 
sensibility. 
 Shaftesbury only used the term “moral sense” in passing, and although he is sometimes 
credited as being foundational to the creation of an affective sense of morality, rationality was 
also important to his moral scheme.489 As Lawrence E. Klein argues, “Human morality, though it 
arose in the feelings, was a phenomenon of consciousness and rationality as well.”490 
Shaftesbury writes in his An Inquiry Concerning Virtue and Merit: 
So that if a Creature be generous, kind, constant, compassionate; yet if he cannot reflect 
on what he himself does, or sees other do, so as to take notice of what is worthy and 
honest; and make that Notice or Conception of Worth and Honesty to be an Object of his 
Affection, he has not the Character of being virtuous: For thus, and no otherwise, he is 
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capable of having a Sense of Right or Wrong; a Sentiment or Judgment of what is done, 
thro just, equal, and good Affection, or the contrary.491
This passage illustrates Shaftesbury’s conflicted feelings about the grounds of morality; an agent 
can be naturally benevolent, but the agent must further make his or her own (or others) 
benevolent actions an object of affection through rational reflection. This conflict is summed up 
in Shaftesbury’s conflating of “Sentiment” and “Judgement” at the end of the passage. At the 
base of Shaftesbury’s moral scheme is an affective sense, but at a second order level reason also 
is absolutely essential. 
 Shaftesbury’s privileging of affect in morality, while still maintaining an aspect of 
rationality helps explain Trotter’s conflicted feelings towards his work. In addition, Trotter took 
great exception to Shaftesbury’s ambiguous and unorthodox religion. In her later published 
letters, Trotter has long exchanges about moral philosophy and discusses Shaftesbury several 
times with her niece, a defender of his philosophy. Throughout, Trotter maintains the primacy of 
Christianity. In a letter to her niece from 3 September 1743, Trotter cautions her niece “not to be 
too fond of such moralists, as would draw us from all societies of Christians” because in the 
Gospels “undoubtedly the purest morality is to be found, and upon the surest grounds.”492 In the 
same letter, she laments that “the noble earl you so much admire (the great oracle of the deists) is 
one of these; whose fine genius, and personal virtue, might otherwise have been of great service 
to the religion of his country.”493 By 1743, Shaftesbury’s reputation as an “oracle of the deists” 
was secure, and, although recognizing his contributions to moral philosophy, Trotter’s sarcasm 
in calling him “noble” and her lament about how he could have been “of great service” to 
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English Christianity indicates why she was unable to fully embrace his work. Shaftesbury’s 
association with deism was a continuous sticking point for Trotter, as it was for both Astell and 
Fielding. In a letter for 12 June 1744 to her niece, Trotter considers that “perhaps [Shaftesbury] 
was a good Christian” when he published the latitudinarian Benjamin Whichcote’s sermons in 
1698.494 However, he “seems to have taken a prejudice against [Locke] at the same time, that he 
fell out with revelation.”495 Trotter thus equates Lockean ideas with Christianity in her criticism 
of Shaftesbury and speculates that his skepticism may have been provoked by “the violencies, 
divisions, or degeneracy of Christians.”496 She again highlights the importance, to her, of a 
practical latitudinarian-inflected Christianity free from dogmatic divisions, similar to what she 
expressed almost 40 years earlier in her discussions of Catholicism with Thomas Burnet of 
Kemnay. 
 In other letters with her niece, Trotter engages directly with Shaftesbury’s ideas of a 
moral sense. She writes that if Shaftesbury “founds virtue on the moral sense, as I think he does, 
his scheme and mine can by no means agree” because she founds “virtue solely on the essential 
difference, nature, and relation of things, not on any instincts” (an essentially Clarkean idea). 
Trotter does concede, however, that she allows “the moral sense its due weight in point of 
obligation.”497 Although she accepts the role of a “moral sense,” she views it as too ambiguous 
to serve as a foundation for virtue, instead embracing Clarke’s idea that morality arises out of the 
way God structured nature. 
Trotter seems to be consistent in her writings in arguing that morality is rationally 
grounded in the essential nature of the universe, yet she does reserve a place for an unmediated, 
                                                 
494 Mrs. Cockburn to her Niece, 12 June 1744, in Works 2:318. 
495 Mrs. Cockburn to her Niece, 12 June 1744, in Works 2:318. 
496 Mrs. Cockburn to her Niece, 12 June 1744, in Works 2:318. 
497 Mrs. Cockburn to her Niece, 2 Oct. 1747, in Works 2:330. 
 164
affective sense of practical morality. In her 1747 Remarks Upon the Principles and Reasonings 
of Dr Rutherforth’s Essay on the Nature and Obligation of Virtue she writes: 
that though our passions, our benevolent affections, our love of truth, and approbation of 
what appears to us right and fit, are natural, and implanted in us for good and useful 
purposes; yet the application of any of these, is not determined by nature, but is put in 
our own power, so that we may make either a right or a wrong use of them: It is our fault 
if we suffer our passions or affections to be our masters.498
Although for Trotter the passions can act as an important impetus to Christian benevolence, it is 
essential that they be rationally controlled. Likewise, a few pages later, she maintains that 
founding “virtue solely on benevolent affections, and an instinctive sense of right and wrong” is 
troublesome because “if these may be worn out, or unattended to, or misguided, virtue must be 
left on a very precarious foundation which I leave them to defend as well as they can.”499 
Instead, she is “only concerned to maintain, that a disinterested benevolence and approbation of 
virtue are natural to man, and given him as proper excitements to good actions.”500 Trotter is 
thus concerned that grounding morality on what she views as only a subjective basis, an affective 
moral sense, is problematic; nonetheless, subjects do maintain an affective element internal to 
their behavior that is essential to practical morality. This division in Trotter’s thought between 
the foundation of morality in the fitness of the created order and practical morality as 
experienced by individual subjects is crucial. As we have seen, it is of a piece with her larger 
concerns for a practical Christianity in both her letters and her Discourse. 
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 Trotter makes this division between affect and rationality in her thinking on morality 
explicit in another letter to her niece dated 20 November 1744: 
When you read my Remarks again, you will observe, that I place morality solely and 
entirely on the nature, relations, and fitness of things; for I cannot conceive how any 
other principle can have the least share in the foundation of virtue. But perhaps you 
meant our obligation to the practice of moral virtue, which is a distinct consideration; 
and that I do indeed place upon a threefold bottom, the fitness of things, the moral sense 
(not a blind instinct) and the will of God.501
Throughout her career, Trotter was concerned not with just abstract speculation, but, with the 
practical consequences of philosophy. Her stance on morality is no different. In her discussion of 
Shaftesbury, as we have seen, her first instinct is to assume his skepticism is brought upon by the 
failings within the Christian community itself. Notably, in the passage above, she articulates a 
place for an affective moral sense, but is explicit that it is not simply a “blind instinct.” Trotter’s 
use of “blind instinct” is a signal that she primarily has the thought of Francis Hutcheson in 
mind. As she does with Shaftesbury, Trotter has conflicted feelings about Hutcheson, though she 
does not question his religious orthodoxy. Instead, although she is willing to give a place to 
sentiment in morality, she cannot abide the idea of an unmediated sense as the foundation of 
morality. In her 1747 Remarks, she notes that although she has “a great esteem for that ingenious 
author’s writings, in which are many useful truths” she “cannot agree with him, that a blind 
instinct (if that is what he means by a moral sense) or that public affections (as he calls them) are 
the proper foundations of virtue.”502 In a letter to her niece, Trotter defends her understanding of 
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Hutcheson’s sense of the moral faculty as instinctual and reason-less: “You ask me, who it is, 
that calls the moral sense a blind instinct, for you are sure Mr. Hutchison does not. But that is 
understood to be Mr. Hutchison’s meaning by all, who have wrote upon it ….. Indeed an 
instinctive approbation of virtue &c. can have no other meaning, for all instincts … act without 
judgment.”503 An instinctual moral sense can be acceptable to Trotter insofar as it promotes 
active Christian benevolence, but to her, it should never be considered as a foundation of 
morality. Instead, morality should be grounded in the rational understanding of the fitness of 
God’s created order. Trotter thus argues that the idea of a moral sense must have both crucial 
rational and practical aspects. In her Remarks Upon Some Writers in the Controversy Concerning 
the Foundation of Moral Virtue and Moral Obligation Trotter writes that “Dr. Clarke and his 
followers maintain, that the fitness of things, and conscience or the moral sense (by which they 
never understand, nor would I be understood to mean, a blind instinct, but a consciousness 
consequent upon the perceptions of the rational mind) have in themselves an obligatory 
power.”504 Here we can see Trotter’s Clarkean formulation of an affective moral sense 
subordinated to the rational understanding that was so important to her. Although the 
philosophical landscape had changed considerably in the 40 years between the publication of 
Trotter’s Discourse and her later writings on morality, Trotter maintains a consistent emphasis 
on the need to rationally ground Christian ethics, while at the same time allowing interpretive 
freedom to individual subjects. In her letters to her niece, written when she was nearly 70 years 
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old, Trotter reinvigorates her arguments about the vital role an interpretive freedom supported 
with an attendant ethics plays to a proper understanding of Christianity that she had first 
articulated in the early eighteenth century. 
 Trotter’s wide-ranging critical discussions of the British moral philosophers of her day is 
remarkable, particularly when it is remembered that moral philosophy of the late seventeenth and 
early eighteenth centuries was primarily practiced by men educated in universities or dissenting 
academies (Shaftesbury is a notable exception, as Rivers notes).505 Trotter’s crucial – but 
critically ignored – contribution to this debate was a particular synthesis of sentiment and reason 
in the debate over the foundation and function of morality. Kelley argues convincingly, drawing 
on both Trotter’s fiction and her philosophy, that for Trotter, “rational morality is the key to 
empowerment for women.”506 Although Kelley does not consider at any length Trotter’s writings 
on the sentimental ethics of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, Trotter’s appropriation and modification 
of their views is certainly of a piece with her desire for the betterment of women. Moreover, her 
emphasis on separating an affective Christianized aspect of the moral faculty from a rationalistic 
foundation, drawn from both her intellectual engagement with Catholicism in the early 
eighteenth century and her own unique fusion of rationalist and sentimental ethics, anticipates 
and has similarities to the active intrinsic benevolent morality of later fictionalized 
representations of sentimental ethics in the work of Henry Fielding, Henry Mackenzie, Laurence 
Sterne and, as I discuss in the following chapter, Sarah Fielding. Trotter needs to be recognized 
as an important contributor to the culture of sensibility, arguably the most important ideological 
discourse of the latter half of the eighteenth century. 
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Chapter 4: Sarah Fielding, Masculine Heroism, and the “True Christian Philosophy” 
 
In her 1774 work honoring famous women, The Female Advocate, Mary Scott praises 
Sarah Fielding’s “talent, with ingenuous Art, to trace the secret mazes of the Heart,” and her 
“mind, that nobly scorn’d each low desire, / And glow’d with pure Religion’s warmest fire.”507 
Scott yokes two aspects of Fielding’s work that often get omitted from critical discussions: her 
sentimental exploration of “the secret mazes of the Heart” and her Christianity.508 Critics have 
identified Sarah Fielding as a pioneering writer of sentimental literature, and while eighteenth-
century sensibility has a long scholarly tradition, few scholars have examined at length the 
religious discourse that permeates David Simple.509 The primary feature of David’s character 
throughout both The Adventures and Volume the Last is his ambiguous identity as what Richard 
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Steele called a “Christian hero,” a contested figure throughout the eighteenth century. 
Eighteenth-century novelists repeatedly struggled with how to present a fictional character 
embodying Christian principles because the interpretation of those principles by High and Low 
Church Anglicans as well as dissenters was hotly contested. An overzealous defense of specific 
(High Church) Anglican doctrines could result in civil unrest, as it did in the wake of 
Sacheverell’s 1710 trial, and, as I have discussed in previous chapters, any kind of fervent, vocal 
Christianity could also bring about charges of enthusiasm.510 Too little attention paid to 
Christianity might result in accusations of deism or atheism. Throughout both parts of David 
Simple, Fielding experiments with the role of the Christian hero and her negotiations with 
competing models raise a host of questions: what characteristics define a Christian hero? What 
should be the extent of the hero’s interactions with society? What happens when tragedy befalls 
a Christian hero?511
Although Fielding does not use the term “Christian hero,” it is a fitting description of 
David throughout both The Adventures and Volume the Last. The term is perhaps best known as 
the title of Richard Steele’s first published work, The Christian Hero (1701). Steele wonders 
why “the Heathen struts, and the Christian sneaks in our Imagination” and endeavors to 
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demonstrate the supremacy of Christianity over more fashionable pagan philosophy. 512 The 
descriptions in The Christian Hero of “true” Christian principles (the importance of benevolence 
especially) anticipate many of the qualities associated with David’s character, and it is possible 
Fielding had read the text. As Malcolm Kelsall notes, “Steele was among her favourite 
authors.”513 Steele’s claim that “It is not a Stoical Rant … to be unmov’d at Misfortunes” 
because Christianity “has fortify’d our Minds on all sides, and made’em Impregnable by any 
Happiness or Misery with which this World can attack it” is representative of David’s character, 
especially in Volume the Last.514 Moreover, Steele’s notion of Christianity as “an exalted 
Superstructure” over human nature already “fram’d for mutual Kindness” and an “Eternal God” 
who “presses us by Natural Society to a close Union with each other” served as a counter-
example to libertinism, and aptly describes David and his community of friends who are all 
driven into marriage not by lust, but by friendship and benevolence.515 Regardless of Steele’s 
specific influences on Fielding, The Christian Hero was just one of many early eighteenth-
century texts that discursively negotiated between competing models of virtuous heroism, both 
Christian and otherwise. Jerry Beasley notes the important influence of Christian ideologies to 
the fiction of the 1740s and argues that “Christian heroism … constituted a new delineation of 
the ideals of the age.”516 While rightly arguing that David is a Christian hero, Beasley does not 
explore the implications of David’s heroism at any length. Like many eighteenth-century 
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authors, Fielding deals with this negotiation in her fiction, using competing strands of Christian 
discourse to depict David and his friends. The characters of David Simple dramatize the religious 
controversies that permeated England in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries 
discussed in previous chapters. Recognizing the complexities of David’s Christian heroism is 
vital to understanding how both parts of the novel are situated historically. 
 Linda Bree is an exception to the critics who downplay Fielding’s use of Christian 
discourse, and she astutely argues that in Volume the Last, David is “a type of Christian hero.”517 
Although Bree claims that the “Christian aspect to David’s character is much more apparent in 
Volume the Last,” I argue that his Christian heroism is just as important in The Adventures, albeit 
in a sometimes different form.518 It is easy to see why Volume the Last seems more explicitly 
religious because the narrator compares the suffering that David and his friends undergo to Job’s, 
and his vision of an ideal community must wait for the afterlife. Fielding anticipates the theology 
she dramatizes in Volume the Last in her 1749 critical defense of Clarissa, Remarks on Clarissa, 
a text which has led critics to emphasize the influence of Richardson hanging over Volume the 
Last. Bree suggests that “Richardson’s insistence upon a tragic, rather than a comic, ending, as 
consistent both with real life and with true Christian exemplarity, helped to shape the final part 
of David Simple’s story.”519 More specifically, Richardson’s influence on Fielding was primarily 
theological, and the theology embedded in Clarissa (and praised by Fielding) altered her 
conception of David and his community when she wrote Volume the Last in 1753. However, 
Job-like pious suffering is just one aspect of David’s Christian heroism, and in many ways, the 
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complex theological makeup of David’s character remains consistent throughout both parts of 
David Simple. 
To understand the complexities of David’s character, we need to recognize the stakes 
involved for Fielding in exemplary Christian heroism. Fielding’s Remarks was a significant 
intervention in the contemporary debates surrounding Clarissa, and by extension the theological 
tensions within notions of Christian heroism. Peter Sabor observes that Remarks “played a 
significant role in shaping Richardson’s revisions and additions to Clarissa.”520 Richardson was 
repeatedly frustrated by his readers’ interpretations of Clarissa. Many readers were particularly 
irate about Clarissa’s death at the end of the novel because it frustrated their desire for a romantic 
marriage between Clarissa and Lovelace and a traditional happy ending.521 Richardson defended 
his narrative choices in postscripts to editions of the novel and in his correspondence with 
readers. In the postscript to the 1748 first edition of Clarissa, Richardson defines his notion of 
“Poetical Justice” in theological terms: his novel “is designed to inculcate upon the human mind, 
under the guise of an Amusement, the great Lessons of Christianity.”522 He ends his discussion 
by noting that all “who that are in earnest in their Profession of Christianity … will rather envy 
than regret the triumphant death of CLARISSA” whose virtues “HEAVEN only could 
reward.”523 For Richardson, the purpose of his fiction is religious instruction; he thus sees no 
fundamental distinction between theology and aesthetics. Richardson similarly notes in a letter 
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dated 15 December 1748 to Lady Bradshaigh, a particularly insistent critic, that “A Writer who 
follows Nature and pretends to keep the Christian System in his Eye, cannot make a Heaven in 
this World for his Favourites.”524 For Richardson, a happy ending would negate the orthodox 
Christian purpose of the text. In his discussion of the theology of Clarissa, Thomas Keymer 
argues that “all forms of happy ending were … unavailable” for Richardson “because the just 
apportioning of reward and punishment within the world was … a false expectation.”525 
Clarissa’s virtue can be rewarded only in the Christian afterlife. In her Remarks, Fielding defends 
Richardson’s decision to delay rewards until the extratextual space of the Christian afterlife. 
Fielding defends the ending of Clarissa, and by extension, the dramatized theology of Volume 
the Last. 
Remarks is structured fictionally. The character of Miss Gibson defends the novel from 
criticisms raised by “a pretty large Assembly of mix’d Company,” evidently those raised by 
contemporary readers.526 The end of Remarks consists of two letters exchanged between Miss 
Gibson and Bellario, an initial detractor of the novel’s ending who changes his opinions as a 
consequence of Miss Gibson’s arguments. In her letter, Miss Gibson writes that if “the Story was 
not to have ended tragically, the grand Moral would have been lost.”527 She continues: 
[Clarissa] I think could not find a better Close to her Misfortunes than a triumphant 
Death. Triumphant it may very well be called, when her Soul, fortified by a truly 
Christian Philosophy, melted and softened in the School of Affliction, had conquered 
every earthly Desire, baffled every uneasy Passion, lost every disturbing Fear, while 
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nothing remained in her tender Bosom but a lively Hope of future Happiness. … The 
Death of Clarissa is, I believe, the only Death of the Kind in any Story; and in her 
Character, the Author has thrown into Action (if I may be allowed the Expression) the 
true Christian Philosophy, shewn its Force to ennoble the human Mind, till it can look 
with Serenity on all human Misfortunes, and take from Death itself its gloomy 
Horrors.528
In this passage we can partially locate the turn from romance to tragedy present in Volume the 
Last. Fielding’s comments in Remarks on Clarissa robustly defend the importance of a 
narratively represented Christian death to a “true Christian philosophy,” an idea that influenced 
Volume the Last. As Bree argues, “Fielding’s rejection of the principles of ‘poetical Justice’ … is 
based on the fact that such a doctrine flies in the face both of Christian morality and of real 
life.”529 Fielding’s surviving letters make it clear that she greatly admired Richardson and was 
certainly influenced by his example; however, it is also possible that at least part of the tragedy 
present in Volume the Last stems from Fielding’s awareness of the popularity of Clarissa. 
Fielding astutely altered the ending of David Simple from happy to tragic to take advantage of 
the new vogue for a pious and suffering Christian protagonist.530 Her Remarks, in addition to 
defending Richardson’s novel, authorizes the mode of Christian heroism that characterizes David 
in Volume the Last. 
As critics have noted, and the novel makes clear, Job is one of the primary models of 
religious heroism for David in Volume the Last. Because of her attentive reading of Clarissa, 
Fielding altered David’s story in the sequel to take advantage of the popularity that Clarissa’s 
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Job-like model of pious suffering excited. Jonathan Lamb identifies the dominant form of 
theodicy from the book of Job as “an argument founded on a postulate that nothing happens or 
subsists in the world beyond the horizons of the divine plan; hence the apparently most 
anomalous and heartbreaking events are dispensations made according to an ultimately coherent 
system.”531 Volume the Last is replete with references to death, suffering, and heaven: by the end 
of the novel, everyone has died except Cynthia and David’s child Camilla, yet the characters 
respond to these tragedies by submitting to God’s ultimately coherent plan. During his wife’s 
illness and eventual death, David, “like Job … could almost have contended with the Almighty” 
but ultimately he, again like Job, “humbly acquiesced, satisfied in the Wisdom as well as the 
Goodness of the great Disposer of Events.”532 In Volume the Last, it is David’s acquiescence to 
God’s divine plan for justice that in part defines his “true Christian philosophy.” His reward, like 
Clarissa’s, must be delayed until the afterlife. Early in the novel the narrator states that as 
David’s group “had suffered, as yet, no material Separation, so they had not tasted of that 
temporary Sorrow, which, though enough to embitter our Cup, is not sufficient to subdue a 
Christian Mind, whose Reliance on a future State is its only Foundation for Happiness.”533 In 
Volume the Last, then, hope for happiness shifts from the establishment of a well-ordered 
community of like-minded individuals at the end of The Adventures to a Richardsonian faith in 
divine rewards in the Christian afterlife. Similarly, while dying, David’s wife Camilla “was all 
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Resignation and Submission to the Will of her God.”534 After she has died, the narrator notes 
that had he “been an Infidel” David “would have raved to Madness, or wept himself to Death,” 
but when “the Christian Hope came over his Mind, that his Camilla was really happy … his 
Grief would subside, and patient Resignation take its Place.”535 The novel ends with a long first 
person account by David of his life and coming death. He notes his uniqueness – “there was 
something peculiar in my Frame” – as well as the dangers of hoping for lasting happiness with 
friends “subject to Infirmities, Diseases, and to certain Death.”536 The solution for these “Horrors 
of Friendship” is the Christian afterlife.537 Dying, David writes, “with a strong and lively Hope 
in the Revelation God has been pleased to send us, and with a Heart swelling with Gratitude for 
that Revelation, I can carry my Prospect beyond the Grave.”538 A Christian death for David in 
Volume the Last, as it is for Clarissa, is a crucial marker of true Christian principles.539
Yet, in important ways, David’s Christian heroism is not a function solely of his suffering 
and impending death, but remains consistent throughout The Adventures and Volume the Last. 
Despite its positive outlook The Adventures is more explicitly Christian than previous critics 
have assumed. Fielding often appropriated Anglican rhetoric in striking ways. In Fielding’s first 
extant letter to Richardson, she expresses her admiration for his second novel in gendered 
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religious allusions: “In short, Sir, no pen but your’s can do justice to Clarissa. Often have I 
reflected on my own vanity in daring but to touch the hem of her garment; and your excuse for 
both what I have done, and what I have not done, is all the hopes of, | Sir, your ever faithful | 
humble Servant.”540 Fielding included with the letter a presentation copy of Remarks on 
Clarissa, so the stakes for her were high in her correspondence with Richardson.541 Earlier in the 
letter, Fielding carefully humbles by observing that a male dinner companion called her and her 
friend Jane Collier “silly women,” a distance reinforced later with the biblical allusion, “daring 
but to touch the hem of her garment.”542 Her rhetorical distancing is emphasized in the last 
sentence which, the editors of the collected letters point out, alludes to the General Confession in 
the Anglican Order for Morning Prayer.543 Because of her esteem for Richardson and with an 
eye toward gaining his favor, Fielding shrewdly subordinates herself rhetorically by using the 
kind of religious language that she knew would appeal to him. She was aware of the rhetorical 
possibilities Anglican discourse offered and was savvy enough to deploy it in both her 
correspondence and her fiction.  
David Simple likewise demonstrates Fielding’s awareness and use of eighteenth-century 
Anglican discourse. As I have noted, in large part the change in David’s circumstances between 
the two parts responds to larger changes in how a Christian hero functioned in the eighteenth-
century literary marketplace between 1744 and 1753. A perceptive reader of the literary 
marketplace, producing an array of writing in several genres between the early 1740s and 1762, 
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Fielding admitted she wrote David Simple because of “Distress in her Circumstances.”544 The 
narrative crux that governed Fielding’s changing focus and tone of The Adventures and Volume 
the Last is the negotiation between competing models of Christian heroism motivated by both 
market factors and a desire to map competing strands of theological discourse onto a religiously 
virtuous, but theologically unspecific character. David as a Christian Hero is an ideological 
figure who works to embody generalized Christian virtues at the expense of theological 
specificities. In both parts of the novel, Fielding emphasizes a broad-based, minimalist religious 
discourse, which had affinities with the latitudinarianism of Catharine Trotter and others. The 
generalized religious virtue of David’s “True Christian Philosophy” elides the contentious 
disputes between High Church, Catholic, Low Church, and dissenting Christians which 
characterized the English Church in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. 
David’s role as a Christian hero interacts in complex ways with the novel’s larger 
sentimental and satiric project.545 Understanding David as Fielding’s attempt at articulating a 
sentimental yet overtly religious hero as a vehicle for her satire allows us to see more clearly 
how such two seemingly opposed discourses as sentiment and ironic satire fit together. Mapping, 
in a broad sense, simple Christian principles stripped of theological specificities and division 
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onto David allows Fielding’s moral didacticism to stand in starker relief. Indeed, Fielding’s 
satiric project of moral reform relies on David’s theologically minimalist benevolent nature. 
Although his childlike benevolence tempts readers to view him as almost irredeemably foolish, 
this would be a mistake.546 In both parts David’s naïveté (which even the narrator at times gently 
mocks) does indeed create trouble for him and his companions, even as it also creates the ironic 
distance necessary for readers to relate to his simple Christian goodwill. 
Fielding’s working relationship with her brother Henry in the early 1740s offers insights 
into the ideologies (religious and otherwise) that shaped David Simple.547 The two shared a close 
and complex literary association, and while Henry Fielding’s religious allegiances have been the 
subject of debate, it seems at least aspects of latitudinarian Anglican theology were influential to 
his thinking.548 Bree notes that Sarah is most likely the author of both Leonora’s letter in Joseph 
Andrews and Anna Boleyn’s narrative in A Journey From This World to the Next.549 For his part, 
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Henry provided a preface to and revised the second edition of David Simple.550 Several 
commentators have called attention to specific literary connections between the work of Sarah 
and her brother.551 Most important for my purposes is Gerard Barker’s claim that Henry 
“probably influenced his sister’s conception of [David Simple] … by means of his concept of 
good-nature.”552 As both Sarah’s contribution of Leonora’s letter to Henry’s novel and her later 
appropriation of his concept of good-nature demonstrate, the working relationship between the 
two seemed to center primarily on discourses of sentiment and feeling, not on satire. 
Since Henry’s ethic of good-nature and its foundations – at least in part – in latitudinarian 
Anglican ideology influenced David Simple, this ethic is worth examining at some length.553 As 
Barker notes, Henry’s verse essay “Of Good-Nature” is practically a description of David.554 His 
elaboration of his conception of good-nature in the Champion for Thursday, 27 March 1740 
paraphrases a line from Macbeth when he writes that good-nature “is (as Shakespear calls it) the 
Milk, or rather the Cream of Human Nature.” 555  It seems likely that Sarah had Henry’s 
conception of good-nature in mind when she also describes David as having “more of what 
                                                 
550 He also remarked in the Preface, “two or three Hints which arose in the reading of it, and 
some little Direction as to the Conduct of the second Volume [Books III and IV of David 
Simple], much the greater Part of which I never saw till Print, were all the Aid she received from 
me” (344).  For a discussion and analysis of Henry’s revisions and alterations to the second 
edition of David Simple, see Janine Barchas, “Sarah Fielding’s Dashing Style and Eighteenth-
Century Print Culture,” English Literary History 63, no. 3 (Fall 1996): 633-56. 
551 Richard Terry discusses Sarah’s debt to essays from Henry’s Miscellanies, especially his “Of 
the Remedy of Affliction for the Loss of our Friends” in his essay “David Simple and the Fallacy 
of Friendship,” Studies in English Literature 44, no. 3 (Summer 2004): 525-44. Yoshihiro 
Shiratori argues for the influence of David Simple on Henry’s The Journal of a Voyage to Lisbon 
in Shiratori, “The Journal of a Voyage to Lisbon: Henry Fielding’s Art of Tormenting,” Poetica: 
An International Journal of Linguistic-Literary Studies 67 (2007): 61. 
552 Barker, 70. 
553 For a thorough analysis of Henry’s conceptions of good-nature and its connections to 
latitudinarian discourse see Battestin, Moral Basis, and Miller Essays on Fielding’s Miscellanies. 
554 Barker, 70-1. 
555 Henry Fielding, Contributions to The Champion and Related Writings, ed. W. B. Coley 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), 255. 
 181
Shakespear calls the Milk of Human Kind, than any Man that ever was born.”556 However, Sarah 
carefully Christianized Henry’s ethic of good-nature for her own purposes. 
Henry himself specifically notes the importance of Christianity as an alloy to good-nature 
in the same essay: 
That as Good-nature, which is the chief, if not only Quality in the Mind of Man in the 
least tending that Way, doth not forbid the avenging an Injury, Christianity hath taught us 
something beyond what the Religion of Nature and Philosophy could arrive at; and 
consequently, that it is not as old as the Creation, nor is Revelation useless with regard to 
Morality, if it had been taught us no more than this excellent Doctrine, which if generally 
followed, would make Mankind much happier, as well as better, than they are.557 
On the question of revenge then (particularly relevant to David Simple) good-nature must be 
strengthened by Christianity, which is both constitutive of and a supplement to good-nature 
against the threat of deism, as the allusion to Matthew Tindal’s 1730 deist work Christianity as 
Old as the Creation makes clear. However, as his weak negative phrasings in this passage seem 
to indicate, Henry offers a rhetorically measured endorsement of Christian revelation. His 
conception of good-nature is far from a straightforwardly orthodox Christian concept. Indeed, in 
the same essay, his descriptions of God as “The best natur’d Being in the Universe” (likely 
drawn from Shaftesbury) and his claim that the more we “cultivate” good-nature, “the nearer we 
draw to Divine Perfection,” sound much closer to deism.558 Sarah modifies Henry’s more secular 
and deistic ethic of good-nature to make it explicitly Christian yet theologically unspecific in 
David Simple. 
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Although in some ways David’s temperament reflects Henry’s concept of good-nature, 
his character lacks a sense of judgment. In the same essay, Henry notes how important judgment 
is to true good-nature: “That as Good-nature requires a distinguishing Faculty, which is another 
Word for Judgment, and is perhaps the sole Boundary between Wisdom and Folly; it is 
impossible for a Fool, who hath no distinguishing Faculty, to be good-natured.”559 Sarah’s David 
seems to lack “a distinguishing Faculty” and he is prone to folly. David’s lack of judgment 
marks a further split from her more satirically inclined brother that also serves to highlight both 
the theologically unspecific Christian principles motivating her fiction and the role women play 
in propagating English Christianity. David’s lack of judgment allows greater reader identification 
with his simple non-doctrinal Christian principles partly because the worldly Cynthia covers up 
his foolishness and instructs David in the mercenary ways of English society. The educated and 
sophisticated Cynthia allows David’s simple Christian benevolence to flourish, suggesting that 
women can have a more rational understanding of Christianity than men. Unlike the naïve 
Christian heroism of Parson Adams, David rarely becomes a figure of mirth, meant to be mocked 
by the reader; rather, David’s lack of judgment (especially when he is supported by his friends) 
places him in situations in which his Christian benevolence can be un-reflexively exercised. 
Fielding uses, to an extent, Henry’s (Christian and secular) ethic of good-nature to emphasize 
David’s heroism, but crucially she is careful to recast Henry’s ethic of good-nature in explicitly 
Christian terms, an ethic itself constructed from a complex background of religious and secular 
discursive formations. 
The Christianity that David and his friends embody in The Adventures and Volume the 
Last primarily takes the form of good-natured benevolence, which is important for Fielding’s 
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satire. The novel avoids mentions of specific religious doctrine and ceremony and puts in its 
place a noncontroversial simple Christianity, thus steering clear of any theological or political 
controversy. For example, at the end of The Adventures, David spontaneously “proposed the 
going to Church” as a way to “thank his Creator, for giving him so much Happiness.”560 David 
attends church out of thankfulness for his circumstances that he and his friends see as a “Mark of 
divine Providence” and not out of any doctrinal or political obligations.561 By fashioning a broad 
Christianity that clearly leans toward latitudinarian ideology as the primary marker of the ideal 
way of orienting oneself to English society, and avoiding any politically charged religious 
pitfalls, Fielding uses David’s religion as a vehicle for her satire. The satiric function of the novel 
works in large part by contrasting David’s simple Christian ideology to the beliefs of various 
characters he meets who embody negatively figured, overtly irreligious philosophies: in various 
parts of the novel David and his friends meet an avowed atheist (really David’s debauched 
brother), a stoic rationalist, an irreligious fop, and other characters explicitly hostile to 
Christianity. Fielding’s primary way of demonstrating the corruption of English society is by 
embodying that corruption in characters who are enemies of a benevolent, latitudinarian-
inflected Christianity and who violate the bounds of good-nature. 
The behavior and beliefs of David’s brother Daniel offer the most extreme example of an 
ideology contrasted to his unreflexive Christianity. Early in the novel, Daniel is described as 
“one of those Wretches, whose only Happiness centers in themselves.”562 His duplicity with the 
family will and subsequent exposure as a liar provokes David’s quixotic quest “to travel through 
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the whole World, rather than not meet with a real Friend.”563 When Daniel shows up again in a 
stagecoach with Cynthia in the third book of The Adventures, he is known only as “The 
Atheist.”564 He “was as dirty as if he had sat up two or three Nights together” and “one Side of 
his Face was beat black and blue, by Falls he had had in his Drink, and Skirmishes he had met 
with.”565 Daniel’s type of debauched atheism (as opposed to a later, more philosophical unbelief) 
was a common theological straw man in the period. In his 1704 Boyle Lectures, A 
Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, the latitudinarian divine Samuel Clarke 
identified the causes of atheism as falling into only three categories: extreme ignorance, 
debauchery, or faulty “speculative reasoning.”566 Clarke’s text is primarily concerned with 
refuting the third type of atheism, associated with “Mr. Hobbes, Spinoza, and their followers,” 
but he devotes a paragraph early in the essay to describing degenerate atheists:567
Being totally debauched and corrupted in their practice, they have by a vicious and 
degenerate life corrupted the principles of their nature and defaced the reason of their 
own minds. And instead of fairly and impartially enquiring into the rules and obligations 
of nature and the reasons and fitness of things, [they] have accustomed themselves only 
to mock and scoff at religion and, being under the power of evil habits and the slavery of 
unreasonable and indulged lusts, are resolved not to harken to any reasoning which would 
oblige them to forsake their beloved vices.568
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Clarke’s account of atheism caused by degeneracy aptly describes Daniel, an unrepentant (until 
the end of the novel) criminal and drunk, whose only arguments against God are “the 
Unevenness of the Roads” and the headache that comes with a hangover.569  
Daniel’s irreligion is a consequence of his corrupted lifestyle, but the guise of an atheist 
is merely one of Daniel’s irreligious roles. Near the end of the novel, in a chapter entitled, “In 
which is related the Life of an Atheist,” Daniel recounts how, in order to swindle money, he also 
took on the role of first a religious con artist and then a deist.570 Like a corrupt televangelist 
today, Daniel “chiefly frequented old Women” and talked “very religiously” to collect money 
fraudulently.571 Unable to keep up the ruse because his “Propensity to all manner of Vice was so 
strong” he is unmasked, only then to remake himself as “a Moralist” who “cried down all 
Religion – calling it Superstition” and rails against the clergy.572 Daniel uses this guise to trick 
those “who were so glad to catch hold on any thing that they thought could give them any 
Reputation of Sense” out of their money.573 Again found out, he “began to curse the Author of 
my Being.”574 Daniel squanders what remains of his money in “Drink – and Debauchery” and 
becomes an atheist out of “the Fear of believing there was a Deity.”575 Daniel is the bogeyman of 
a century of quasi-strategic and quasi-paranoid attacks on various strains of “atheism.” David’s 
exemplary Christian role in the text is brought into greater relief because Daniel functions as a 
cipher for all manner of eighteenth-century irreligion: debauched atheism, deism, and anti-
clericalism. Daniel’s guises at the end of the novel demonstrate various accusations that could be 
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leveled at his brother like insincerity and hypocrisy. The text associates these with the obviously 
immoral and fraudulent Daniel and deflects these criticisms from David. Daniel also works to 
gloss over David’s noncommittal theology: by attacking atheism in its various guises, the novel 
subsumes theological dispute to a fight against a greater enemy. 
Daniel isn’t the only irreligious character David has dealings with in The Adventures. 
Before David meets his true friends Cynthia, Valentine and Camilla, he encounters several false 
ones, including Mr. Orgueil, whose very name means Pride. As critics have noted, Orgueil is a 
satiric representation of a Stoic rationalist. 576 Because Orgueil “did not rate Men at all by the 
Riches they possessed, but by their own Behaviour” David thinks he has finally “met with the 
Completion of his Wishes” and found a true friend.577 He observes Orgueil and “could not find 
he was guilty of any one Vice” and determines his only failing is “a too severe Condemnation” 
of other people’s actions.578 Orgueil expects everyone to “act up to the strictest Rules of Reason 
and Goodness.”579 Of course, David soon learns that Orgueil is not what he is looking for in a 
friend because of his lack of compassion. 
David first suspects Orgueil when he observes that he can tell a tragic tale with “dry Eyes 
and quite unmoved.”580 Orgueil states that he looks “upon Compassion, Sir, to be a very great 
Weakness; I have no Superstition to fright me into my Duty, but I do what I think just by all the 
World, for the real Love of Rectitude is the Motive of all my Actions.”581 This morality is strictly 
internal. Unlike David, whose good-nature implicitly comes from unreflexive Christianity, 
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Orgueil’s comes from egocentric rational contemplation, and he criticizes David’s form of 
compassion as self-interest. What is crucial about Orgueil’s function in David Simple is how 
Fielding explicitly describes him (and consequently his neo-Stoicism) as un-Christian. Orgueil 
claims he has no superstition to scare him into doing what is right and as Mr. Spatter, David’s 
next traveling companion, states, he “has made a God of himself” and (in a statement that recalls 
Shaftesbury), “thinks even Obedience to the Divine Will, would be but a mean Motive to his 
Actions.”582 David’s realization of Orgueil’s true nature (even though Mr. Spatter is a less than 
reliable narrator, as David himself acknowledges in Volume the Last) forces him to recast his 
search for a true friend in explicitly religious terms. When David decides to leave Orgueil and 
follow Spatter, he announces he is searching for “a Person who could be trusted, one who was 
capable of being a real Friend; whose every Action proceeded either from Obedience to the 
Divine Will, or from the Delight he took in doing good.”583 Orgueil’s type of unfeeling 
rationalism is at odds with the basic premises of an emerging ideology of sensibility which 
prioritizes affect and emotion. After his disappointments with Orgueil, David explicitly 
reformulates his search for a friend in latitudinarian terms; he seeks someone whose conduct 
aligns him or her with divine commands or who takes delight in doing good. His actions proceed 
from obedience to an ideal Christianity or embodied benevolence, and Fielding explicitly equates 
the two. 
By intentionally opposing David to neo-Stoic philosophy, Fielding again deflects 
potential criticism of her “True Christian Philosophy” as self-righteous and props up the 
benevolent, primitive Christianity of David as the proper antidote to the pride that is the hallmark 
– to her – of neo-Stoic rationalism. The contrast between the Stoic overemphasis on reason and 
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Christian morality was a central concern for divines and religious writers of the late seventeenth 
and early eighteenth centuries and Steele’s The Christian Hero is in large part an attack on neo-
Stoicism.584 Primitive Christianity often stood as a counterexample to the philosophy praised by 
the Stoics. For example, in a 1694 English translation of Malebranche, primitive Christian virtue 
is contrasted to pagan stoicism: “St. Paul and the Primitive Christians, had doubtless more 
Vertue than Cato and all the Stoicks.”585 Fielding fictionalizes this conflict between primitive 
Christianity and Stoicism, and as she does with Daniel’s various irreligious guises, sets David’s 
Christian heroism against competing strands of non and quasi-Christian moral and philosophical 
discourse. Attacking neo-Stoicism is a way for the novel again to elide theological disputes by 
attacking an external adversary. 
Orgeuil returns in Volume the Last, and Fielding also introduces his ridiculous wife as the 
primary antagonists in the sequel and explicitly irreligious foils for David and his small 
community, deflecting criticism that otherwise might be directed at David. Despite the novel’s 
comparisons of the hero to Job and grim preoccupation with suffering, David’s interactions with 
the irreligious Orgueil show him to be essentially the same benevolent hero he was in The 
Adventures. He again comes into conflict with Orgueil’s “Rule of Rectitude,” and in Volume the 
Last Orgueil’s principles cause real harm to David’s family.586 The malevolence shown by 
Orgueil and his wife stands in stark contrast to the principles of David’s Christian community. 
Orgueil’s frequent opinions of Christianity in Volume the Last are intended to be ironically 
dismissed by the reader. He “allowed St. Paul to be a very fine Writer” because he “had human 
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Learning before he became a Teacher of the Christian Doctrines.”587 He made the “Miracle of 
[Paul’s] conversion … the common Subject of his Ridicule.”588 Orgueil’s deistic insistence on 
denying miracles and Christian revelation mark him as hopelessly corrupt, and thus Mrs. 
Orgueil’s jealous and hypocritical condemnation of David “for his Pride” helps prevent his 
benevolence from appearing self-righteous. Just as she does in The Adventures, Fielding places 
David’s brand of Christian heroism in conflict with competing ethical philosophies to ensure that 
even his seeming folly is preferable to the alternatives.  
When David is attending Orgueil in his illness, the two have a long debate about religion. 
David attempts “to prove that human Wisdom can soar no higher than the Knowledge of our 
Dependance on God” while Orgueil “laboured hard to prove … the Justness of worshipping his 
Idol, human Reason.”589 Because Orgueil “admired Christ’s Sermon on the Mount, for the 
Beauty of its Morality … he thought himself a Christian,” an idea the narrator finds preposterous 
because “every Word he uttered” showed that “his every Notion of Religion was confined to 
Self-adoration.”590 Unable to convert David “to the Sect of Self-worshippers,” Orgueil “grew 
angry, and at different Times introduced the Words, an Enthusiast, a Methodist, a mad Man; and 
at last, as an unconquerable Argument, told him, that he held Principles which were fit for 
nothing but old Women.”591 As Brett C. McInelly demonstrates, enthusiasm, madness and 
Methodism were often equated in mid-eighteenth-century England.592 As I have discussed in 
previous chapters, a charge of enthusiasm in the eighteenth century could of course stand for all 
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manner of socially inappropriate or morally suspect conduct. One contemporary polemicist 
writes “if by an Enthusiast is meant a Deceiver … I do not know a worse Sort of Enthusiasm … 
than those Ministers who solemnly profess to be inwardly moved by the Holy Ghost.”593 
Another claims that Methodism “is a Composition of Enthusiasm, Superstition, and Imposture” 
and “it is most properly Enthusiasm; which is Religion run mad.”594 David could be vulnerable 
to such charges because of his non-doctrinal Christian benevolence and sometimes naïve 
behavior. Orgueil signals the “opprobrious Names” that could be heaped on sentimental 
benevolence in eighteenth-century England, but the novel dismisses these labels as nonsense 
because they come out of the mouth of a character satirically mocked as both foolish and 
irreligious.595 The consequence is that David’s brand of broad, benevolent good-natured 
Christianity is reinforced even in the midst of his sufferings. 
Besides Daniel and Orgueil, other characters David meets are also figured as explicitly 
irreligious. Mr. Spatter’s lack of true Christianity leads David to abandon him as well. While 
talking, Spatter and David end up on revenge.  Spatter claims: 
“I think there is nothing so pleasant as Revenge; I would pursue a Man who had injured 
me, to the very Brink of Life: I know it would be impossible for me ever to forgive him, 
and I would have him live, only that I might have the Pleasure of seeing him miserable.”  
David was amazed at this, and said, “Pray, Sir, consider, as you are a Christian, you 
cannot act in this manner.”  Spatter replied, “he was sorry it was against the Rules of 
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Christianity, but he could not help his Temper; he thought forgiving any body a very 
great Meanness, and he was sure it was what he could never bring himself to do.”596
This doctrine so disturbs David that “he could not sleep that Night,” and he departs the next day 
“without taking Leave or any Notice of him, in order to seek a new Lodging,” going so far as to 
call Spatter “a perfect Daemon.”597 Although Varnish’s later description of Spatter mitigates 
David’s revulsion, it is again evident in this passage that at the root of what David is searching 
for is someone like himself, someone who subordinates baser inclinations to a theologically 
unspecific Christian ethic. Spatter’s beliefs also highlight perhaps the most important element of 
David’s nature – revenge. The passivity inherent in his avoidance of those he finds unworthy or 
who do him harm is what marks him as morally exemplary in the novel. Earlier, when David is 
spurned in his affections by Nanny Johnson, a possible love interest, the narrator notes “as 
tenderness was always predominant” in David’s mind, “no Anger, nor even a just Cause of 
Hatred, could ever make him inveterate, or revengeful: It cost him very little to be a Christian in 
that Point.”598 David’s passive doctrine of quietly avoiding someone “whenever he found out 
any thing he thought despicable” is not a sign of weakness in his character, but of Fielding’s 
conception of embodied Christianity and its manifestation in David’s actions.599 “Desiring to do 
good,” says Cynthia, is a “true Christian Principle.”600
David’s episode with Nanny Johnson demonstrates Fielding’s larger moral project of 
linking feminism and Christianity in The Adventures. The scene underscores what true Christian 
principles are and how they should be held by women as well as men, not just the exemplary 
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hero, although David’s non-aggressive masculinity likewise encourages readers to relate to him 
as an exemplar regardless of their gender. David believes his quest is at an end when he meets 
Miss Johnson, the daughter of wealthy jeweler. While part of his attraction to her is clearly 
sexual, her virtuous behavior allures David even more; he watches “her very narrowly, to see, if 
her Mind was equal to her Person, which was indeed very agreeable.”601 He considers her 
behavior to be “in all respects engaging” and “her Duty to her Father, Complaisance and 
Affection to her Sister, and Humanity to the Servants” lead him to conclude that “his traveling 
was at an end.”602 Ironically, Miss Johnson’s duty to her father leads to the breakdown of 
David’s relationship with her because Mr. Johnson’s only motivation for finding his daughters 
matches is his own monetary gain. 
The falling out centers on religion, partly in the form of anti-Semitism. A “rich Jew,” 
visiting Mr. Johnson on business who “thought Women’s Souls were of no great Consequence,” 
becomes smitten with Nanny’s older sister.603 Of course religion becomes a stumbling block for 
the match, but this is quickly overcome by her father because, although the suitor “might object 
to her being a Christian,” she had always obeyed her father and “therefore he need not fear her 
conforming to whatever he pleased.”604 The sister is approached (and effectively forced to 
consent) with the thought of changing her religion to better her father’s financial situation: 
She was at first startled at the thoughts of changing her Religion; but as she had no more 
Understanding, than was just necessary to set off her own Charms, by knowing which 
Dress, and which Posture became her best; and had never been taught any thing more 
than to go to Church of a Sunday, when she was not wanted to stay at home to overlook 
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the Dinner, without knowing any other Reason for it than Custom: The rich Presents the 
Jew made her, and the Promises of keeping her great, soon overcame all her Scruples, 
and she consented to have him.605
Because of the unfit and superficial education given to women, the sister has never been taught 
anything but religion as a custom, resulting in her readiness to shrug off her Christianity for 
money.  This connection between education and religion is an important area where Fielding’s 
feminism and her religion intersect, a nexus stressed throughout both The Adventures and 
Volume the Last. When Cynthia mentions that she and Camilla were friends because of a shared 
love of reading and learning, her “Mother was frighten’d out of her Wits,” and thought they 
“should draw Circles - - - and turn Conjurers.”606 Cynthia’s mother has the mistaken belief that 
education is detrimental to religion and might even turn the girls to the occult. Likewise, in 
Volume the Last, Mrs. Dunster defends Cynthia’s methods of education to Mrs. Orgueil because 
she often reads “the Bible to the Children.”607 Christianity is a key component of Fielding’s 
feminist project. For Fielding, women require the right type of education, something she spends 
a great deal of time exploring in her novel The Cry, discussed below. 
Ironically, for the modern reader, the normative social reliance on Christian foundations 
creates many of the problems for the characters in David Simple. As Bree points out, legal 
principles derived in part from the Bible supported the lack of any kind of equality in marriage 
for women.608 Fielding, like Mary Astell, also recognizes the constraints placed on women by 
Christianity. In Miss Gibson’s letter to Bellario in Remarks, she writes, “as the Laws of God and 
Man have placed a Woman totally in the Power of her Husband, I believe it is utterly impossible 
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for any young Woman, who has any Reflection, not to form in her Mind some kind of Picture of 
the Sort of Man in whose Power she would chuse to place herself.”609 Miss Gibson notes, in a 
statement very reminiscent of Astell, that because of the difficulty in finding a man good enough 
to “submit without Reluctance” and because of the “Example daily before her of her Mother’s 
being tyrannized over,” Clarissa “thought a single Life, in all Probability, would be for her the 
happiest.”610 Fielding, like Astell, maintains that marriage to the wrong man is fatal because 
religion offers no escape for women; consequently, it is imperative that women either remain 
single or find a husband like either David or Valentine in David Simple, whose primary virtue is 
his kindness and friendship. Both Fielding and Astell were very cognizant of the injurious effects 
that an increasingly secularized, masculine society might have on women. In particular, in the 
novel following Volume the Last, Fielding critiques masculine polite society in a manner very 
similar to Astell. 
The Cry, Shaftesbury, and Secularization 
Sarah Fielding published The Cry: A New Dramatic Fable in 1754, one year after Volume 
the Last. If Fielding did indeed modify David Simple’s story in Volume the Last to take 
advantage of the changing tastes of the literary scene, she charted a radical new path for fiction 
in The Cry. The Cry, although not completely neglected in modern scholarship, has received less 
commentary than David Simple, and there is no modern edition of the text apart from a 1986 
facsimile reprint. This neglect may stem from the fact that the authorship of the text is in 
question and from its experimental nature. Although it is almost certain that Fielding co-wrote 
the work with her friend and companion, Jane Collier, the precise contribution of each to the 
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authorship of the text is unclear.611 Collier was the daughter of the neo-Platonic philosopher 
Arthur Collier and the author of the satirical The Art of Ingeniously Tormenting (1753). 
As the subtitle of The Cry: A New Dramatic Fable suggests, the text is highly 
experimental, “an innovative and wholly original prose work, a combination of allegory, 
philosophy … feminism, and social satire.”612 Although the structure of the text is original, the 
central plot (which is told in fits and starts) is relatively conventional. The sympathetic 
protagonist Portia becomes acquainted through her friend (and one of the two main antagonists) 
Melantha with the family of Nicanor, a widower with three children. Oliver (the other primary 
antagonist) is Nicanor’s eldest son and the twins Ferdinand and Cordelia are younger siblings. 
Upon meeting the family, Portia is rightly skeptical of Oliver, but befriends Cordelia and falls in 
love with Ferdinand. The reader is meant to trust the judgment of Portia, and her beliefs and 
practices are clearly those with which Fielding sympathized. Nicanor has wasted the family 
fortune on his mistress, Cylinda. Because of his profligacy, the family becomes dependent on 
Oliver, who takes a perverse pleasure in his family’s reliance on him. Ferdinand eventually sails 
to the West Indies and succeeds in becoming wealthy. Upon his return, Ferdinand’s behavior 
undergoes a markedly negative shift, and as a result, Portia refuses his offer of marriage. 
Ferdinand, prompted by a sudden sickness which befalls Portia, reveals that he altered his 
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behavior to test her, and the two marry and take in Cordelia and Nicanor, while Oliver and 
Melantha are left to an unhappy marriage. 
Several critics have commented that the central plot of The Cry acts as a commentary on 
Richardson’s Sir Charles Grandison. Bree notes that there are several moments where the work 
“threatens to subvert Richardson’s narrative of a loving young woman and an ideal son of a 
faulty father,” and Emily C. Friedman suggests that the text “can be understood as … 
functioning as ‘Remarks on Grandison.’”613 As with her Volume the Last, Fielding was 
obviously an astute reader of contemporary fiction, and her response to Richardson within the 
body of her fictional narrative demonstrates the intertextual nature of her work.614 Indeed, it is 
this intertextuality that is the is most interesting aspect of The Cry, and that highlights the quasi-
latitudinarian oriented didacticism that, like with David Simple, informs the text. 
Although the main plot is relatively straightforward, the structure is anything but. “The 
Cry” of the title refers to a chorus of characters who comment on the action and respond to 
Portia. The Cry spends the text mocking, deriding and shouting down Portia’s virtue and ideals. 
They are not a uniform voice, and at times throughout the text individual characters come 
forward or parts of the Cry disagree with each other. The readers of the work are encouraged to 
“bear” themselves “On the wings of Fancy” and imagine an “assembly” who have “an inveterate 
hatred to Truth and Simplicity, and which are possess’d also with a strong desire of supporting 
Affectation and Fallacy.”615 Portia is supported by the Spenserian Una, who acts as the voice of 
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truth in the text and is as different from the Cry as “truth from error.”616 Although several critics 
have noted the dramatic aspects of the novel (it is divided into scenes, for example) and the way 
the Cry often functions as a theater audience, the Cry also represents the negative aspects (to 
Fielding) of the masculine public sphere.617 Similarly, G.A. Starr observes that the Cry 
“personifies the polite world, represented as complacent and obtuse, but also as malicious and 
mercurial.”618 Fielding, in a manner that has affinities with Astell, critiques the masculine culture 
she sees around her by associating it with the malevolent Cry, and demonstrates that the Cry’s 
preferred method of criticism, raillery, is damaging and vacuous. As I discuss below, Fielding, 
like Astell, also critiques Shaftesbury’s philosophy along similar lines. With both her critiques of 
masculine culture and Shaftesbury, she upholds a theologically unspecific Christianity (notably 
held by the virtuous females in the novel) as the proper belief system in opposition to various 
irreligious philosophies promoted by the text’s antagonists. 
The collaborative effort between Fielding and Collier demonstrates how crucial 
intertextuality was to the creation of the novel. In her commonplace book Collier reveals the 
nature of her and Fielding’s collaboration using a sewing metaphor. The commonplace book 
reports that “Jenny is struck with the description Sally has given of her Plan, & hastens to 
Change, buys all the Silks, sorts them, and lays them in Sallys way” and “Sally begins weaving, 
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and a sweet flowerd brocade turns out.”619 Jenny then “makes the flowers all Joyn according to 
the Pattern designed by Sally.”620 Exactly what the “Silks” refers to is not completely clear, but 
it at least in part represents the large number of texts that Fielding and Collier drew on in the 
creation of The Cry. As Woodward observes, the works of the many authors cited in the novel 
“are the raw materials out of which The Cry was constructed.”621 Like both Catharine Trotter 
and Mary Astell, Fielding carefully defines her feminist Christianity against the irreligious 
philosophies promulgated by writers in masculine dominated polite society. The works of writers 
such as Shaftesbury and Epicurus function in The Cry in a similar way to Orgueil and his Stoic 
philosophy in David Simple: the philosophies these writers promote are placed in the mouth of a 
clear antagonist in the text (Cylinda), and thus are meant to be contrasted to the non-doctrinal 
Christianity promoted by the sympathetic and virtuous Portia. 
Although Portia is obviously the moral center, the most dynamic character in the novel is 
Cylinda. J. Paul Hunter describes her as “By far the most interesting character in the novel, and 
arguably the most sympathetic.”622 Cylinda, the mistress of Nicanor, who indirectly ends up 
creating most of the financial difficulties that motivate the plot, narrates her movement between 
Stoicism, Skepticism, Platonism, Shaftesburianism, and ultimately Christianity. Cylinda relates 
that although she had “learn’t to read … out of the Bible,” because “all [her] conversation which 
by [her] father’s acquaintance fell chiefly amongst men of learning, and great literature, [she] 
had never heard the sacred writings mentioned with half the reverence which was paid to the 
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heathen authors.”623 She “looked on christianity as well as every other religion, only as a piece 
of policy invented to keep the ignorant vulgar in awe” and she was prouder “in remembering a 
verse of Homer, Virgil, or Horace, or a sentiment in Plato than in knowing the whole doctrine of 
the old and new testament.”624 Cylinda’s philosophical wrongheadedness ultimately rests on her 
classical education and the privileging of “heathen” writers over Christianity by “men of 
learning.” Both the voices of the Cry and these “men of learning” denigrate the “True Christian 
Philosophy” that motivates Fielding’s feminism. Although critics have noted Fielding’s use of 
“Addisonian characters,” her revisiting in The Cry of the idea that Christianity is superior to 
“heathen” philosophy suggests, just as in David Simple, that the Low Church Anglicanism 
promoted in texts such as Steele’s The Christian Hero was a crucial influence on her fiction.625 
Timothy Dykstal argues that Fielding endorses active and lived experience above philosophical 
learning, writing that Fielding “means that philosophy is meant to be practiced, not just recited” 
and that “[t]he moral of Cylinda’s story is that neither women nor men can gain wisdom by a 
cut-rate survey of philosophical schools.”626 Dykstal and other critics have also noted the 
importance of Christianity as opposed to classical philosophy in the novel.627 However, it is not 
simply “Christianity” that informs Fielding’s novels, but is instead a latitudinarian Christianity 
that emphasizes practical virtue. Fielding certainly emphasizes lived Christianity above passive, 
book-learned philosophy, but Cylinda’s repeated failures with various philosophical schools and 
her failure to internalize Christian truths by merely reading the Bible demonstrate Fielding’s 
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endorsement of a doctrinally minimal yet actively lived Christianity derived in part from 
latitudinarian Whig writers like Steele.  
Ellen Gardiner persuasively argues that Portia acts as a type of Christ figure in the novel, 
but also maintains that “Collier’s and Fielding’s use of the Bible as the authoritative text which 
empowers Portia and themselves to be literary and social critics may be the most subversive of 
all the strategies they use in their narrative,” and that “until this point, the Bible had been a 
favored tool for teaching women to be properly submissive to authority.”628 Yet, as we have 
seen, Fielding inherits a tradition that writers such as Mary Astell and Catharine Trotter 
inaugurated several decades earlier. Indeed, although Astell and Fielding promote different 
conceptions of Christianity, the thread they share is an attempt to rescue Christianity for women 
from what they see as irreligious masculine intrusion. They both maintain that the secularization 
arising from a growing skepticism and an emphasis on classical culture being advanced by 
masculine polite society have deleterious effects on women. This critique of secularization is 
most clearly seen in Fielding’s criticisms of Shaftesbury in The Cry. 
In the character of Cylinda, Fielding narrates the fears expressed by Astell in Bart’lemy 
Fair about the injurious effects of Shaftesbury’s desacralization of Christian revelation on both 
English society and women. She also uses Cylinda to demonstrate that while the Christianity 
upheld by her fiction is doctrinally minimal, it is not secularized religion stripped of revelation. 
Although Cylinda did attend church as a youth, she “sagaciously separated every word that was 
peculiar to the christian doctrine, from those which treated of the beauties of morality,” leaving 
the former to “the mob” and herself “concerned only in the latter.”629 Cylinda, like Shaftesbury, 
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divorces morality from revealed religion. These irreligious leanings are further supported by her 
“admiration” for Shaftesbury, which “originally arose from the common conversation [she] 
heard at table from [her] father and his companions.”630 Cylinda’s “father was a learned and 
generally esteemed a very wise man” because of the “approbation” he received “from the whole 
body of moral philosophers.”631 He educated Cylinda “as if [she] had been a boy”: she learnt 
Latin and Greek and spent her time “reading the most admired authors.”632 Because her father 
taught her “about the nature of mankind and natural religion: from which [she] collected no more 
than … That ‘twas very right to do right, and very wrong to do wrong” she “worships” her “own 
understanding,” forming “an implicit faith in the infallibility of this [her] new-formed deity.”633 
For Fielding, Cylinda is emblematic of an essentially false brand of feminism predicated on 
secular reason – without a grounding in Christianity her morality is self-centered and relativistic. 
Cylinda’s faith in her own understanding immediately makes her susceptible to the flattery of her 
cousin Phaon, who cajoles her by praising her intelligence and arguing “that women of 
uncommon understanding, and a superiority of parts, ought not to be tied in fetters by the rules of 
honour or forms of established custom” which are “fit to be imposed only on the vulgar and 
illiterate.”634 Because of Phaon’s flattery, Cylinda is “commanded by the divinity [she] 
worshipped, to assist [her] imagination in inflaming [her] passions.”635 Crucially, Cylinda’s 
desire is motivated by her un-Christian, self-interested philosophy. Fielding articulates the threat 
to women of a masculine education unmoored from Christianity. Cylinda’s irreligion, derived 
from a predatory masculine culture, results immediately in a threat to her virtue: She was 
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“pleased” to discover “the folly of those people, who would imagine that nature, or the God of 
nature (for [she] always considered them as synonymous terms) would give laws to restrain those 
passions which were … natural to us.”636 Her equation of God with nature suggests the deism 
that underlies her philosophy, and its result is no check on her behavior, leaving her open to the 
seduction by her cousin, which is only thwarted by his untimely death abroad. 
Cylinda’s irreligious upbringing leaves her open to Shaftesbury’s influence. Remarkably, 
Fielding fictionally represents the negative effects of Shaftesbury’s philosophy that Astell 
highlighted in Bart’lemy Fair, especially his test of ridicule.637 Cylinda narrates “that the making 
RIDICULE the TEST OF TRUTH was most perfectly agreeable to [her] inclinations.”638 Even 
more dangerous for Cylinda is her reading of Shaftesbury’s Letter that denies Christian 
revelation, exactly as Astell had warned: “That pleasant fancy of a grave bishop’s believing in 
fairies, with the words tradition and revelation being jumbled in so very near to that story, had 
the effect designed, and easily convinced me that all belief in revelation or tradition had in it 
something very ridiculous.”639 Cylinda’s narration of her Shaftesburian corruption echoes 
Astell’s complaint of Shaftesbury’s Letter that he “has made several horrible Jumbles, which are 
                                                 
636 Fielding, The Cry, 2:268. 
637 Fielding’s extended critique of Shaftesbury in the middle of her novel has surprised readers. 
In the eighteenth century, Hester Thrale Piozzi speculated that Arthur Collier had written it. See 
Fielding, Correspondence, 136n10. Starr argues that “Fielding’s critique of ridicule may have 
been part of a pro-Anglican, anti-Shaftesburian program of the Ralph Allen circle” in Starr, 
“From Socrates,” 123n30. Allen was Henry Fielding’s friend and patron, and also was friends 
with Sarah Fielding. It is notable, however, that Henry Fielding was less antagonistic toward 
Shaftesbury than Sarah. See, for example, the mention of Shaftesbury in Henry’s The Champion, 
discussed above. 
638 Fielding, The Cry, 2:276-77. 
639 Fielding, The Cry, 2:277. 
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not less Silly, than they are Profane.”640 The ultimate effect of Shaftesbury’s philosophy on 
Cylinda is that it “equaled [her] with the deity” and as a result, she claims “that the deity was to 
submit to my censures” and this made her “superior to the supreme being.”641 Because of his 
philosophy, Cylinda drew the “conclusion, that religion itself was all policy and priestcraft, fit 
only to awe the vulgar and illiterate.”642 She thus articulates exactly what Astell argues will 
happen because of Shaftesbury’s work. Although Cylinda ultimately abandons his philosophy, 
she does so only for selfish reasons, because she realizes that “Shaftesbury’s owning that the 
narrow-sightedness of us mortals” contradicts her idea that she “was sovereign judge of all 
things.”643  
Cylinda then moves on to other irreligious philosophies, although they are presented in 
less detail than Shaftesbury’s. Portia is given the last word, claiming that “Of all the inventions 
in which mankind have delighted, this favourite of making ridicule the test of truth, stands 
foremost in the rank for doing mischief.”644 Portia, the sympathetic voice in the text, explicitly 
rejects Shaftesbury’s ridicule test of truth on the same grounds that Astell did over 40 years 
earlier. In contrast to Cylinda’s upbringing, Portia says that although she read “the most admired 
ancient authors, the greatest care was taken to shut out from [her] bosom philosophic pride” and 
her “home was to be the christian faith into which [she] was baptized” and her “trust was to be 
placed in the revelation of God.”645 Ultimately, Cylinda realizes the error of her ways, and at the 
end of the novel, embraces the doctrinally minimal Christianity espoused by both Portia and 
                                                 
640 Mary Astell, An Enquiry After Wit: Wherein the Trifling Arguing and Impious Raillery Of the 
Late Earl of Shaftesbury, In his Letter concerning Enthusiasm, and other Profane Writers, Are 
fully Answer’d and justly Exposed, 2nd ed. (London, 1722), 174. 
641 Fielding, The Cry, 2:283. 
642 Fielding, The Cry, 2:284. 
643 Fielding, The Cry, 2:294. 
644 Fielding, The Cry, 2:296. 
645 Fielding, The Cry, 3:113. 
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Una: “Una received Cylinda with a benignity peculiar to her nature, and smiled with pleasure on 
her new-made convert; telling her also, that if her penitence was real, and her heart truly 
reclaim’d, that she should not want encouragement to persevere in the road to virtue, and 
consequently to lasting happiness.”646 Cylinda’s redemption demonstrates to the reader that her 
lasciviousness and corruption were not a consequence of her feminine susceptibility, but were 
rather due to the fact that she was brought up with a neo-classical masculine education that 
neglected proper Christian virtue and thereby exposed her to the damaging effects of 
Shaftesbury’s philosophy. 
Fielding dramatizes the similar anxiety both Astell and Trotter had that the growing 
societal emphasis on moral philosophers like Shaftesbury at the expense of simpler Protestant 
virtue will have damaging effects on women. For Fielding, secular moral philosophy divorced 
from revealed Christianity leads directly to the vulnerability of women who can be seduced both 
intellectually and sexually by men who flatter their intelligence. The secularization brought upon 
by Shaftesbury’s emphasis on benevolent sociability at the expense of religious belief does not 
result in the protection of women’s interests according to Fielding; rather, it is, as with Astell, the 
Bible that ultimately provides the greatest support to English women. The protagonists of both 
David Simple and The Cry ultimately rely on an unmediated and doctrinally minimal Christianity 
as a support against an increasingly secularized and corrupt English culture. 
                                                 
646 Fielding, The Cry, 3:292. 
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